Synthetic Ethical Naturalism by Rubin, Michael
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Open Access Dissertations
2-2009
Synthetic Ethical Naturalism
Michael Rubin
University of Massachusetts Amherst, rubin.375@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rubin, Michael, "Synthetic Ethical Naturalism" (2009). Open Access Dissertations. 24.
https://doi.org/10.7275/qhda-m972 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/24
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SYNTHETIC ETHICAL NATURALISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented 
 
by 
 
MICHAEL RUBIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
February 2009 
 
Philosophy 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Michael Rubin 2009 
All Rights Reserved
  
 
 
SYNTHETIC ETHICAL NATURALISM 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented 
by 
MICHAEL RUBIN 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
Fred Feldman, Chair 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
Phillip Bricker, Member 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
Hilary Kornblith, Member 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
Christopher Potts, Member 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 Phillip Bricker, Department Head 
 Philosophy 
 DEDICATION 
 
To my family: Linda, Michelle and Neil Rubin
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 In writing this dissertation, I have incurred a number of debts, not all of which are 
financial.  My greatest debt is to my dissertation director Fred Feldman.  I am also 
grateful to Hilary Kornblith, Jason Raibley, Lynne Rudder Baker, Jake Bridge, Phil 
Bricker, Vere Chappell, Sam Cowling, Dan Doviak, Chris Heathwood, Kristen Hine, 
Justin Klocksiem, Uri Leibowitz, Helen Majewski, Kris McDaniel, Kirk Michaelian, 
Andrew Platt, Chris Potts, Alex Sarch, Kelly Trogdon, and Brandt Van der Gaast. 
Material from chapters one and two appear in “Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin 
Earth,” Philosophical Studies (2008) 139: 307-327.  I thank Springer for permission to 
reprint that material here.  Chapter five is published as “Is Goodness a Homeostatic 
Property Cluster?” (2008) Ethics 118: 496-528.  I thank the University of Chicago Press for 
permission to reprint that material here.  I am grateful to anonymous referees from both 
journals for helpful comments. 
 
 
 
vi 
ABSTRACT 
SYNTHETIC ETHICAL NATURALISM 
FEBRUARY 2009 
MICHAEL RUBIN, B.A., BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
M.A., NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman 
 
This dissertation is a critique of synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN).   SEN is a 
view in metaethics that comprises three key theses: first, there are moral properties and 
facts that are independent of the beliefs and attitudes of moral appraisers (moral realism); 
second, moral properties and facts are identical to (or constituted only by) natural 
properties and facts (ethical naturalism); and third, sentences used to assert identity or 
constitution relations between moral and natural properties are expressions of synthetic, a 
posteriori necessities.  The last of these theses, which distinguishes SEN from other 
forms of ethical naturalism, is supported by a fourth: the semantic contents of the central 
moral predicates such as ‘morally right’ and ‘morally good’ are fixed in part by features 
external to the minds of speakers (moral semantic externalism).  
 Chapter 1 introduces SEN and discusses the most common motivations for 
accepting it.  The next three chapters discuss the influential “Moral Twin Earth” 
argument against moral semantic externalism.  In Chapter 2, I defend this argument from 
the charge that the thought experiment upon which it depends is defective.  In Chapters 3 
and 4, I consider two attempts to amend SEN so as to render it immune to the Moral 
vii 
Twin Earth argument.  I show that each of these proposed amendments amounts to an 
abandonment of SEN. 
 Chapter Five explores Richard Boyd’s proposal that moral goodness is a 
“homeostatic property cluster.”  If true, Boyd’s hypothesis could be used to support 
several metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic claims made on behalf of SEN.  I 
advance three arguments against this account of moral goodness.  
 In the sixth chapter, I argue that moral facts are not needed in the best a posteriori 
explanations of our moral beliefs and moral sensibility.  Because of this, those who 
accept a metaphysical naturalism ought to deny the existence of such facts or else accept 
skepticism about moral knowledge.  In Chapter 7, I consider a counterargument on behalf 
of SEN to the effect that moral facts are needed in order to explain the predictive success 
of our best moral theories.  I show that this argument fails. 
viii 
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CHAPTER 1 
MORAL REALISM, ETHICAL NATURALISM, AND THE 
NECESSARY A POSTERIORI 
1. Chapter. 
1.1. Introduction. 
Synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN) is a theory in metaethics according to which: (1) there 
are stance-independent moral properties and facts; (2) these properties and facts are 
identical to—or otherwise constituted only by—natural properties and facts; and (3) 
sentences used to assert identity or constitution relations between moral and natural 
properties and facts express synthetic a posteriori necessities.  The goal of the present 
chapter is to explain more clearly what these three theses amount to and to present the 
central considerations that make SEN a prima facie attractive metaethical view.  In 
sketching the commitments of SEN, I will be deferring primarily to the work of three of 
its early proponents: Richard Boyd, David Brink, and Nicholas Sturgeon.1  In the 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation I will argue that we should reject SEN. 
 It may be worthwhile to take a moment to get clear about the goals of metaethical 
inquiry.  I find that the best way to do this is by contrasting metaethics with what is 
sometimes called first-order ethics or normative ethics.  It is difficult to give a general 
                                                
1 A fourth that deserves mention is Peter Railton.  Although others seem to view Railton as holding the 
same sort of view as the trio just mentioned, his metaethical outlook is different enough to warrant 
hesitation about lumping him in with this group.  Most importantly, Railton—unlike Boyd, Brink, and 
Sturgeon—expresses ambivalence as to whether moral realism really requires that moral facts be stance-
independent (see his 1995 and 1996; for a characterization of stance-independence, see §1.2.1 below).  On 
top of this, he seems favorably disposed towards an ideal observer kind of metaethical theory.  (This is 
most explicit in his 1996.)  Because ideal observer theories render moral facts stance-dependent, to the 
extent that Railton accepts such a view he should not be counted as a moral realist.  At any rate, he does not 
appear to be a realist in the same robust sense in which Boyd, Brink, and Sturgeon are.  In spite of all this, 
Railton’s credentials as a metaphysical naturalist are impeccable and I will appeal to his work when 
explaining the ontological commitments of ethical naturalism. 
2 
description of first-order ethical claims without begging any questions against a particular 
metaethical view.2  It is best to proceed, then, by way of example.  The following 
sentences express first-order ethical claims: ‘Ann is morally obligated to fulfill her 
promise to Ben’; ‘It is good that Carl is happy’; ‘Dana is a virtuous person.’  While these 
examples are all expressions of particular moral judgments, first-order ethics includes 
claims of a more general kind, such as ‘lying is morally wrong’ and ‘pleasure is better 
than pain.’  In addition, the subject matter of first-order normative ethics includes general 
moral theories.  Among these are theories in the normative ethics of behavior, which are 
intended to tell us what makes a morally right action morally right; theories in axiology, 
which are intended to tell us what makes one life, state of affairs, or possible world non-
instrumentally better than another; and theories in virtue ethics, which are intended to tell 
us which traits of character make an agent virtuous.   
 It will be useful to have before us some sample first-order ethical theories to refer 
to.  Here are two historically important theories in the normative ethics of behavior: 
AUh: Necessarily, for any act-token, x, x is morally right iff x maximizes hedonic 
utility (i.e., the balance of pleasure over pain). 
 
CI-2:  Necessarily, for any act-token, x, x is morally right iff the agent of x, by 
performing x, treats no person as a mere means. 
 
AUh represents a hedonistic form of act-utilitarianism.  CI-2 is a restatement of the 
second formulation of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative.  It should be noted that 
both AUh and CI-2 are more than just theories about what makes a morally right action 
right; each expresses a standard of morally right action that one may accept or reject.  
                                                
2 If I were to set aside concerns about maintaining metaethical neutrality, I would describe first-order ethics 
in this way: a first-order ethical claim ascribes a normative, evaluative, or moral property, such as moral 
wrongness, goodness, or virtuousness to an action (or kind of action), state of affairs, or character trait etc.  
The trouble with this characterization is it precludes a classical non-cognitivist account of moral judgments. 
3 
That is to say, each theory doubles as a possible moral code that agents or social groups 
could adopt to regulate their behavior.3 
 Metaethical theories are theories about first-order ethical claims.  Metaethical 
inquiry includes (but is not limited to) questions concerning the semantic, metaphysical 
and epistemological commitments of first-order ethical thought and discourse.  Among 
the semantic questions posed by metaethical inquiry are these:  Do moral utterances and 
sentences express truth-apt propositions?  If they do, what is the meaning or semantic 
content of moral predicates?  If the primary function of moral utterances is not to express 
propositions, do they have some other important function?  The core metaphysical 
questions addressed by metaethical inquiry include (i) the question of whether there are 
moral facts or true moral propositions, (ii) the question of whether moral properties and 
facts are natural, supernatural, or non-natural, and (iii) the question of whether such facts 
are “objective” or “stance-independent.”  Epistemological questions asked by 
metaethicists include these:  Do we have any moral knowledge (or, at any rate, 
epistemically justified moral beliefs)?  If we do, are moral truths discoverable a priori, or 
only a posteriori?  Are our moral beliefs justified by their being inferable from 
foundational or epistemically basic propositions, or are they justified in virtue of their 
mutual coherence with the rest of our beliefs? 
 
                                                
3 I hesitate to say that this will be true of all moral theories.  It might be argued that a bare divine command 
theory in the normative ethics of behavior—a theory according to which an act is morally right just in case 
it is permitted by God’s commands—does not, by itself, constitute a moral code, since, without a further 
description of God’s commands, it cannot be used by agents in any meaningful way to regulate their 
conduct.  It is not important for my purposes that I take a stand on this matter.  It will suffice that some 
theories in the normative ethics of behavior, including AUh and CI-2, double as standards of conduct.  My 
purpose in bringing this double nature of moral theories to the reader’s attention is to warn that I will 
sometimes speak of AUh and CI-2 as theories of right action and at other times speak of them as standards 
of conduct or moral codes. 
4 
1.2. Moral Realism. 
1.2.1. Moral Realism and Moral Constructivism.   
SEN, as I understand it, is both a form moral cognitivism and a form of moral realism.  
Moral cognitivists take sentences of the form, ‘φ is morally right,’ to express 
propositions.  Such propositions involve the ascription of a property (viz., moral 
rightness4) to act-tokens and are truth-evaluable in a straightforward way.  By contrast, 
according to traditional versions of non-cognitivism, the primary function of moral 
sentences and utterances is to express prescriptions or attitudes, rather than truth-
evaluable propositions.5                   
 Moral realism is the view that (1) there are moral properties and facts and (2) 
these properties and facts are “stance-independent.”6,7  The first clause distinguishes 
moral realism from moral nihilism.  The second clause, which we may call ‘the stance-
independence clause,’ distinguishes moral realism from moral constructivism.  The most 
clear and concise characterization of the stance-independence clause that I know of 
belongs to Russ Shafer-Landau.  By his characterization, stance-independence requires 
                                                
4 Throughout this dissertation I italicize terms that refer to properties (e.g. redness, roundness and 
rightness).  I do not italicize the names of properties when these names are mentioned and not used; in such 
cases, those terms refer to linguistic items rather than to properties.   Finally, I do not italicize terms 
referring to property instances or tropes (e.g., the redness of Ann’s shirt).  In Chapter 5, which deals more 
directly with natural kinds, I add a convention of using small capital letters for names of kinds (such as 
GOLD, THE TIGER, and BACHELORS).  Although the metaphysics of kinds is controversial, it may help the 
reader to know that I tend to think of kinds as a distinct sort of entity from their corresponding properties.  
As I see it, the property of being a tiger stands in the same relation to the kind THE TIGER that the property 
being Socrates stands to the man Socrates. 
5 This is a very simplified description of non-cognitivism.  Although a non-cognitivist must hold that the 
primary function of moral sentences (e.g. ‘φ is morally right’) is to express an attitude or to issue a 
prescription, some non-cognitivists allow that moral sentences may have a secondary, descriptive function.  
(See, for example, Hare 1952: ch. 7).  Furthermore, contemporary non-cognitivists have appealed to 
minimalist theories of truth in order to justify the predication of truth to moral sentences (see Blackburn 
1998: 75-83). 
6 The term ‘stance-independence’ was introduced by Russ Shafer-Landau (2003: 15) who credits Ron Milo. 
7   Sturgeon and Boyd, but not Brink, add a third, epistemological component to their statements of moral 
realism: “…our ordinary methods of arriving at moral judgments provide us with at least some approximate 
knowledge of moral truths” (Sturgeon, 1986b: 117; cf. Boyd 1988: 182). 
5 
that “the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their 
ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (2003: 15).8,9  
Thus, a relativist metaethical view according to which an action’s being morally right 
consists in its being permitted by the moral code that is accepted by the members of the 
agent’s society fails to render moral facts stance-independent, and therefore, should be 
construed as a form of moral constructivism, rather than a form moral realism.  Note that 
the same holds for ideal observer views of the kind proposed by Roderick Firth (1952).  
According to a view of this sort, an action’s being morally wrong consists in the fact that 
it violates the moral code that would be endorsed every observer in suitably idealized 
epistemic conditions.  If it should turn out that all ideal observers would endorse the same 
moral code, then the ideal observer view would vindicate ethical absolutism.  Even so, it 
would not be a genuinely realist metaethical position since the moral standard that fixes 
the moral facts is made true by the fact that ideal observers would endorse or ratify it.   
 It is worth mentioning here a third form of moral constructivism according to 
which the truth of a moral theory T simply consists in the fact that T is the moral theory 
that we would believe or accept, were our beliefs to achieve a state of reflective 
equilibrium or maximal coherence.10,11  What is noteworthy about this form of 
constructivism is that it incorporates the same coherentist moral epistemology that is 
accepted by all SEN proponents (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989: Ch. 5; Sturgeon 2002).  For the 
moral realist, however, coherence reasoning is seen as a procedure for discovering the 
                                                
8 Italicized in the original. 
9 Boyd, Brink, and Sturgeon all include a stance-independence clause in their own formulations of moral 
realism (Boyd 1988: 182; Brink 1989: 17; 2001: 154; Sturgeon 1986b: 117). 
10 John Rawls defends a form of constructivism along these lines in his (1980).  However, because he is 
reluctant to ascribe truth to substantive moral theories, he might not accept this particular formulation.  
11 For an account of the method of reflective equilibrium in moral theorizing, see Rawls (1971/1999: 40-46) 
and Daniels (1979). 
6 
moral facts.  Among other things, the realist takes it to be a logical possibility that the 
moral theory that we would accept in reflective equilibrium (and, so, are justified in 
believing) is nevertheless false.12  The moral constructivist, by contrast, views the 
procedure of coherence reasoning as by itself settling what the moral facts are;13 the 
theory that we would accept in reflective equilibrium is by that very fact the true theory. 
 
1.2.2. The presumptive case for moral realism.   
It is has been claimed that the conjunction of moral cognitivism and moral realism 
accords with commonsense ethical thought better than its metaethical rivals do.  This is 
taken as grounds for thinking of cognitivist moral realism as the default metaethical 
position: the burden of argument is on opponents of cognitivism and moral realism to 
show that these views fail or that rival metaethical views are superior (Brink 1989: ch. 2).  
I think this is right.  I want to briefly outline the main considerations that support the 
claim that cognitivism and moral realism best accord with commonsense ethical thought.   
 At least four considerations serve as prima facie evidence favoring moral 
cognitivism over non-cognitivism.14  First, the surface grammar of moral sentences (and 
utterances) is declarative.  This suggests that the primary use of moral sentences is to 
express propositions.  Second, speakers of our language often ascribe truth and falsity to 
moral sentences.  By the most natural way of understanding what it is for a sentence to be 
true, a sentence is true just in case it expresses a proposition that is true.  Thus, the 
                                                
12 This characteristic of moral realism—that it allows for the possibility that the theory we would accept 
under ideal epistemic conditions is false—is stressed by Brink (1989: 31-36).  Compare this with Putnam’s 
characterization of metaphysical (rather than moral) realism as “radically non-epistemic” in the sense that 
“the theory that is ‘ideal’ from the point of view of operational utility, inner beauty and elegance, 
‘plausibility’, simplicity, ‘conservatism’, etc., might be false” (Putnam 1977: 485). 
13 Or, to be more precise, the constructivist views the would-be results of coherence reasoning as settling by 
itself what the supervenience bases of moral properties are. 
14 In this paragraph, I draw on Brink (1999: 196-199) and Shafer-Landau (2003: 23f). 
7 
practice of ascribing truth or falsity to moral sentences suggests that commonsense 
thought takes such sentences to express propositions, as cognitivists claim.  Third, moral 
sentences can appear in unasserted contexts; for instance, they can be embedded in the 
antecedent of a conditional statement.  In such contexts it is not plausible to claim that the 
embedded moral sentence functions to express a prescription or attitude: the person who 
sincerely utters ‘if abortion is wrong, then emergency contraception is wrong as well,’ for 
example, does not thereby express an attitude of disapproval towards acts of abortion.  
Standard non-cognitivist views according to which moral utterances express the speaker’s 
attitudes have trouble accounting for this feature of moral discourse (Geach 1960; 1965).  
Cognitivism, by contrast, has no trouble accounting for it.  Fourth, moral sentences 
appear as premises in seemingly valid deductive arguments.  If moral sentences express 
propositions, then there is no trouble in seeing how to accommodate the validity of such 
arguments.  If moral sentences express attitudes, however, then things are more difficult; 
unless we are willing reject the validity of moral arguments as a mere appearance, a logic 
of attitudes needs to be constructed (Geach ibid.).  Since attempts to construct a logic of 
attitudes have proven to be controversial, this consideration prima facie favors moral 
cognitivism, which can account for logical relations between moral statements using the 
widely accepted resources of propositional logic.15 
 Commonsense moral thought, then, seems to favor moral cognitivism.  What 
about moral realism?  It should be uncontroversial, assuming cognitivism, that the default 
commonsense view is that there are moral facts.  Since virtually everyone makes moral 
claims, it stands to reason that it is part of commonsense moral thinking that some of 
                                                
15 For a look at attempts to articulate a logic of attitudes, see Blackburn (1984; 1998) and Gibbard (1990; 
2003). 
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those claims are true.  Of course, it might be that speakers use moral discourse in order to 
describe a useful fiction, as some moral fictionalists have claimed.  But even proponents 
of such a view admit that moral fictionalism does not capture moral discourse as 
laypersons actually use it, but rather describes a way in which we might continue to use 
moral discourse after we have come to accept (on the basis of philosophical argument) 
that all affirmative first-order moral claims are literally false (Joyce 2001: 185f; Nolan et 
al. 2005: 309). 
 If moral realism is to be credited as the default metaethical position of 
commonsense, it is not enough that moral discourse contains an implicit commitment to 
moral facts; it must also include a commitment to the stance-independence of such facts.  
Here, I think matters are more difficult.  My own pre-theoretical intuitions support moral 
realism on this score: when I am struck by a moral intuition, I normally experience it as 
an appearance of a fact that obtains independent of what any appraiser (real or imagined) 
may happen to think.  Others, however, report a different experience of moral value and 
obligation.  Gilbert Harman writes, 
I have always been a moral relativist.  As far back as I can remember thinking 
about it, it has seemed obvious to me that the dictates of morality arise from some 
sort of convention or understanding among people, that different people arrive at 
different understandings, and that there are no basic moral demands that apply to 
everyone.  For many years, this seemed so obvious to me that I assumed it was 
everyone’s instinctive view, at least everyone who gave the matter any thought in 
“this day and age” (1985: 27). 
 
Harman and others (e.g. Nichols 2004: 169f; Stich and Weinberg 2001: 641) also note 
that a significant number of college undergraduates profess their acceptance of moral 
relativism.  Because standard versions of moral relativism take the moral rightness of 
actions to depend upon the attitudes of people belonging to certain social groups, such 
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views violate moral realism’s stance-independence clause.  Consequently, unless we have 
reason to think that Harman and relativist college students are atypical, we might lack 
justification for taking moral realism to be the default metaethical position of 
commonsense. 
 Fortunately for those who assert realism to be the metaethics of commonsense, 
there are studies that purport to show that children regard the moral wrongness of certain 
actions as independent of human conventions and responses (see Nichols 2004: 167-177).  
These findings suggest that laypersons espousing moral relativism do so as a matter of 
their moral education—rather than on the basis of unvarnished moral appearances.  While 
these studies and their conclusions could be contested, I am inclined to grant that 
commonsense moral theory includes a claim to the stance-independence of moral facts.  
In any case, since my goal in this dissertation is to argue that SEN’s brand of moral 
realism should be rejected, I see no harm in granting that moral realism enjoys a default 
status in metaethics while the burden of argument rests on its opponents. 
 
1.3. Naturalism: Metaphysical and Ethical. 
1.3.1. Ethical naturalism.   
It is easy enough to say what ethical naturalism is: it is the view that moral, normative, 
and evaluative properties and facts are identical with, or else constituted only by, natural 
properties and facts (cf. Brink 1989: 22, 176ff; Sturgeon 2006b: 92).16  What is not so 
                                                
16 The constitution relation is discussed in Brink (1989: 157-160) and Sturgeon (1986a: 75).  Constitution 
has two jobs to perform for the ethical naturalist.  First, it explains the supervenience of the moral on the 
natural in a way that does not require moral facts to be anything “over and above” natural facts.  Thus, it 
avoids the need for a kind of epiphenomenalist account of the supervenience relation between the moral 
and the natural.  Second, it permits moral properties to be “multiply realizable.”  The claim that moral 
properties are multiply realizable is thought to absolve the ethical naturalist of the need to promise that 
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easy is to say what a natural property or fact is.  Some metaethicists have counted as 
many as seven distinct ways the natural/non-natural distinction for properties has been 
drawn (Copp 2003; Ridge 2008).  This is not the space to canvass every proposal that has 
been offered.  To my mind, the most promising conceptions of natural propertyhood 
invoke an epistemological criterion.  Drawing on David Copp’s (2003), the account that I 
favor is roughly this: 
NP: a property, P, is natural just in case a synthetic proposition to the effect that 
an individual instantiates P can be known only by way of empirical investigation, 
if it can be known at all.17,18 
 
By NP, a property such as maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain counts as a 
natural property since the question of whether an act-token instantiates this property can 
be settled, if at all, only by empirical means such as observation, induction and perhaps 
inference to best explanation.  Although I am not in possession of a precise account of 
                                                                                                                                            
moral properties are reducible to natural properties.  For brevity, I will focus on identity claims offered by 
naturalists, leaving aside constitution claims. 
17 Here I follow the provisional formulation of natural propertyhood that appears in Copp’s (2003: 185f).  I 
am somewhat hesitant to sign on for the refinements that Copp proposes to this formulation.  My hope is 
that NP will serve us well enough.   
18 Compare NP with other accounts offered by metaethicists: “According to [Naturalistic Ethics], Ethics is 
an empirical or positive science: its conclusions could be all established by means of empirical observation 
and induction” (Moore 1903); “What I find plausible (even if not a conceptual truth) is that ethical facts 
could not be natural if they could not be investigated empirically” (Sturgeon 2003: 543n24); “Natural facts 
and properties are presumably something like those facts and properties as picked out and studied by the 
natural and social sciences (broadly conceived)…” (Brink 1989: 22); “The natural is whatever is the object 
of study by the natural sciences.  […]  [A] science is a natural science just in case its fundamental 
principles are discoverable a posteriori, through reliance primarily on empirical evidence.” (Shafer-Landau 
2006: 212, 213); “The vague, pre-theoretic idea that the philosophical naturalist tries to articulate and 
defend is that everything – including any particulars, events, facts, properties, and so on – is a part of the 
natural, physical world that science investigates” (Timmons 1999: 12). 
 I should address an objection to criteria of natural propertyhood such as NP.  While he accepts 
that a property’s being amenable to empirical investigation is necessary for its counting as natural, 
Sturgeon expresses doubt as to whether this is sufficient on the grounds that there could in principle be 
empirical evidence concerning the instantiation of supernatural properties (such as being a god).  If there 
were such empirical evidence, then being a god would count as a natural property (and presumably, any 
god would count as a natural entity).  But Sturgeon objects that “It is not plausible that the success of this 
sort of natural [i.e. empirical] theology would show that the divine attributes were really natural properties” 
(2006b: 109).  While I do not have any knockdown argument against Sturgeon on this point, I do want to 
enter into the record that I am less troubled by the prospect of “naturalizing” gods and their attributes.  If 
there were empirical confirmation that God exists, I would be inclined to say that the natural world includes 
one more entity than I had previously supposed. 
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what it is for one person to treat another as a mere means, I presume that a property such 
as treating no one as a mere means will also come out as natural according to NP.   
 
1.3.2. Metaphysical naturalism.   
It is worth considering a somewhat different way of getting at the commitments of ethical 
naturalism.  This can be accomplished by examining the commitments of metaphysical 
naturalism, of which ethical naturalism is a special case.19  Consider, then, the following 
characterization of metaphysical naturalism: 
The task of the naturalistic metaphysician, as I see it, is simply to draw out the 
metaphysical implications of contemporary science.  A metaphysics which goes 
beyond the commitments of science is simply unsupported by the best available 
evidence.  A metaphysics which does not make commitments as rich as those of 
our best current scientific theories asks us to narrow the scope of our ontology in 
ways which will not withstand scrutiny.  For the naturalist, there simply is no 
extrascientific route to metaphysical understanding (Kornblith 1994: 40). 
 
These comments suggest the following methodological principle, which can be taken as 
characteristic of a metaphysically naturalist philosophical approach: posit all and only 
those entities that are needed in our best available scientific theories.  Since scientific 
theories are in the business of providing a posteriori or empirical explanations of 
observable phenomena, it seems to me that it would do no harm if we were to restate the 
naturalist’s methodological principle as follows: 
EC: posit the existence of an entity (or a kind of entity) if and only if reference to 
that (kind of) entity is needed in our best available a posteriori explanations of 
observable phenomena. 
 
                                                
19 This is not to suggest that all ethical naturalists must accept the broader picture of metaphysical 
naturalism.  For example, someone who accepted the existence of supernatural entities like God might 
nevertheless embrace the claim that moral properties are identical with natural properties.  Even so, it is my 
impression that a good deal of the interest in the ethical naturalist’s project stems from a desire to reconcile 
moral realism with metaphysical naturalism. 
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EC (the explanatory criterion) is in accord with what some ethical naturalists have 
explicitly avowed. Peter Railton, for instance, writes: 
What might be called ‘the generic stratagem of naturalistic realism’ is to postulate 
a realm of facts in virtue of the contribution they would make to the a posteriori 
explanation of certain features of our experience.  For example, an external world 
is posited to explain the coherence, stability, and intersubjectivity of sense 
experience.  A moral realist who would avail himself of this stratagem must show 
that the postulation of moral facts similarly can have an explanatory function 
(Railton 1986: 171f). 
 
The acceptance of EC explains why the metaphysical naturalist who accepts moral 
realism is eager to argue that moral facts and properties are identical with or constituted 
by natural facts and properties: if it is not possible to discover whether or not an 
individual instantiates a moral property by solely empirical means, then it is hard to see 
how such a property (or the fact that consists in its being instantiated) would be needed in 
the best available a posteriori explanations of observable phenomena.  But if moral 
properties were not needed in our best a posteriori explanations, then, by EC, the 
metaphysical naturalist ought to deny that there are any moral facts and, thus, he ought to 
reject moral realism.   
 
1.4. Analytic Ethical Naturalism. 
1.4.1. The general strategy of analytic ethical naturalism.   
The ethical naturalist’s task is to achieve a naturalistic accommodation of moral 
properties and facts.  This involves, above all, making the case for the plausibility of the 
claim that moral properties such as moral rightness and moral goodness are identical 
with (or constituted only by) natural properties.  The traditional strategy for achieving 
accommodation is to argue that moral predicates are synonymous with predicates known 
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to express natural properties.  According to the realist version of this strategy, we should 
view theories in first-order normative ethics as expressing analytic equivalences.  Thus, a 
theory such as AUh, if true, is true in virtue of the fact that the predicate ‘morally right’ 
has the same meaning as the predicate ‘maximizes hedonic utility.’   Because the two 
predicates are synonymous, the former expresses the same property that the latter 
expresses.  And because, as most metaethicists will grant, the latter predicate expresses a 
natural property, it follows that ‘morally right’ expresses the very same natural property.  
In this way, a successful demonstration of an analytic equivalence between ‘morally 
right’ and a natural predicate such as ‘maximizes hedonic utility’ suffices for the 
conclusion that moral rightness is identical with (and so, is itself) a natural property, as 
the ethical naturalist claims.  Call any view that employs this strategy of naturalistic 
accommodation a version of analytic ethical naturalism (AEN).20 
 
1.4.2. Semantic assumptions of analytic ethical naturalism. 
To get a better grasp on AEN, and to better understand the ways in which SEN departs 
from it, it will be useful to have before us a sketch the semantic assumptions that 
underwrite the former.  I begin with some brief preliminaries. 
 Call any set of individuals at a possible world an extension.  Call any function that 
maps possible worlds to extensions an intension.  The semantic content of any given 
predicate is identified with an intension.  The semantic content (and hence, intension) of a 
                                                
20 Here I am interested in explicating what might be thought of as a “classical” version analytic ethical 
naturalism that relies on a traditional understanding of meaning and conceptual analysis.  Since my goal in 
discussing AEN is simply to provide some motivation for, and a contrast with, SEN, I will not consider 
more sophisticated versions of AEN that adopt so-called network analyses and two-dimensional semantics.  
To see an implementation of these resources in defense of ethical naturalism, see Smith (1994) and Jackson 
(1998). 
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predicate determines the contribution that the predicate makes to the truth-conditions of 
sentences in which that predicate appears.  Thus, the sentences ‘x is F’ and ‘x is G’ have 
the same truth-conditions just in case the intension of ‘F’ is the same as the intension of 
‘G.’ 
 The semantic theory that grounds AEN is sometimes called descriptivism.  By this 
view, the intension (and, hence, semantic content) of a speaker’s use of a predicate, ‘F,’ is 
determined by a description that she “associates” with ‘F.’  More precisely, the intension 
of ‘F,’ as used by a speaker, S, is the function that maps each possible world to the set of 
individuals at that world that satisfy the description that S associates with ‘F.’  Some 
descriptivists urge that we think of the relevant description not as a linguistic entity, but 
rather, as a property or collection of properties that speakers associate with a given 
predicate (Jackson 1998: 203f).  In either case, the description associated with a predicate 
should be thought of as something like a criterion specifying the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that any given individual must satisfy in order for that predicate to be correctly 
applied to it.  In fact, it may be less misleading in some cases to speak of these criteria as 
senses or concepts,21 rather than as descriptions: we might suppose that a speaker has a 
concept that she associates with ‘red’ even if she cannot produce an interesting 
description that applies to all and only red things (perhaps because her concept is more 
like a pictorial image than a list of properties).  The meaning of a predicate as used by a 
speaker should be identified with the concept or description that she associates with it.  
Thus, where ‘F’ and ‘G’ are non-indexical predicates, an utterance of ‘F’ is synonymous 
                                                
21 As I will be using the word ‘concept’, the concept associated with a predicates is something that 
(according to descriptivism) fixes or determines which intension is expressed by that predicate.  By my 
usage, a concept should not be identified with the intension itself; nor should it be identified with the 
property expressed by the predicate.  In this, my usage differs from that of (e.g.) Carnap (1947/1956: 21). 
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with an utterance of ‘G’ just in case the concept or description associated with one is the 
same as the concept or description associated with the other. 
 Something needs to be said about this three-place relation of “association” that 
obtains among speakers, concepts, and predicates.  If descriptivism is to serve the needs 
of AEN, then facts about which concept a given speaker associates with a given predicate 
must be discernible for that speaker by a priori introspection.  Thus, the relation of 
association should be understood as something like an introspectively accessible 
psychological state of a speaker.  It is for this reason that the form of descriptivism that 
underwrites AEN must be construed a form of semantic internalism.  According to 
semantic internalism, the semantic content of a token predicate is fixed solely virtue of 
how things are in the mind of a given speaker; facts about the environment outside of the 
speaker’s mind do not directly contribute to fixing the content of the predicates she utters.  
It follows from this internalist construal of descriptivism that the matter of which 
intension and content is expressed by a given predicate ‘F’ depends entirely upon the 
introspectively accessible psychological states of the speaker who utters ‘F.’22  
 A final point concerns a metaphysical assumption that goes along with the 
descriptivist semantics that underwrites AEN: for each intension there corresponds one 
and only one property.23  Indeed some descriptivists, such as Carnap, identify intensions 
with properties (Carnap 1947/1956: 19).  Construing properties this way entails that any 
two predicates that share the same intension will also express the same property; in other 
                                                
22 This accords with the account of intension individuation advanced by Rudolph Carnap.  He writes, “the 
intension of a predicate ‘Q’ for a speaker X, is the general condition which an object y must fulfil in order 
for X to be willing to ascribe the predicate ‘Q’ to y” (1955/1956: 242) 
23 Note that this assumption will not be shared by an ethical non-naturalist.  A non-naturalist who accepts 
AUh will agree that ‘morally right’ has the same intension as ‘maximizes the balance of pleasure over 
pain’; but he will deny that the two predicates express the same property. 
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words, co-intensionality is sufficient (and necessary) for property identity (cf. Carnap 
ibid.: 18f).  Moreover, because predicates that share the same meaning also share the 
same intension, the descriptivist semantics sketched here implies that synonymy of 
predicates is sufficient to establish property identity.24  In other words, a speaker’s 
utterance of ‘Necessarily, for any x, x is F iff x is G’ is true just in case her utterance of 
‘F’ is synonymous with her utterance of ‘G’.  Indeed, this necessity statement is analytic, 
since its truth depends solely upon the meanings of the words that compose it. 
 
1.4.3. First-order normative ethics as conceptual analysis. 
For the analytic ethical naturalist who accepts both moral realism and the descriptivist 
semantics sketched above, first-order ethical theorizing is an exercise in conceptual 
analysis. 25  In order to discover whether (e.g.) AUh is true, we must investigate the 
description or concept that we associate with the predicate ‘morally right’.  If it should 
                                                
24 Hence, this version of descriptivism implies what Brink calls “the semantic test of properties” (see his 
1989: 162).  
25 It should be acknowledged that not every naturalistic analysis of moral predicates has the result that first-
order moral theorizing proceeds by way of conceptual analysis.  Consider, for example, the following ideal 
observer analysis: (IO) ‘φ is morally wrong’ =df. ‘φ is forbidden by the moral standard that would be 
endorsed of by all observers in suitably idealized epistemic conditions.’  Even if we agree that IO is the 
correct metaethical theory, we still need to engage in further inquiry in order to determine what the correct 
moral standard is and which actions are morally wrong.  Indeed, two people could assent to IO and yet 
disagree as to whether AUh, CI-2, or some other standard is the correct substantive theory in first-order 
normative ethics of behavior.  To discern which of these theories is correct presumably requires a non-
conceptual investigation into what standards an ideal observer would endorse (Firth suggests that this 
would be an empirical investigation, drawing primarily on the resources of psychology [1952:325ff]).  
 My own view is that analyses along the line of IO are far more plausible than analytic versions of 
AUh, CI-2, and the like.  The trouble, however, is that IO is incompatible with moral realism: IO identifies 
moral wrongness with (roughly) the property of being forbidden by the moral standard that would be 
accepted by all idealized observers.  Because of this, if IO is true, then the matter of which actions are 
morally wrong depends upon facts about which moral standard the ideal observers accept.  This, however, 
is a clear violation of the stance-independence clause associated with realism.  The most robust metaethical 
view that IO can deliver, then, is a naturalistic version of moral constructivism. 
 The lesson is that not every naturalistic analysis of moral predicates that has been proposed could 
be put to service in defense of moral realism.  My suspicion is that only those analyses that double as 
theories in first-order ethics will avoid this blatant violation of stance-independence.  (Although, as we will 
see in §1.5.6, there is reason to worry that all forms of analytic naturalism violate stance-independence).  I 
will not pursue this suspicion any further, since my primary interest in Realistic AEN is as a contrast to 
SEN. 
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turn out upon analysis that the concept that we associate with ‘morally right’ is the same 
concept that we associate with ‘maximizes hedonic utility’ then we can conclude that the 
two predicates are co-intensional and that AUh is, in fact, true (and analytic at that).  
More importantly from a metaethical point of view, we could conclude that ‘morally 
right’ expresses the same property as ‘maximizes hedonic utility’; and since it is not in 
dispute among metaethicists that latter predicate expresses a natural property, we may 
conclude that the property expressed by the former is also natural.  In that case, it will 
have been shown that the property moral rightness just is the natural property maximizing 
hedonic utility.  In this way, AEN (when armed with a successful naturalistic analysis of 
all moral predicates) achieves a naturalistic accommodation of moral properties and facts. 
 
1.5. The Rejection of Realistic Analytic Ethical Naturalism. 
Let us turn now to considerations that have lead metaethicists, including proponents of 
SEN, to reject analytic ethical naturalism.  My treatment will be brief, since my interest 
here is only to outline the considerations that motivate the adoption of SEN for 
proponents of moral realism and ethical naturalism. 
 
1.5.1. The rejection of analyticity.   
One motivation for rejecting AEN that deserves brief mention is a general skepticism 
about the existence of any analytic truths whatsoever.  An influential case for this 
skepticism can be found in Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951).26  Among the 
                                                
26 Of the proponents of SEN, at least Boyd expresses doubt as to whether there are any interesting analytic 
truths at all.  He writes, “On Quinean grounds, I doubt that…analytic definitions or specifications of 
necessary and sufficient conditions are ever to be found in the case of philosophically important concepts” 
(1979: 378f; cf. 1988: 196). 
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arguments Quine advances, there is this: a statement is analytic only if it is incorrigible or 
immune to revision; no statement is incorrigible; therefore, no statement is analytic (ibid.: 
40).  Obviously, if no statement is analytic, it follows that, contrary to AEN, no theory in 
first-order ethics can have the status of an analytic truth. 
 
1.5.2. Doubts about descriptivism.   
The classical version of descriptivism that underwrites AEN is vulnerable to several well 
known objections.  I will very briefly mention three.  First, speakers are sometimes able 
to express one property rather than another using a predicate even when the concept that 
she associates with that predicate does not distinguish between the two properties.27  For 
instance, although Kant offers up yellow metal as the description that he associates with 
gold, (Kant 1783/2004: 72f) we take him to speak falsely when, pointing to a sample of 
iron pyrites (fool’s gold), he utters ‘this stuff here is gold.’  But if descriptivism were 
true, we would have to say that he speaks truly (Kripke 1980 116-119; cf. Putnam 
1975b:226f; Donnellan 1970).  Second, speakers are sometimes able to express a 
particular property using a predicate even though the description they associate with that 
predicate is erroneous.  For example, it is argued that speakers who, because they were 
ignorant of marine biology, associated being a fish with the predicate ‘whale’ 
nevertheless spoke truly when, pointing to a humpback whale, they uttered ‘this is a 
whale.’  If descriptivism were true, however, this would not be so: the object that the 
                                                
27 Although I continue to speak of predicate expressions here, I should acknowledge that most of the attacks 
on descriptivism have focused on the theory as an account of referring expressions such as names and 
natural kind terms.  For the sake of continuity, I tailor these objections to apply to natural kind predicates.  
As far as I can see, there isn’t any reason to think that arguments suitable for refuting a descriptivist 
treatment of the names of kinds (e.g. ‘the tiger’) won’t be equally effective to refute a descriptivist 
treatment of corresponding predicates (e.g. ‘tiger’). 
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speaker is pointing to does not fall within the intension that that corresponds to her 
concept (since that intension would include only individuals at a world that are fish) 
(Kripke ibid.).  The third objection to descriptivism is related to the previous one: in 
cases where speakers come to have new beliefs about the nature of a kind—for instance, 
that whales are not fish, but mammals, descriptivism seems to entail that the  semantic 
content of their predicate (e.g. ‘whale,’ or else ‘fish’) has changed.  But this, some have 
argued, is incorrect (Kripke ibid. 138).  An additional objection worth mentioning is 
Hilary Putnam’s famous “Twin Earth” argument (1975b: 223ff).  (A discussion of this 
argument can be found in the next chapter).   
 The objections outlined here have lead a number of philosophers to reject 
classical descriptivism, at least as it applies to proper names and natural kind terms.  It 
might be argued, of course, that moral predicates are less like natural kind predicates, 
such as ‘gold’ and ‘tiger,’ and more like the predicate ‘bachelor’ (for which descriptivism 
is still thought to offer a plausible account).  Even so, the objections to descriptivism 
about natural kind predicates deserve mention since they seem to have played a role in 
turning philosophers away from AEN. 
 
1.5.3. The open question argument.   
I turn now to objections against AEN that fall more narrowly within the purview of 
metaethics.  Arguably the most well known of such objections is the open question 
argument.  The locus classicus for the open question argument is G. E. Moore’s (1903: 
66-69), though different versions of the argument have been advanced by Ayer 
(1936/1952: 104f) and Hare (1952: 83-93, 154f), among others.  Without attempting to be 
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faithful to Moore’s own exposition,28 here is a brief sketch of (one version of) the open 
question argument:  Consider this question: (Q1) “Is act-token φ, which maximizes 
hedonic utility, morally right?”  If ‘morally right’ is synonymous with ‘maximizes 
hedonic utility,’ then any competent speaker of English who fully understands Q1 should 
know the answer to it.29  But it seems that there could be (indeed, it seems that there are) 
competent speakers of English who fully understand Q1 but do not know the answer to it.  
For them, Q1 remains an “open question.”  It follows that ‘morally right’ is not 
synonymous with ‘maximizes hedonic utility.’  Consequently, when AUh is construed as 
an analytic definition of ‘morally right,’ it is false.  Proponents of the open question 
argument claim that this argument generalizes; they maintain that we would arrive at a 
similar conclusion for any other naturalistic analysis of ‘morally right’ that might be 
offered (and similarly for naturalistic analyses of ‘morally good’ etc.).  If they are right, 
then AEN cannot succeed.30 
 
                                                
28 For a thorough and sympathetic exposition of Moore’s open question argument, see Feldman (2005). 
29 This premise may look too strong at first glance, but consider what we would say about a speaker who 
failed to know the answer to the question (Q2) ‘Is Mr. X, a man who, though eligible for marriage, has 
never been married, a bachelor?’  I think we would be strongly inclined to suppose that this speaker does 
not understand the meaning of at least one of the words in Q2 and so, we would conclude that she is not a 
competent speaker with respect to Q2.  The same holds, I believe, for the questions (Q3) ‘Is Fuzzy, who is 
a female fox, a vixen?’ and (Q4) ‘Is Alex, who is a male sibling of Bert, the brother of Bert?’ 
30 The standard defense of AEN against the open question argument is to maintain that there might be 
“unobvious synonymies”.  In the recent metaethical literature, this line of reply has been pressed by 
Jackson (1998: 151) and Smith (1994: 37). 
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1.5.4. Chauvinistic conceptual relativism.31   
Another objection to AEN is that it entails a kind of conceptual relativism that makes 
genuine moral disagreement impossible between speakers (or linguistic communities) 
that subscribe to different moral standards (Blackburn 1984: 168; 1998: 14f; Boyd 1988: 
186f; Gibbard 1990: 9-18; Hare 1952: 49,148f; Moore 1903: 62ff; Sturgeon 1984: 
327f).32  To illustrate, let’s suppose there are two islands that had been colonized by 
English speakers in the 17th century, but which have not had extensive contact with the 
outside world since.  Suppose further that the denizens of each island are homogenous 
with respect to the moral code that its members subscribe to.  On the Island of 
Benthamania, (nearly) all denizens accept AUh.  Among other things, they tend to feel 
anger and resentment towards those (and only towards those) who knowingly perform 
actions that fail to maximize hedonic utility.  On the island of New Immanuel, (nearly) all 
denizens accept CI-2.  Among other things, they tend to feel anger and resentment 
towards those (and only towards those) who knowingly perform actions that treat others 
as a mere means.  If, as the realist construal of AEN requires, we view AUh and CI-2 as 
expressing analytic definitions of ‘morally right,’ then we must conclude that in this 
scenario that ‘morally right’ has a different meaning in the mouths of Benthamanians 
than it does in the mouths of New Immanuelers.  In addition, we must conclude that 
                                                
31 I borrow the phrase ‘chauvinistic conceptual relativism’ from Horgan and Timmons (1996a: 15).  For 
them, a relativistic construal of a given class of predicates is chauvinistic if “it entails lack of genuine 
disagreement in cases where two speakers utter apparently contradictory statements which really are 
contradictory.”  Perhaps they chose the term ‘chauvinistic’ to describe this phenomenon because a further 
apparent implication of this sort of relativism is that groups of speakers who do not accept the sort of first-
order normative theory that we accept simply fail to have any moral vocabulary at all.  What is 
chauvinistic, then, is that this relativism implies that only we have a moral vocabulary, while all those who 
fail to share our moral values simply lack one. 
32 Although this objection is articulated earlier by G. E. Moore, R. M. Hare’s (1952), with its memorable 
example involving a missionary among cannibals, is more widely cited and appears to have the status of the 
locus classicus for this particular argument. 
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Benthamanian and New Immanueler uses of ‘morally right’ express different intensions 
and properties.  In the mouth of a Benthamanian, ‘morally right’ expresses the property 
maximizing hedonic utility.  In the mouth of a New Immanueler, ‘morally right’ expresses 
the property treating no one as a mere means.  It follows that Benthamanian uses of 
‘morally right’ and New Immanueler uses of ‘morally right’ contribute differently to the 
truth-conditions of sentences in which they appear. Thus, when Benthamanians utter 
‘organ harvesting is morally right’ and New Immanuelers utter ‘organ harvesting is not 
morally right’ they are not engaging in a substantive moral disagreement; because their 
uses of ‘morally right’ are incommensurable with one another, the two parties are merely 
talking past each other.   But this seems incorrect.  It is obvious that the Benthamanians 
and the New Immanuelers are having a substantive moral disagreement and are not 
talking past each other.  If so, then AEN should be rejected; it (at any rate, the semantics 
required to sustain it) commits us to an implausible kind of conceptual relativism with 
respect to moral predicates.33 
                                                
33 My presentation of the argument here is directed against those versions of AEN that attempt to analyze 
‘morally right’ in terms of putative right-making properties.  It might be thought that a more “indirect” 
version of AEN—one that offers, for example, an ideal observer analysis of ‘right’—would be more 
successful.  By this proposal, we should suppose that both Benthamanians and New Immanuelers associate 
the property of being permitted by the moral standard that all ideal observers would endorse with their use 
of ‘morally right’.  In this way, they express the same intension and property with their uses of ‘morally 
right.’  The disagreement between the two parties concerns the matter of which moral standard all ideal 
observers would endorse.  But this is a substantive (and potentially empirical) disagreement. 
 There are at least two reasons why this strategy will not work in the present context.  First, as we 
saw in note 25, ideal observer accounts of moral properties are not compatible with moral realism.  Since I 
am here interested in AEN as a way of preserving moral realism in the face of a commitment to 
metaphysical naturalism, the present suggestion is of no use.  Second, there are doubts about whether an 
ideal observer can be sufficiently described so that we have reason to think that there is a determinate fact 
about which moral standard she would endorse.  If there is not a determinate fact about this, then there may 
be excessive moral indeterminacy.  But even if the ideal observer can be described in enough detail, a new 
worry arises: two communities of speakers may associate different descriptions with their conception of an 
ideal observer.  If so, then the content of ‘right’ in each community will again express different properties 
and, thus, chauvinistic relativism returns. 
 There may be, of course, other indirect versions of AEN (ones that do not directly build a moral 
standard into the content of ‘morally right’) that better suit the needs of moral realists.  I leave it to 
proponents of AEN to produce such an account.  My hope is that I have said enough here to make clear that 
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1.5.5. The argument from normativity.   
The next kind of argument that I want to consider is has been directed against moral 
realism in all of its varieties.  I am of the mind, however, that this sort of objection is 
especially problematic for AEN since, in my estimation, AEN has fewer resources 
available to answer it than do other forms of realism (such as ethical non-naturalism and 
SEN).  The argument comes in two varieties.  One focuses on a supposed link between 
moral judgment and motivation.  The other focuses on a supposed link between moral 
facts and reasons for action.  I consider each argument in turn. 
 The argument from motivation, which has its roots in Hume’s writings, begins 
with an assertion of moral judgment internalism, the thesis that there is a necessary 
connection between judging that an act is obligatory for oneself and being motivated to 
perform that act.  More specifically, 
MJI: Necessarily, if S judges (de se) that S is morally obligated to φ, then S is pro 
tanto motivated to φ.34 
 
MJI is typically asserted as an analytic, conceptual truth.  The trouble it raises for moral 
realists is that, by the standard theory of motivation (which is, again, associated with 
Hume), an agent is motivated to φ only if she has some desire that would be served by φ-
ing.  If this Humean account of motivation is correct, then it follows from MJI that an 
agent judges that she is morally obligated to φ only if she has some desire that would be 
satisfied by her φ-ing.  But it is hard to see why we should think that a speaker’s making 
                                                                                                                                            
chauvinistic conceptual relativism presents enough of a challenge to realistic analytic naturalism to produce 
some motivation for seeking a form of naturalism that does not construe sentences that express necessary 
co-variance between moral and natural properties as analytic. 
34 MJI, or something very much like it, has been endorsed by Hume (1739/2000: 294-299), Stevenson 
(1937: 16), Hare (1952: 172), Nagel (1970: Chh. 1, 2), Harman (1975), Mackie (1977: 40), Blackburn 
(1984: 188), Korsgaard (1986), Dancy (1993: Ch. 1), and Smith (1994: ch. 3), among others. 
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a moral judgment entail the existence of a desire in this way unless moral judgments are 
themselves expressions of speakers’ desires;35 but to allow that moral judgments express 
conative states such as desires is to abandon moral cognitivism.  In that case, there would 
be no point in maintaining moral realism. 
 One way to answer the anti-realist argument from moral internalism is to reject 
the Humean theory of motivation.  This maneuver requires belief in the existence of 
“intrinsically motivating propositions.”  For reasons that are not always well-articulated, 
naturalists have generally been reluctant to dispense with the Humean theory of 
motivation and have agreed with Mackie’s contention that intrinsically motivating facts 
would be a “queer sort” of entity (Mackie 1977: 40f; cf. Brink 1997: 12-15; Sturgeon 
1992: 100f; 2002: 195).  Instead, the standard response to the argument from motivation 
is to deny MJI.  But if proponents of MJI are correct in supposing that the thesis is a 
conceptual truth, it is hard to see how analytic ethical naturalists can reject it without 
entering into a stalemate over conceptual intuitions. 
 The other version of the normativity argument takes as its starting point a thesis 
that is sometimes called moral rationalism:36 
MR: Necessarily, if S is morally obligated to φ, then S has a pro tanto normative 
reason to φ.37 
 
                                                
35 There are other alternatives that merit acknowledgement.  For one, MJI can be satisfied by adopting a 
cognitivist-subjectivist analysis of moral obligation.  Such an analysis might look something like this: ‘φ is 
morally obligatory =df. ‘I disapprove of the failure to φ.’  But this subjectivist maneuver does the realist no 
good; it violates realism’s stance-independence clause and so represents a constructivist account of moral 
facts. 
36 In Brink’s favored taxonomy, ‘agent internalism about reasons’ denotes what I am calling ‘moral 
rationalism’ (1989: 40).  I prefer the latter name since it cuts down on the number of philosophical theses 
that go by the name ‘internalism’. 
37 MR, or something like it, is endorsed by Dancy (1993: 4), Harman (1975: 8), Mackie (1977: 29), Joyce 
(2001: ch. 2), Shafer-Landau (2003: ch. 8) and Smith (1994: 182ff), among others. 
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As with MJI, MR is claimed to be an analytic, conceptual truth.  It raises trouble for 
naturalistic moral realism because, according to the standard naturalistic account of 
normative reasons, an agent’s normative reasons are relativized to her desires.  When this 
account of reasons is combined with MR, it follows that an agent’s moral obligations are 
also relativized to her desires.  But this is implausible.  Surely, a very powerful 
psychopath is morally obligated to refrain from torturing his victims even if this serves 
none of his desires.  In order to accommodate MR and a plausible first-order account of 
our moral obligations, it looks like we must reject the thesis that normative reasons are 
desire-relative.  But this raises some dangers for AEN since there is reason to think that 
desire-independent normative reasons (sometimes called “external reasons”) cannot be 
accommodated within a naturalistic framework (see Joyce 2001 and §4.5.2 of this 
dissertation). 
 
1.5.6. Analyticity and stance-independence.   
A final problem for AEN that I will mention has not received much attention, though it is 
hinted at by Nicholas Sturgeon (1986b: 117).  This problem concerns the question of 
whether the conception of moral epistemology that goes along with AEN is compatible 
with the moral realist’s claim that moral facts are stance-independent.  For a proponent of 
AEN, the question of which first-order moral theory is correct depends upon which 
description (or which set of properties) we happen to associate with moral predicates like 
‘right’ and ‘good.’  But it looks as though the matter of which description we associate 
with ‘right’ and ‘good’ just depends upon which moral theory (construed now as a moral 
standard) we happen to (perhaps tacitly) accept.  (In other words: I associate maximizing 
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hedonic utility with ‘morally right’ if and only if I accept AUh).  If so, then the moral 
facts turn out to be stance-dependent: what makes a theory like AUh true (if it is true) is 
that we happen to accept AUh as our moral standard.  If we had accepted a different 
theory, such as CI-2, then it would be the case that we associate treating no one as a mere 
means with ‘morally right.’  But in that case, CI-2 would be the true theory in the 
normative ethics of behavior instead of (say) AUh.  In this way, AEN looks to be 
incompatible with a genuinely realist construal of moral facts and moral theory. 
 
1.6. Synthetic Ethical Naturalism. 
1.6.1. The necessary a posteriori.   
The analytic ethical naturalist achieves naturalistic accommodation by construing 
sentences expressing necessities between moral and natural properties as expressions of 
analytic, a priori necessities.  As we have seen, this construal of moral theorizing leads to 
a host of problems.  Fortunately for ethical naturalists, advances in the philosophy of 
language during the 1970’s opened up new metaethical possibilities.  Perhaps the most 
important advance was the recognition of property identities and relations of necessity 
that are a posteriori and synthetic (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975b).  Perhaps the most 
common example cited of an a posteriori identity is the claim that water is identical with 
H2O.  By the necessity of identity, this identity claim entails that, necessarily, something 
is a quantity of water just in case it is a quantity of H2O.  This latter proposition (like the 
former) is thought to be synthetic because ‘water’ is not synonymous with ‘H2O’: the 
description a competent speaker associates with ‘water’ may be entirely distinct from the 
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description she associates with ‘H2O’.38  The proposition is thought to be a posteriori 
because its truth is (and was) discovered, not by conceptual analysis or by synthetic, a 
priori intuition, but by experimental chemistry, which is an a posteriori form of inquiry. 
 Taking the theoretical identities of chemistry as their inspiration, ethical 
naturalists argue that sentences used to assert identities (or constitution relations) between 
moral and natural properties should be understood as expressing synthetic, a posteriori 
necessities: 
The [ethical] naturalist can concede that there are neither synonymies nor 
meaning implications between moral and nonmoral, for instance, natural, terms 
and still maintain that moral facts and properties are identical with, or constituted 
by, natural and social scientific facts and properties.  The naturalist’s identity or 
constitution claims can be construed as expressing synthetic [a posteriori]39 moral 
necessities (Brink 1989: 166, 175; cf. Boyd 1988; Lycan 1988; Railton 1989: 157; 
Sturgeon 1985a: 75n16; 1985b: 25f).40 
 
This claim, as I see it, is the distinguishing feature of SEN as a form of naturalistic moral 
realism.   
                                                
38 The idea is that the description a competent speaker associates with ‘water’ may include only the 
superficial qualities of water.  For instance, such a speaker might associate with the predicate ‘water’ the 
property of being a clear, potable liquid (at room temperature) that fills the lakes, rivers and oceans of 
Earth.  By contrast, a competent user of ‘H2O’ is likely to associate with it something like the following 
description: being a substance composed of molecules consisting in two hydrogen atoms bonded to one 
oxygen atom. 
39 Although he does not say so in the passage cited here, Brink later adds (in 1989: 175) that the 
epistemological status of these moral necessities is a posteriori. 
40 To my knowledge the first person to suggest this view of moral identities is Hilary Putnam in his 
(1975a)—though his remarks are very brief and inchoate.  Putnam gives this view a more explicit 
endorsement later on (1981: 205-208); but by that time he has already abandoned robust metaphysical 
realism.  Thus, it is not clear whether he should be counted as a proponent of SEN since SEN, as I am 
understanding it, includes a commitment to realism about moral facts.  Two other philosophers deserve 
mention as having proposed early on that moral identities are a posteriori, although they do not fall within 
the SEN camp.  The first is Robert Adams.  In his (1979: 76), he writes “ethical wrongness is (i..e. is 
identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God.  I regard this as a 
metaphysically necessary, but not an analytic or a priori truth.”  It is not clear that Adams should be classed 
as a proponent of SEN, however, since he identifies wrongness with a supernatural property.  (On the other 
hand, Adams suggests both that God plays a causal role in the world and that we can discover the correct 
moral theory via a posteriori inquiry.  As I have mentioned above, I am inclined to think that, if there is a 
god who plays a causal role in the world, and if there is empirical evidence of his presence, then we should 
count that god as a natural entity.)  The second philosopher deserving mention is Gilbert Harman.  In his 
(1977: 19f), he suggests that an ethical naturalist could argue that moral identities are a posteriori in order 
to answer Moore’s open question argument.  Since Harman rejects moral realism in favor of a relativistic 
moral constructivism, I do not classify him as a proponent of SEN. 
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 SEN proponents maintain that the question of which natural properties are to be 
identified with moral properties (or taken to constitute them) is to be settled by 
substantive, first-order ethical theorizing (Brink 1989: 177f, 238).  Sturgeon, for instance, 
writes that 
“If hedonistic act utilitarianism…turns out to be true, for example, then we can 
define the good as pleasure and the absence of pain, and a right action as one that 
produces at least as much good as any other…” (Sturgeon 1985a: 61; cf. Brink; 
2001: 162; Railton 1989: 167). 
 
From these remarks it should be clear that synthetic ethical naturalists view first-order 
theories like AUh and CI-2, which identify the natural supervenience base of moral facts 
and properties, as expressing definitions of moral terms.  In addition, they view these 
theories as expressing property identities: “The ethical naturalist claims that moral facts 
and properties supervene upon natural facts and properties, because moral facts and 
properties are natural facts and properties” (Brink 1989: 176, emphasis in the original).41 
 
1.6.2. The semantic and metaphysical underpinnings of the necessary a posteriori.   
In §1.4.2 I noted that AEN rests upon a semantic foundation: viz., descriptivism of an 
internalist sort.  SEN also rests upon a semantic foundation: proponents of SEN support 
their view by adopting an externalist semantics for moral predicates and property names.   
 According to semantic externalism, the semantic contents of certain predicates are 
individuated in part by features of the speakers’ environment.  This semantic view goes 
hand in hand with the metaphysical doctrine that there exist natural kinds—kinds whose 
membership is delimited by a “real” (as opposed to “nominal”) essence (Boyd 1988: 194-
                                                
41 Brink goes on to clarify that the appearance of ‘are’ here may represent either the ‘is’ of identity or the 
‘is’ of constitution (ibid.).  Presumably a moral constitution claim would look like a one-way conditional of 
the form “Necessarily, for any φ, if φ has N in a circumstance of type C, then φ is morally right” where ‘N’ 
expresses a natural property. 
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199; Brink 2001: 160ff; Sturgeon 1985b: 26).  A kind’s real essence is typically 
understood to be a property (or collection of properties) that is causally responsible for 
the observable similarities among its members.  The significance of natural kinds for 
semantic externalism is this:  Suppose there is a natural kind, K, with real essence, E.  If 
there is a predicate, ‘F,’ that expresses the property of being a K, then, for any world, w, 
and any object, o, o is in the extension of ‘F’ at w iff o instantiates E at w.  The resulting 
function that maps possible worlds to extensions is the intension and semantic content of 
‘F.’  Importantly, competent users of ‘F’ may have no a priori access to the matter of 
which properties are included in E.  That is a fact about their environment; it is not settled 
by how things are in the minds of speakers.  As a result of this, speakers will have no 
purely a priori route towards knowing precisely which intension is expressed by their 
uses of ‘F.’ 
 We can now see the connection between semantic externalism, natural kinds, and 
a posteriori necessity.  Suppose that there is a predicate ‘G’ that expresses the property E.  
Given the stipulations above, ‘G’ is co-intensional with ‘F.’  Even so, it may be that ‘F’ 
and ‘G’ are not analytically equivalent.42  In that case, speakers will be unable to know 
that ‘F’ and ‘G’ are co-intensional without the benefit of an a posteriori investigation into 
which properties belong to the real essence of K.  It follows that the necessity claim, 
‘Necessarily, for any x, x is F iff x is G,’ is knowable only a posteriori.43  
 
                                                
42 We can suppose this only if we deny that that the meaning of a predicate is to be identified with its 
intension.  Brink rejects the identification of meaning with intension in his (1989: Ch. 6). 
43 Again, this necessity claim can be construed further as expressing an a posteriori property identity if we 
assume that co-intensionality is sufficient for property identity. 
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1.6.3. Causal theories of reference.   
Semantic externalism needs to be supplemented by an account that specifies how a given 
real essence comes to fix the intension of a given predicate.  While it is possible to adopt 
a more sophisticated version of descriptivism to accommodate externalism about 
semantic content, externalists have traditionally adopted some kind of causal theory of 
reference (or, better, content-fixing).44  On a view of this sort, the intension of a predicate 
is fixed by the real essence of the kind or property that bears the right causal relation to 
speakers’ use of that predicate (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975b).  The version of the causal 
theory of content most closely associated with SEN is Boyd’s “causal regulation” 
account.  In the most widely cited formulation of this view, Boyd writes, 
Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a kind (property, relation, 
etc.) k just in case there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it 
about, over time, that what is predicated of the term t will be approximately true 
of k […].  Such mechanisms will typically include the existence of procedures 
which are approximately accurate for recognizing members or instances of k (at 
least for easy cases) and which relevantly govern the use of t, the social 
transmission of certain relatively approximately true beliefs regarding k, 
formulated as claims about t […], a pattern of deference to experts on k with 
respect to the use of t, etc. […]” (Boyd 1988: 195; cf. Boyd 2003a: 538). 
 
Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have introduced a useful shorthand to denote the 
right-hand side of Boyd’s biconditional.  Following them, let us say that when the right 
hand side the biconditional is satisfied, k causally regulates the use of t. 
 Boyd’s statement of his theory of reference is not as lucid as one might like.  In 
the remainder of this section, I want to indicate how I understand his account of 
reference-fixing (and content-fixing) to work.  To begin with, I should note one 
complication.  Hitherto, I have been speaking about the relationship between predicates 
and the semantic contents (i.e. intensions) that they express.  However, Boyd’s account of 
                                                
44 For sketches of sophisticated descriptivism, see Chalmers (1996), Jackson (1998) and Lewis (1970). 
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reference is stated in terms of singular terms and the kinds that they putatively refer to.  
To facilitate discussion, I make the following assumption: if a property causally regulates 
the use of a property-name (e.g., ‘being gold’, ‘tigerhood’, ‘goodness’, etc.), then that 
property not only serves as the referent of that property name, but also fixes the intension 
of any corresponding predicate of which the property name is a nominalization (e.g., 
‘gold’, ‘tiger’, ‘good’, etc.).  In saying that a property (or essence), P, fixes the intension 
of a predicate ‘F’, I mean simply that the intension of ‘F’ is a function that maps each 
possible world to the set of individuals at that world that instantiate P (or to the empty set, 
if nothing at the world instantiates P).  Although it may be best for the purposes of SEN 
not to identify properties with intensions, when a property fixes the intension of a 
predicate, I will say that that predicate expresses that property.45  In addition, I will 
assume that when a property as causally regulates the use of a property-name, it also 
regulates the use of that name’s corresponding predicate. 
 Here, then, is a (very rough) illustration of Boyd’s causal regulation theory of 
reference as I understand it:  Let’s assume that it is a necessary truth that something is a 
quantity of (pure) gold iff it is a quantity of substance composed solely of atoms with 
atomic number 79 (Au, for short).  Consider, now, the use of ‘gold’ by speakers living 
prior to the rise of atomic chemistry.  How does Boyd’s theory of reference explain the 
fact that these speakers used ‘gold’ to express the property of being Au, even though they 
were not in a position to know or believe anything about atomic numbers, etc.?  Here is 
the sort of story Boyd might tell:  First, there is a tendency for it to be true that the pieces 
                                                
45 Although it is customary in semantics to identify each intension with a property, this may conflict with 
some commitments expressed by SEN proponents.  In particular, Brink appears to favor a sparse 
conception of properties whereby not every meaningful or contentful predicate expresses a genuine 
property (Brink 1989: 158f; cf. Armstrong 1978: 19-29). 
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of stuff to which the predicate ‘gold’ is applied by these speakers have the property of 
being Au.  Similarly, there is a tendency for it to be true that, when other properties are 
ascribed to the pieces of stuff to which ‘gold’ is applied, those pieces really have those 
other properties.  For instance, when the speakers utter ‘everything that is gold is 
malleable,’ it is true of everything that has the property of being Au that it also has the 
property of being malleable.  I take this to be what Boyd has in mind when he requires 
for reference that “what is predicated of the term t will be approximately true of k.”  
Second, this tendency for the speakers’ ascriptions to be correct is the result of the sorts 
of causal mechanisms that Boyd describes.  I take it that, at bottom, this involves the 
claim that the dominant,46 ultimate47 causal source of these speakers’ ‘gold’-related 
beliefs is being Au (or its instances).48  Under roughly49 these conditions, according to 
                                                
46 Here I am drawing on Gareth Evan’s (1973) for help.  The importance of the dominance condition is this: 
it may be that some number of our ‘gold’-related beliefs have their causal origin not in the property of 
being Au, but rather, in being FeS2 (i.e., being fool’s gold).  This can happen when someone comes to 
believe that ‘there is gold in them hills’ expresses a truth as a result of having seen instances of being FeS2 
in those hills.  Nevertheless, provided that being Au is the dominant source of speakers’ ‘gold’-related 
beliefs (and that being FeS2 is the source of relatively few of those beliefs) we should judge that the 
property expressed by ‘gold’ is being Au, and not being FeS2 (and not a disjunction of the two properties). 
47 I say ‘ultimate’ because it will likely be the case that many speakers never have direct contact with the 
relevant property expressed by their predicate.  For instance, it may be that some users of ‘gold’ have never 
been in its presence, and that all of their ‘gold’-related beliefs are acquired second hand, by testimony from 
other speakers.  In that case, what is important for reference, as I understand Boyd views, is that at the 
beginning of the chain of speakers from whence the information related to (e.g.) ‘gold’ came, there is some 
speaker for whom being Au is the dominant causal source of her ‘gold’-related beliefs. 
48 Compare this with Boyd’s claim that “the sorts of causal connections which are relevant to reference are 
just those which are involved in the reliable regulation of belief…” (1988: 195).  
49 Why only “roughly”?  I add this hedge because it is doubtful that the conditions Boyd lays out are really 
sufficient to deliver determinate referents or semantic contents to the relevant terms and predicates in all 
circumstances.  The trouble is this:  It could turn out that every piece of Au that the speakers have ever 
causally interacted with was impure and mixed with some other element, for example, oxygen.  In that 
case, there is another property besides being Au that is a candidate for the honors of being the property 
expressed by ‘gold’: viz., the property of being a compound of Au and O.  This is one manifestation of the 
so-called “qua problem,” noted by Kim Sterelny (1983), among others.  Boyd addresses the qua problem 
(though not by that name) in his (1999c: 58f) and (2003a: 536f).  His discussion is difficult and I am sure I 
do not fully understand his solution to the problem.  As best as I can tell, it involves adding an additional 
condition for reference: “[In] order for t to refer to p, the epistemic access which uses of t affords speakers 
to the real properties of p must (help to) explain the theoretical and/or practical successes achieved in the 
domains of inquiry or of practice to which t-talk is central” (2003a: 515).  Returning to the example 
involving ‘gold,’ this means, presumably, that we should expect that the causal connection between our 
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Boyd’s theory of reference, we can say that being Au is the real essence that fixes the 
intension of ‘gold’ (as used by our sample speakers).  The intension of ‘gold’ among 
these speakers then, is a function that maps each possible world to the set of all 
individuals at that world that exemplify being Au, if there are any such individuals. 
 Let us turn, now, to Boyd’s theory of reference as it applies to moral terms and 
examine the way in which it supports the claim that moral necessities are synthetic a 
posteriori.  
 Boyd proposes that, among English speakers, the use of moral terms like ‘moral 
goodness’ and ‘moral rightness’ is causally regulated by certain natural properties.  I 
understand this to imply that those natural properties also causally regulate the 
corresponding predicates ‘morally good’ and ‘morally right.’  If Boyd’s hypothesis is 
correct, and if his causal regulation account of content-fixing is true, it follows that, for 
any natural property, N, that uniquely causally regulates (e.g.) ‘morally right,’ the 
following necessity claim with be true (where ‘N’ is a non-moral predicate that expresses 
N): ‘Necessarily, for any x, x is morally right iff x has N.’  As long as N is not among the 
properties that are analytically associated with ‘right,’ this necessity claim is synthetic.  
Since it is presumably an empirical question which natural property causally regulates 
our use of ‘right’—and not something that can be discovered by conceptual analysis or 
synthetic a priori intuition—whether or not this necessity claim is true can be discovered 
only by a posteriori inquiry.  In this way, semantic externalism, supplemented with a 
                                                                                                                                            
‘gold’-related beliefs and being Au helps to explain the theoretical and/or practical success achieved 
through the use of the predicate ‘gold,’ whereas the connection between our ‘gold’-related beliefs and 
being a compound of Au and O does not explain this (or else explains it less well).  Among the things that 
are unclear here is the matter of what constitutes theoretical and practical success of ‘gold’-talk among the 
speakers living prior to modern chemistry.  Although I must set aside these worries about the qua problem, 
I must nevertheless acknowledge that how these matters are resolved by Boyd have the potential to affect 
the cogency of arguments I will be advancing in later chapters. 
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casual theory of reference, explains how it is possible for there to be moral identity 
claims whose truth-value is discoverable only a posteriori. 
 
1.6.4. The epistemological commitments of SEN.   
It may be worth making note of some further aspects of the epistemological commitments 
and preferences associated with SEN and the philosophers who defend it.  In addition to 
holding moral knowledge to be a posteriori, the principal defenders of SEN endorse a 
coherentist account of epistemic justification for moral (and non-moral) beliefs (Boyd 
1988; Brink 1989: ch. 5; Sturgeon 2002).  According to Brink’s characterization, moral 
coherentism “…holds that one’s moral belief p is justified insofar as p is part of a 
coherent system of beliefs, both moral and nonmoral, and p’s coherence at least partially 
explains why one holds p” (1989: 103).  On such a view, no moral belief is self-evident 
or self-justifying.  (That is, no moral belief is justified independently of its inferential 
relations to other beliefs held by the epistemic agent).   
 Brink (ibid. 104), Boyd (1988: 207) and Sturgeon (2006b: 105) all cite the 
method of wide reflective equilibrium as their preferred characterization of a coherentist 
method of moral inquiry.50  According to this method, roughly, an epistemic agent begins 
with a stock of considered moral judgments, general moral principles, and non-moral 
background beliefs.  She then makes modifications to all three elements with the goal of 
producing a new set of judgments, principles, and background beliefs that exhibits 
maximal coherence.  (Note that none of the three elements are thought of as incorrigible 
or as playing a privileged “foundational” role; all three are susceptible to revision in the 
                                                
50 The method of wide reflective equilibrium for moral inquiry was articulated by Rawls (1951; 1971/1999; 
1980).  For an especially clear description of this method, see Daniels (1979). 
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interest of coherence.)  When her moral judgments, moral principles, and background 
beliefs exhibit maximal coherence, the agent’s moral beliefs can be said to be in 
“reflective equilibrium.”  In this state, her moral beliefs (taken as a complete system) 
enjoy maximal epistemic justification for her. 
 It is expected that, in pursuing reflective equilibrium among her moral (and non-
moral) beliefs, an epistemic agent will make use of her moral intuitions.  We may 
understand an agent S to have a intuition that p just in case it seems to S that p, where this 
seeming is neither (i) the product of S’s sensory perception nor (ii) the product of S’s 
introspecting her own mental operations nor (iii) a process of reasoning from other 
premises held by S that can be introspectively accessed by S (cf. Bealer 2000: 3f; Huemer 
2005: 101f).  Following Huemer, we can say that a moral intuition is an intuition with a 
moral proposition as its content (Huemer ibid.).51 
 The role of intuitions here raises some questions about the empirical purity of 
moral knowledge as it is conceived by proponents of SEN.  At first sight anyway, moral 
intuitions have the appearance of being a priori.  Synthetic ethical naturalists, however, 
cannot allow this.  They cannot allow that moral intuitions are analytic a priori, since this 
would jeopardize their contention that the moral theories arrived on the basis of such 
intuitions are synthetic.  Nor can they allow that moral intuitions are synthetic a priori.  
This is because the synthetic a priori is not an empirical way of knowing.  In light of  the 
characterization of natural propertyhood in §1.3.1, we could not regard moral properties 
                                                
51 In formulating this characterization of a moral intuition I draw on the work of Bealer and Huemer.  I 
depart from them, however, in allowing that it is possible that S has a moral intuition that p even if p is the 
product of a process of reasoning.  I require only that any such process of reasoning is hidden from the 
epistemic agent (i.e., that the process is not accessible to her via introspection).  My reason for loosening 
the account in this way is to avoid begging the question against the account of intuition preferred by 
naturalists.  
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as natural properties if synthetic a priori intuition is required to know which things 
instantiate them. 
 What is needed by the synthetic ethical naturalist, then, is a naturalistically 
acceptable account of synthetic moral intuition.  To fill this need, SEN proponents 
contend that moral intuitions are really covert inferences from tacitly held background 
moral theories.  They maintain that moral intuitions resemble scientific intuitions in this 
respect.  With respect to intuitions of the latter kind, Boyd writes, 
…[I]t seems overwhelmingly likely that scientific intuitions should be thought of 
as trained judgments which resemble perceptual judgments in not 
involving…explicit inferences, but which resemble explicit inferences in science 
in depending for their reliability upon the relevant approximate truth of the 
explicit theories which help to determine them (1988: 193). 
 
Sturgeon adds, 
…I find it more plausible to think that what is [in scientific practice] called 
intuition is actually a product of inference in a broad but epistemologically well-
motivated sense.  Judgment here outruns the ability to articulate reasons; but we 
need some account of why the only people with physical intuition worth trusting 
are those with extensive knowledge of highly sophisticated, approximately true 
physical theory and a lot of experience in applying it (2002: 203). 
 
Although Boyd and Sturgeon here suggest that the scientific theories that ground 
scientific intuition are themselves explicitly known, other naturalists note that scientific 
intuitions can be grounded in tacit theories that epistemic agents cannot easily articulate 
(Kornblith 2002: 13).  Most importantly, all of these naturalists suppose that the relevant 
background scientific theories are empirically justifiable (if justifiable at all).  As a result, 
the scientific intuitions that are covert inferences from such theories should not be 
thought of as a priori; they are, instead, a posteriori, since they are inferences drawn 
from empirically or a posteriori justifiable background theories. 
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 SEN proponents argue that this conception of scientific intuition extends to moral 
intuitions as well.  Thus, Boyd writes 
…[W]e may now treat moral intuitions exactly on a par with scientific intuitions, 
as a species of trained judgment.  Such intuitions are not assigned a foundational 
role in moral inquiry…[they] are simply one cognitive manifestation of our moral 
understanding, just as physical intuitions, say, are a cognitive manifestation of 
physicists’ understanding of their subject matter (1988: 207f; cf. Sturgeon 2002: 
203). 
 
The idea, as I understand it, is this:  When contemplating possible cases, an epistemic 
agent will often have moral intuitions.  Although these intuitions may be 
“phenomenologically basic,” in the sense that “their inferential heritage is not 
introspectively available” to the agent (Kornblith 2002: 20), they are, nevertheless, the 
result of tacit inferences from the agent’s background moral beliefs and theory.  The 
epistemic agent who has these intuitions can use them as evidence in coherence 
reasoning, where the goal is to move from the tacit background theory to an explicit 
moral theory that is more coherent, and thus, better justified than the initial tacit theory. 
 Naturally, critics of SEN will want to ask where the agent’s tacit background 
theory comes from.  Sturgeon suggests that such a theory might be innate, though, in his 
view, the answer to this question “doesn’t much matter” (2006a: 254).  I disagree: the 
genealogy of our tacit moral beliefs is of grave metaethical importance.  In the first place, 
it isn’t obvious that our tacit theory has a genealogy that is compatible with the 
commitments of the naturalist’s empiricism.  An ethical non-naturalist, for instance, 
might concede that many of our particular moral intuitions are inferences from a tacit 
background moral theory but insist, nevertheless, that the tacit theory, inchoate as it may 
be, enters our minds by way of a synthetic a priori grasping.  While I am not inclined to 
accept the non-naturalist line suggested here, I do think the naturalist owes us greater 
38 
assurances that the tacit theory has a genealogy that is compatible with his empiricism.  
But secondly, there is to my mind a more serious challenge to SEN than the worry about 
preserving the empirical purity of moral epistemology.  This challenge asks whether there 
is a plausible story about the origins of our tacit moral theory according to which that 
theory is a roughly accurate reflection of moral reality.  All SEN proponents recognize 
that, in order for the method of reflective equilibrium to yield moral knowledge (rather 
than merely justified moral belief), it needs to be the case that the background moral 
beliefs with which we start are “sufficiently near the truth” (Boyd 1988: 201, 207; Brink 
1999: 207; Sturgeon 1985a: 67; 2006a: 254f; 2006b: 105f).  The present worry is that the 
most plausible genealogical stories about the sources of our tacit moral beliefs and 
theories—including stories according to which they are innate—may turn out to 
undermine our confidence that such theories really are “approximately true.”  (This worry 
is expanded in to a full-blown argument against SEN in Chapter 6 of this dissertation).   
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1.7. How SEN answers the objections to AEN.   
In this, the final section of Chapter 1, I want to revisit the objections to AEN discussed in 
§1.5 and briefly indicate how SEN promises the ethical naturalist an answer to them.  Its 
answers to first two objections require little comment.  In the first place, because SEN 
takes knowledge of moral claims to be synthetic, it does not run afoul of skepticism about 
analyticity.  Second, since SEN is grounded in an externalist moral semantics, it does not 
require the kind of internalist-descriptivist semantics thought to be refuted by the 
arguments of Kripke, Putnam, and others.   
 The externalist moral semantics also supplies the ethical naturalist with a simple 
response to the open question argument.  The open question argument can be used to 
show that moral properties are distinct from all natural properties only if it is assumed 
that two predicates express the same property only if they are synonymous.  However, 
recall from §1.6.2 that semantic externalism makes it possible for two predicates to 
express the same property even when their meaning (thought of as the concepts speakers 
associate with them) are distinct.  The synthetic ethical naturalist can claim that, just as 
‘water’ and ‘H2O’ express the same property despite being non-synonymous, so too is it 
(epistemically) possible for us that ‘morally right’ and the natural predicate (e.g.) 
‘maximizes hedonic utility’ express the same property even if these predicates are known 
not to be synonymous (Boyd 1988: 199; Brink 1989: 165; Lycan 1988: 199-202; Railton 
1989: 157f; Sturgeon 1985b: 25f; 2003: 533f). 
 SEN also promises the ethical naturalist a way out of the problem of chauvinistic 
conceptual relativism.  Given the externalist moral semantics favored by SEN, it does not 
follow from the fact that two speakers accept a different moral standard (and thus, 
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associate different descriptions with their use of moral predicates) that their uses of 
‘morally right’ must express different semantic contents.  It may be that the very same 
property causally regulates the use of both speakers’ predicates even if (at least) one of 
them has an incomplete or mistaken concept associated with that predicate.  Thus, it 
could be that the property of treating no one as a mere means causally regulates the use 
of ‘morally right’ among the Benthamanians (who, recall, accept AUh).  If so, 
Benthamanian uses of ‘right’ express the same content as the New Immanuel uses of 
‘right.’  The Benthamanians are simply mistaken as to the real nature of the property that 
regulates their own uses of ‘right.’  (One possible explanation that might be offered for 
their error is, perhaps, the fact—if it is a fact—that most of the actions that treat no one as 
a mere means also maximize hedonic utility.)52  Whatever the case may be, SEN’s 
externalist moral semantics makes it is possible—in certain cases, at least—for speakers 
who accept different moral standards to engage in a substantive disagreement about what 
is morally right or morally good (Boyd 1988: 199, 209f; Brink 2001: 163; Sturgeon 1984: 
329; 1986b: 124). 
 SEN proponents respond to the normativity objections by denying both MJI and 
MR.  For an analytic naturalist, this denial can succeed only if he can show that neither 
MJI nor MR is part of the concept that we associate with ‘moral judgment’ or ‘moral 
obligation.’  While SEN proponents have followed this strategy (thereby embracing what 
is sometimes called moral externalism),53 it has two disadvantages.  In the first place, 
                                                
52 In advancing this hypothesis, I am merely trying to indicate how an explanation of their error might go.  
For what it’s worth, I have grave doubts that most actions that treat no one as a mere means also maximize 
hedonic utility. 
53 Brink argues this way in his (1989: ch. 3).  He offers as conceptual possibility the existence of an 
amoralist.  There are two salient kinds of amoralist, and Brink contends that both are possible.  The first 
amoralist is an agent who judges an action to be obligatory but has no motivation to perform it.  The second 
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while MJI might be thought to be a vulnerable principle, the denial of MR is much harder 
to swallow.  To deny MR is to allow that it is a conceptual possibility that there is some 
very powerful psychopath who, while morally obligated to refrain from harming his 
victim, simply has no reason to so refrain.  I believe that the concept of a moral 
obligation does not allow for such a possibility.  A second disadvantage for this strategy 
is that a straight denial of MJI and MR appears to be doomed to end in stalemate at best.  
Fortunately, the synthetic ethical naturalist’s acceptance of an externalist moral semantics 
makes available a stronger reply.  One of the supposed benefits of an externalist 
semantics is that it makes it possible for speakers to use a predicate to express a property, 
even if the concept that those speakers associate with that predicate is erroneous.  For 
example, we saw in §1.5.2 that semantic externalism about biological species predicates 
makes it possible for a community of speakers to use ‘whale’ to express the property of 
being a whale even if the description they associate with that predicate mistakenly 
includes the property of being a fish.  With this in mind, the SEN proponent is in a 
position to concede that MJI and MR are both part of the concept or description that we 
associate with the predicate ‘morally obligatory’ while denying that the real property of 
moral obligation satisfies either conceptual requirement.54   
 The last objection to AEN concerns the question over whether construing moral 
theories as expressing conceptual or analytic truths leaves enough room for the possibility 
(characteristic of robust moral realism) that our best moral theory is nevertheless false.  
SEN seems able to account for this possibility with less difficulty.  According to the 
                                                                                                                                            
amoralist is an agent who has an obligation but, because of his preferences, has no reason to fulfill it.  See 
also Boyd (1988: 214ff) and Sturgeon (1986b: 121f). 
54 I am not aware of any synthetic ethical naturalist who explicitly advances this argument in precisely this 
fashion.  Brink comes close when he rejects the status of MJI as a conceptual truth on what he calls 
“Quinean grounds” in his (1987: 294). 
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semantics of SEN, the matter of which property is expressed by ‘morally right’ is not 
settled merely by the concept we associate with the predicate.  Because of this, it appears 
to be in principle possible that we achieve reflective equilibrium among our beliefs about 
what is morally right while the moral theory we accept fails to capture the true nature of 
the natural property that causally regulates our use of ‘morally right’ (i.e., the property 
moral rightness).55 
 
                                                
55 Contrast this with Putnam who, writing against metaphysical realism, argues that “The supposition that 
even an “ideal” theory (from a pragmatic point of view) might really be false appears to collapse into 
unintelligibility” (1977: 486).  If Putnam is right, then even SEN’s central supposition that moral terms 
pick out kinds or properties with a posteriori real definitions will not deliver a robustly realistic metaethic. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MORAL TWIN EARTH VERSUS EXTERNALIST MORAL SEMANTICS 
2. Chapter. 
2.1. Introduction. 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the realist variety of AEN cannot accommodate the 
existence of genuine moral disagreement between speakers (or communities of speakers) 
who subscribe to different moral standards; instead, AEN entails a chauvinistic form of 
conceptual relativism, wrongly implying that speakers disagreeing with one another 
about moral matters are only verbally disagreeing.  As we also saw, the adoption of SEN 
is thought to promise a way around this problem for the ethical naturalist.  Because the 
externalist moral semantics that grounds SEN makes it possible for two speakers to 
express the same content with a predicate even when the concepts they associate with that 
predicate are distinct, the fact that two speakers associate different moral standards with 
their uses of ‘morally right’ need not entail that they express distinct properties; and if 
their predicates do express the same property, they will be able to use those predicates to 
engage in substantive moral disagreement, even if they happen to associate different 
moral standards with their use of those predicates. 
 In a series of papers, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (H&T) have advanced 
an argument that shows that this supposed advantage for SEN over AEN is illusory: the 
externalist moral semantics favored by SEN also entails a chauvinistic form of conceptual 
relativism.  If they are right, then the externalist semantics that serves as the foundation 
of SEN should be rejected. 
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 H&T’s argument centers around their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment 
(MTE).  In constructing this thought experiment, H&T draw inspiration from the famous 
Twin Earth thought experiment introduced by Hilary Putnam in his “The Meaning of 
‘Meaning’” (1975b).  However, whereas Putnam’s thought experiment convinced many 
that semantic externalism offers the correct semantics for natural kind terms like ‘water’ 
and ‘aluminum,’ the MTE thought experiment is meant to show that externalist semantics 
do not offer a correct account of the contents of moral predicates.  In the present chapter, 
I begin by sketching Putnam’s original Twin Earth argument for natural kind terms.  I 
then present H&T’s MTE thought experiment and the accompanying argument against 
semantic externalism for moral predicates.  In the remaining sections, I consider several 
challenges to H&T’s argument.  These challenges all involve the claim that the MTE 
thought experiment is misleading and that the intuitions generated from it—intuitions that 
undermine SEN’s semantics—should not be trusted.  If these objections are well-
founded, then we should reject H&T’s argument against SEN.  I argue, however, that 
these objections miss their mark: there is no reason to suppose that the MTE thought 
experiment is misleading.  The intuitions generated by the thought experiment are at least 
as innocent as the intuitions generated by Putnam’s original.  (In Chapters 3 and 4, I go 
on to consider other attempts to defend SEN from the MTE argument.) 
 
2.2. Putnam’s Twin Earth. 
Putnam asks us to imagine a planet in our galaxy that is as near a duplicate to Earth as is 
possible save for the following difference: on Twin Earth “…the liquid called ‘water’ is 
not H2O but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very long and complicated.”  
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Putnam calls this chemical formula ‘XYZ.’  Despite its different chemical structure, XYZ 
is indiscernible from H2O in all of its superficial properties.  In addition, the role that 
XYZ plays on Twin Earth is very similar to the role that H2O plays here on Earth: e.g. it 
fills the lakes, rivers, and oceans; nourishes Twin Earthling life forms; etc. (Putnam 
1975b: 223). 
 In light of the Twin Earth scenario, there are two salient alternative ways of 
describing the extensions of ‘water’ as used by Earthlings and ‘water’ as used by Twin 
Earthlings.  (Hereafter, I use t-‘water’ to represent Twin Earthling uses of ‘water.’)  In 
the first place, we can say that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ have the same extension.  This 
extension includes all molecules of XYZ and all molecules of H2O and nothing else.  By 
the second alternative, we can say that ‘water’ has all and only molecules of H2O as its 
extension, while t-‘water’ has all and only molecules of XYZ as its extension.  Putnam 
contends (and much of the philosophical community agrees) that the second alternative is 
correct. 
 Putnam recognizes that he has not yet established semantic externalism as an 
account of the semantic contents of predicates like ‘water.’  For all that has been said, our 
judgment that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ differ in extension may be due to our supposing that 
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings have different ‘water’-related concepts or beliefs.  After 
all, many present day Earthlings believe that the stuff they call ‘water’ is composed of 
H2O.  Given Twin Earth’s similarities with Earth, we should expect that many Twin 
Earthlings believe that the stuff they call t-‘water’ is composed of XYZ.  Thus, it may be 
that the difference in extension is a result of differences in the internal1 mental states of 
                                                
1 Here I use ‘internal’ where others might use ‘narrow.’  An individual’s narrow mental states are typically 
understood to be those mental states that the individual shares with all of her intrinsic duplicates.  Some 
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Earthling and Twin Earthling speakers, and not simply a result of differences in their 
environments, as Putnam wants to claim. 
 To block the semantic internalist’s preferred explanation of the intuition that 
‘water’ and t-‘water’ have different extensions, Putnam asks his readers to imagine both 
planets as they were in 1750, prior to the rise of modern chemistry.  It may now be 
plausibly supposed that the beliefs and concepts that Twin Earthlings associate with t-
‘water’ are exactly like—if not identical to—the beliefs and concepts that Earthlings 
associate with ‘water.’  But even in this case, Putnam contends (and many philosophers 
agree) that “the extension of the term ‘water’ was just as much H2O on Earth in 1750 as 
in 1950; and the extension of the term [t-]‘water’ was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 
1750 as in 1950” (ibid. 224). 
 The pre-chemistry Twin Earth case shows that it is possible for two speakers A 
and B to associate the same descriptions or concepts with a kind predicate ‘F’ and yet A 
expresses a different intension using ‘F’ than B does.2  It follows that the intensions (and 
hence semantic contents) of these predicates are not fixed solely in virtue of the concepts 
that speakers associate with them.  Something external to the speaker’s mind is needed.  
The upshot of Twin Earth, then, is that semantic externalism offers the correct account of 
the semantic contents of natural kind predicates like ‘water.’ 
                                                                                                                                            
have noticed that, on this construal, it isn’t clear that an Earthling and her Twin Earth counterpart can have 
the same narrow mental states.  The problem is that over half of the Twin Earthling’s body is presumably 
composed of XYZ molecules, whereas the same proportion of the Earthling’s body is composed of H2O 
molecules.  If so, the two are not intrinsic duplicates, strictly speaking.  Thus, they cannot have the same 
narrow mental states.  In light of this, I prefer the somewhat less loaded ‘internal mental state.’  This 
locution is meant to capture intuitively whatever kind of mental state Putnam intended each Twin Earthling 
to share with his or her Earthling counterpart in the 1750 story. 
2 Putnam does not himself state the conclusion of the Twin Earth argument in terms of intensions.  This 
may be because in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” he is thinking of intensions as “something like an 
individual speaker’s concept” (1975b: 245, cf. 216-219).  I am not using ‘intension’ in this way.  I take 
intensions to be functions from worlds to extensions.  The intension of a term need not be fixed by 
speakers’ concepts.  If intensions are thought of as functions from worlds to extensions, then it follows that 
if two predicates have different extensions at any single world, they have different intensions. 
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 It is worth observing that causal theories of reference such as Boyd’s nicely 
explain the intuition that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ have different extensions.  On Earth, 
speakers have causal contact with H2O but not with XYZ.  On Twin Earth, speakers have 
causal contact with XYZ but not with H2O.  A defender of a causal theory of reference 
might argue that the intuition that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ have different extensions is due to 
our tacit recognition that some sort of causal acquaintance is necessary for successful 
reference. 
  
2.3. Moral Twin Earth. 
H&T’s Moral Twin Earth thought experiment draws inspiration from Putnam’s thought 
experiment in order to undermine the application of Boyd’s semantics to moral terms.  
We have already met Boyd’s causal theory in §1.6.3.  Here is H&T’s formulation of this 
theory as it applies to moral terms: 
CSN Causal semantic naturalism: Each moral term t rigidly designates the natural 
property N that uniquely causally regulates the use of t by humans (1990-91: 
455). 
 
We should understand CSN to include the claim that each moral predicate, ‘F,’ expresses 
the natural property that uniquely causally regulates the use of ‘F’ by humans.3 
 The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment (MTE) begins with the stipulation that 
on Earth “human uses of ‘good’ and ‘right’ are causally regulated by certain functional 
properties;4 and that, as a matter of empirical fact, these are consequentialist properties 
                                                
3 That is to say, if there is a natural property N that uniquely causally regulates the actual use of ‘F,’ then 
the intension of ‘F’ is the function that maps each possible world to an extension containing all and only 
instances of N at that world. 
4 By stipulating that moral properties are functional properties, H&T are following Brink’s suggestion in 
his (1984: 121f).  There, Brink invokes a functionalist account of moral properties in order to explain the 
supervenience of moral properties on physical properties. 
48 
whose functional essence is captured by some specific consequentialist normative theory; 
call this theory Tc” (1990-91: 458).5  I find that it makes for easier discussion if we name 
one of these consequentialist properties.  Let us add to H&T’s stipulations that the 
property of maximizing utility causally regulates the use of ‘morally right’ among 
Earthling speakers. 
 Moral Twin Earth is a planet in our galaxy that is as near a duplicate of Earth as 
possible save for one difference to be noted shortly.  But first, let us highlight an 
important similarity between the two planets: like us, Twin Earthlings 
…use the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and wrong’ to evaluate actions, persons, 
institutions and so forth…[T]he terms are used to reason about considerations 
bearing on Moral Twin Earthling well-being; Moral Twin Earthlings are normally 
disposed to act in certain ways corresponding to judgments about what is ‘good’ 
and ‘right;’ they normally take considerations about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ to 
be especially important, even of overriding importance in most cases, in deciding 
what to do, and so on (1990-91: 459). 
 
Despite this similarity, on Moral Twin Earth the use of these terms is causally regulated 
by certain functional properties whose essence is captured by a non-consequentialist, 
deontological normative theory called ‘Td’.  Again, I find it useful to name one of these 
properties.  Let’s say that the property of treating no one as a mere means causally 
regulates the use of ‘morally right’ on Moral Twin Earth.  (Hereafter, I use t-‘right’ to 
represent uses of ‘morally right’ by Twin Earthlings.)  To account for this respect in 
which Twin Earthlings differ from Earthlings, H&T stipulate that there are “species-wide 
differences in psychological temperament” between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings (ibid.  
For more on this, see §2.5.3 below). 
                                                
5 Recall from Chapter §1.6.1 that SEN proponents suppose that the essence of moral properties will be 
captured by theories in first-order normative ethics (see Brink 1989: 177f, 238; 2001: 162; Sturgeon 1985a: 
61). 
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 With this description of the MTE case in hand, H&T present the reader with two 
alternative ways to describe the uses of ‘good’ and ‘right’ by Earthlings and Twin 
Earthlings.  On the first interpretation, “moral and twin-moral terms differ in meaning, 
and are not intertranslatable.”  On the second interpretation, “moral and twin-moral terms 
do not differ in meaning or reference” (1990-91: 460, emphasis in the original).  
Although H&T here speak of the sameness of meaning as being what is at issue, I think it 
is better to speak of the sameness of semantic content.6  As mentioned in §1.4.2, I take 
the semantic content of a predicate to be its intension.  The intension of a predicate 
determines the contribution the predicate makes to the truth-conditions of sentences in 
which it appears.  In my view, then, the question before us is whether we should view 
Earthling utterances of ‘φ is right’ as having different truth-conditions from Twin 
Earthling utterances of ‘φ is [t-]right.’  (Putting things this way commits us to moral 
cognitivism.  However, since cognitivism is already a commitment of SEN, I see no harm 
in assuming it to be true so long as we keep in mind that one possible lesson of MTE is 
that the content of moral predicates is [primarily] non-cognitive or of some expressivist 
sort.) 
 H&T contend that the second interpretation is correct: the content of ‘φ is right’ 
on Earth is the same as the content of ‘φ is [t-]right’ on Twin Earth.  If their judgment is 
correct—and I think it is—it spells trouble for CSN.  Since distinct properties causally 
                                                
6 One reason to avoid casting the question as one about meaning is that Brink, for one, separates the 
meaning of a predicate from the property or intension it expresses.  This is apparent in his rejection of “the 
semantic test of properties” (Brink 1989: 162, 166).  He allows that a natural predicate could express the 
same property as a moral predicate even when the two predicates do not have the same meaning.  Brink 
evidently thinks of the meaning of a predicate as something like a Fregean sense.  On such a view, a 
predicate’s meaning is roughly a criterion for its application that speakers associate with that predicate.  If 
this is the way meaning is to be construed, then it is immaterial to the defense of CSN whether ‘right’ has 
the same meaning (i.e., associated criterion of application) as t-‘right.’  For this reason, I find it preferable 
to pose the present question as being about semantic content rather than meaning. 
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regulate the use of ‘right’ and t-‘right,’ CSN entails that utterances of ‘right’ and t-‘right’ 
express different content.  ‘Right’ expresses the property of maximizing utility.  T-‘right’ 
expresses the property of treating no one as a mere means.  That these are distinct 
properties can be seen when we consider organ harvest cases in which an individual 
person is treated as a mere means in order to maximize utility.7  Such actions fall within 
the intension of ‘right’ but not within the intension of t-‘right.’  It follows that, if H&T 
are correct in judging that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ have the same content, CSN is false. 
 The defender of CSN may be tempted simply to reject the judgment that ‘right’ 
and t-‘right’ have the same content.   Such a move would commit CSN to a kind of 
conceptual relativism whereby ‘right’ and t-‘right’ are incommensurable.  The 
implausibility of this maneuver is revealed when one considers how things would go if 
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings were to meet: 
Suppose that Earthlings visit Twin Earth (or vice versa), and both groups come to 
realize that different natural properties causally regulate their respective uses of 
‘good,’ ‘right,’ and other moral terms.  If CSN were true, then recognition of 
these differences ought to result in its seeming rather silly, to members of each 
group, to engage in intergroup debate about goodness—about whether it conforms 
to normative theory Tc or to Td.  […] But such intergroup debate in the Moral 
Twin Earth story would surely strike both groups not as silly, but as quite 
appropriate, because they would regard one another as differing in moral belief 
and moral theory, not in meaning (Timmons 1999: 62f). 
 
By contrast, in Putnam’s original Twin Earth scenario (‘PTE,’ hereafter) it is plausible to 
suppose that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings who meet would cease debating about the 
true chemical composition of “water” as soon as they recognized that different chemical 
substances causally regulate the use of ‘water’ and t-‘water.’  One expects that they 
would readily acknowledge that their disagreement was merely verbal. 
                                                
7 The standard organ harvest case involves a surgeon who kills one innocent healthy patient (without his 
consent) in order to transplant his organs to five other patients who would otherwise die. 
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 It would appear, then, that MTE refutes CSN.  Since CSN is the semantics that 
underwrites SEN, MTE deals a blow to SEN as well.  Nor is there much promise in 
replacing CSN with an externalist moral semantics that has a different content-fixing 
mechanism from Boyd’s.  H&T characterize the basic MTE story as providing a “recipe” 
for generating arguments against any version of externalist moral semantics that one 
might propose.  They contend that, for any relation that is proposed as sufficient to fix the 
reference (and, presumably, the contents) of moral terms, one of the following will be 
true: (a) the relation is insufficient to fix a determinate reference for moral terms; or else 
(b) a population of Twin Earthlings can be imagined whose moral terms bear the 
proposed reference relation to a different natural property than Earthling moral terms bear 
this relation to.  In that case, the proposed moral semantics will again result in an 
objectionably “chauvinistic” form of relativism.8 
 
2.4. The Attack on the Moral Twin Earth Thought Experiment. 
2.4.1. Introduction.   
Several philosophers have argued that H&T’s Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is a 
“flawed-intuition pump.”  This line of argument receives its most sustained articulation in 
a jointly authored essay by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson 
(LM&D).  They claim that the MTE argument provides “no reason at all for rejecting 
ethical naturalism” (1999: 135).  This is because the MTE thought experiment contains 
misleading features that distort readers’ semantic intuitions.  To make their case, they 
highlight the ways in which MTE differs from PTE: 
                                                
8 H&T sketch a “generic” form of the MTE argument in their (2000).  For a look at MTE in action against 
other proposed moral semantics see H&T (1996a; 2000; Forthcoming).  
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Like H&T, we will not question the legitimacy of Putnam’s original Twin Earth 
thought experiment.  Our question is whether H&T’s Moral Twin Earth thought 
experiment is as legitimate as the original.  The whole point of H&T’s direct 
argument is that there is supposed to be an asymmetry between the intuitions 
generated by Twin Earth and Moral Twin Earth; this asymmetry is supposed to 
argue for the claim that the moral terms aren’t rigid designators.9  For the 
argument to work, however, the two thought experiments have to be constructed 
in analogous fashion.  The problem with the argument is that they aren’t.  There 
are a number of crucial disanalogies between the two thought experiments, and 
it’s these disanalogies that do much of the work in generating the intuitions that 
H&T’s arguments rely upon (1999: 155; cf. Geirsson 2003: 118). 
 
Now, I think LM&D vastly overstate the importance of MTE’s connection with Putnam’s 
original.  The MTE argument would stand just fine on its own even if no one had ever 
dreamed up PTE.  But even if the connection were important, the MTE argument cannot 
be undermined simply by pointing to ways in which the MTE thought experiment differs 
from PTE.  Those differences ought to be such that there is good reason to think that they 
will contribute to the distortion of our intuitions.  In the remainder of this chapter, I 
consider the three disanalogies between MTE and PTE that LM&D highlight.  I argue 
that LM&D fail to show that the respects in which MTE differs from PTE exert (or are 
likely to exert) a distorting influence on our intuitions.  My aim here is to establish only 
that the MTE thought experiment is no worse an intuition pump than PTE.  I have 
nothing to say in defense of the use of these (or any other) thought experiments more 
generally. 
 
2.4.2. A preliminary objection.   
Before turning to the objections raised by LM&D, I want to deal with a worry about 
MTE that David Brink raises.  In the version of PTE that establishes semantic 
                                                
9 Whereas LM&D suggest that what is at stake is whether moral terms are rigid designators, I think the real 
issue is whether the contents of moral terms are fixed in accordance with the semantic externalist’s picture. 
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externalism (where the story is set in 1750), it is important that the speakers on Twin 
Earth associate the very same concept with t-‘water’ that Earthlings associate with 
‘water.’  To ensure that they do, Putnam asks us to imagine that the relevant Twin 
Earthling speaker in his example (Oscar2) is an exact duplicate of his Earthling 
counterpart (Oscar1) with respect to his “appearance, feelings, thoughts, interior 
monologue, etc.” (1975b: 224).  Since the only relevant difference between Earth and 
Putnam’s Twin Earth is the underlying composition of the “watery” stuff, this 
supposition can be entertained without much difficulty.  But this is not so for MTE.  As 
Brink observes, 
If people have the same commitments to morality on Earth and Moral Twin Earth, 
the differing standards will cause each planet’s people to assess people, actions, 
and institutions differently; over the long run, this should affect the course of 
individual and social histories on Earth and Moral Twin Earth.  Though the 
members of both planetary pairs—Earth and Twin Earth and Earth and Moral 
Twin Earth—are…otherwise indistinguishable, this caveat includes many more 
differences in the second pair than in the first.  As it seemed important to 
Putnam’s original arguments that differences between Earth and Twin Earth be 
minimized, the more extensive differences between Earth and Moral Twin Earth 
may complicate Timmons and Horgan’s argument (2001: 165n21). 
 
Since the inevitable differences in the behaviors of Earthlings and Moral Twin Earthlings 
are undoubtedly due to differences in their internal mental states, it is hard to see how we 
can maintain that Moral Twin Earthlings have the very same internal mental states as 
their Earthling counterparts.   Here then, we are confronted with an obvious and glaring 
difference between MTE and PTE.  What should we make of this difference?  
 What Brink’s observation reveals is that MTE could not be used to confirm an 
externalist semantics for moral terms.  If, contra H&T, we had judged that ‘right’ and t-
‘right’ express different content, we would not have been free to conclude that the 
contents of moral terms are (at least partly) individuated by features of the external 
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environment.  For we would not have ruled out the possibility that our judging ‘right’ and 
t-‘right’ to have different content is due to our taking Earthlings and Twin Earthlings to 
associate different concepts or beliefs with their respective predicates. 
 This should not worry us.  Although MTE could not confirm externalist moral 
semantics like CSN, it remains an important test that such theories must pass in order to 
remain viable.  In this respect, it is much like Putnam’s own initial setup of Twin Earth.  
Recall that Putnam first warms up his readers with a version of PTE where the relevant 
users of ‘water’ and t-‘water’ are our contemporaries (or nearly so).  In that example it is 
understood that Twin Earthlings have different internal mental states from their Earthling 
counterparts.  Indeed, one such difference is that, whereas contemporary Earthlings 
believe that ‘Water is composed of H2O’ expresses a truth, Twin Earthlings do not 
believe this.  It is important to recognize that it is not trivial that Putnam’s audience 
widely agreed that contemporary Earthlings and Twin Earthlings express different 
properties using ‘water’ and t-‘water.’  If readers had judged otherwise, Putnam’s entire 
argument would have been stopped dead in its tracks.  If we had judged that ‘water’ and 
t-‘water’ had the same content in 1950, despite the different concepts and beliefs that 
speakers on each planet associate with these terms, there would have been no way that 
our intuitions would be reversed by making Earthlings and Twin Earthlings more alike in 
their ‘water’-related internal mental states.  Nor would there be any grounds to complain 
that the differences allowed in the Twin Earthlings’ internal mental states unfairly stack 
the deck against an externalist semantics for ‘water.’  If anything, the inclusion of such 
differences favors the sort of intuition that externalists hope to elicit.  But if this is so with 
respect to the 1950 version of PTE, then we must conclude that there are no grounds for 
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the complaint that MTE stacks the deck against an externalist semantics for ‘right’ by 
allowing (indeed, stipulating) that Moral Twin Earthlings have some internal mental 
states that differ from those of their Earthling counterparts. 
 
2.4.3. First objection: competing theories of a kind.   
LM&D observe that in PTE the relevant substance that the Twin Earthlings are causally 
acquainted with is a fictitious philosophical invention that readers have no familiarity 
with.  They write that XYZ is a “chemical composition that’s tied to a chemical theory 
that no one has ever supposed is true of water” (1999: 156).  Although it may be, strictly 
speaking, an epistemic possibility for us that water is XYZ, it is not a “live” epistemic 
possibility; it is not a possibility that we take seriously in non-skeptical contexts.  To 
abbreviate this feature of PTE, let’s say that PTE does not involve competing theories of a 
kind.   In the MTE scenario, by contrast, the properties that causally regulate ‘right’ and t-
‘right’ do answer to competing theories of a kind.  Both consequentialism and deontology 
are live epistemic possibilities for us.  As LM&D observe, both theories have “strong 
advocates in philosophical circles” (ibid.). 
 LM&D argue that this feature of MTE—the fact that it involves competing 
theories of a kind—distorts readers’ intuitions about the case.  In particular, it makes it 
much more tempting for readers to view the parties on Earth and Twin Earth as 
expressing the same property than would be the case if the Twin Earthlings’ moral theory 
were something with very little plausibility as the correct theory of our own use of 
‘right.’10  If it is to be legitimate, the MTE thought experiment should be purged of this 
                                                
10 Eric Gample makes the same point in his (1997: 152); see also Merli (2002).  Merli argues that, if both 
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings separately achieve reflective equilibrium with respect to the question of 
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misleading feature.  The story should be retold so that the property regulating t-‘right’ 
does not have its essence specified by a moral theory that is a live epistemic possibility 
for us (ibid.). 
  
2.4.4. First reply.   
As a matter of fact, I think a compelling MTE thought experiment can be constructed that 
does not make use of competing moral theories (see §2.4.5 below).  For the moment, 
however, I want to argue that it is by no means obvious that MTE’s inclusion of 
competing moral theories is grounds for criticism.  In fact, it seems to me that LM&D’s 
observation poses a greater threat to PTE than it does to MTE.  In particular, PTE is 
vulnerable to the objection that the externalist intuition gets unfair leverage precisely 
because Putnam’s example fails to involve competing theories of the nature of water.  To 
see why PTE is vulnerable on this front, consider the following complaint that might be 
raised by a semantic internalist against Putnam’s original argument for externalism: 
Surely, all of Putnam’s readers do in fact associate the property being composed 
of H2O molecules with their use of ‘water.’  Indeed, many young children know 
that water is composed of something called ‘H2O’ long before they know what 
‘H’ and ‘O’ stand for.  Being H2O is thus almost certainly part of the concept we 
associate with ‘water.’  In the version of Twin Earth that putatively establishes 
semantic externalism (the 1750 version) readers are asked to set aside the concept 
that they themselves associate with ‘water’ and imagine the concept that a pre-
scientific speaker might associate with it (e.g., “the clear, drinkable liquid in the 
rivers and lakes etc.”).  We are then asked to make a judgment about what the 
extension of ‘water’ is in the example.  What must be recognized is that 
performing this exercise requires great care.  There is always a threat that we will 
sneak our own more familiar concept back into the example.  In addition, we must 
not allow our knowledge that ‘water’ actually refers only to H2O to influence our 
                                                                                                                                            
which property regulates their use of ‘right,’ and further conversation will not move either from their 
normative theory, then “it seems increasingly reasonable to think that moralists and Twin-moralists would 
be warranted in interpreting each other as using different terms” (ibid. 228).   Nevertheless, since both Tc 
and Td are epistemically possible for us, it still (incorrectly) appears to us as if the Earthlings and their 
Twins are having a substantive disagreement.   
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judgment about the semantic facts of the imagined Twin Earth case.  If we do, 
then we are all but guaranteed to judge that the extension of t-‘water’ is different 
from the extension of ‘water.’  In such an event, our inability to set aside our own 
concept that we associate with ‘water’ would have given the false appearance of 
confirmation to semantic externalism. 
 
This complaint shows that it is no virtue of PTE that it avoids the use of competing 
theories of water’s composition.  Indeed, this very feature threatens the integrity of the 
thought experiment.  Our own judgment that XYZ is not water may be due to the fact that 
we cannot easily suspend our belief that water is in fact nothing but H2O. 
 The defender of semantic externalism for natural kind terms could allay this 
worry by finding another Twin Earth story that involves competing theories of a 
(scientific) kind.  This story must again yield the intuition that speakers on Twin Earth 
refer to a different kind (or express a different property) than Earthlings refer to using an 
orthographically identical term.  Unfortunately for LM&D, if the externalist is successful 
in finding a replacement, then, in addition to having defended PTE, he will have shown 
that the use of competing theories of a kind does not give us reason to doubt our 
intuitions about Twin Earth cases.  In that case, MTE is vindicated.  On the other hand, if 
the externalist fails to find a suitable replacement for the twin water case, then this would 
suggest that Twin Earth thought experiments cannot be used to support semantic 
externalism.  If so, PTE is a failure.  But then, the observation that MTE lacks the very 
feature that renders PTE useless is hardly grounds for criticism against MTE. 
 
2.4.5. Second reply.   
Above, we saw that LM&D challenge the opponents of SEN to devise a compelling MTE 
story that does not make use of competing theories of rightness.  I believe this challenge 
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can be met.  Suppose that on Moral Triplet Earth ‘morally right’ is causally regulated by 
a property whose functional essence is specified by the following Nietzsche-inspired 
moral theory:11 
Tw:   Necessarily, for any act, x, x is morally right iff by performing x, the agent 
of x expresses her will to power. 
 
As in H&T’s MTE story, we should suppose that Triplet Earthlings are normally 
disposed to perform actions they believe to have the “Tw property”12 of expressing will to 
power.  Moreover, they normally take an act’s expressing will to power as an overriding 
reason for the agent to perform it.  Let us add that Triplet Earthlings look upon those who 
fail to act in accordance with Tw with some sort of negative attitude (e.g., scorn or 
disgust).  Agents who fail to act in accordance with Tw tend to feel some sort of negative 
attitude toward themselves (an attitude like shame, for instance).  Importantly, such 
reactive attitudes do not generally accompany failures to act in altruistic ways; or, more 
precisely, these attitudes do not accompany failures to perform altruistic acts when those 
acts do not also express the agent’s will to power. 
 I submit that Triplet Earthlings can use the predicate ‘morally right’ to engage in 
substantive moral disagreement with any Earthlings they might encounter.  If we assume 
moral cognitivism, it follows that the Triplets’ use of ‘morally right’ expresses the same 
property as is expressed by Earthling uses of ‘morally right.’  It does so despite the fact 
that the natural property that causally regulates the Triplets’ use of ‘morally right’ is 
                                                
11 This example is inspired by David Copp’s (1990: 247f).  I do not mean to attribute Tw to Nietzsche 
himself. 
12 That is, the natural property whose functional essence is specified by TW.  Throughout this chapter, I also 
use ‘Tc property’ and ‘Td property’ to denote the natural properties whose essences are specified by Tc and 
Td respectively. 
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different from the one that regulates its Earthling uses.  If this is correct, then CSN is 
again refuted. 
 Now, if Moral Triplet Earth is to satisfy LM&D’s challenge, then it must also be 
true that (a) Tw is not an “epistemically live” theory of moral rightness and that (b) Tw 
supplies a potential criterion of moral rightness and not some other kind of rightness (e.g. 
prudential, or aesthetic).  If (b) were false, then the defender of SEN could allow that 
Triplet Earthlings can have a substantive practical disagreement with Earthlings by using 
(tr-)‘right’ while denying that this disagreement is over which acts are morally right. 
 I am satisfied that both (a) and (b) are true.  For me at any rate, Tw is not a live 
epistemic possibility.  It is not among those theories in normative ethics that I can 
seriously entertain as true.  I suspect this attitude toward Tw is widely shared by 
contemporary philosophers.  On the other hand, the claim that (b) is true may face greater 
resistance.  Some may take it to be a minimal requirement of a criterion of morally right 
action that the well-being of others is directly relevant to the rightness of any agent’s 
act.13  Call a criterion of right action that meets this requirement other-regarding.  By Tw, 
the well-being of others is never directly relevant to the rightness of an agent’s act.  
Hence, Tw is not other-regarding and, so the objection goes, it is not an eligible candidate 
for a criterion of morally right action.  A further consequence is that Triplet Earthlings 
cannot use the term ‘right’ to have a substantive moral disagreement with Earthlings.  
Whatever else they are saying about an act when they apply ‘morally right’ to it, Triplet 
Earthlings are not ascribing moral rightness to it. 
                                                
13 Of course, the well-being of others may be indirectly relevant to the moral rightness of actions, given Tw.  
For example, there are likely to be situations in which an agent can express her will to power by forming 
alliances that benefit others. 
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 Against an objection of this sort, I offer two observations.  First, neither the 
Oxford English Dictionary, The American Heritage Dictionary, nor the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary mention anything about other-regarding duties (or altruism) in their 
definitions of the adjective ‘moral.’  Second, it is common for moral philosophers to 
include ethical egoism on the menu of theories of morally right action (see, for example, 
Brandt 1959; Feldman 1978; Kagan 1998; Moore 1903; Ross 1930; Sidgwick 1907; cf. 
Foot 1958).14  For an ethical egoist, the welfare of others is not directly relevant to the 
rightness of an action.  Consequently, we would not expect egoism to be catalogued as a 
moral theory by these philosophers if other-regardingness were a requirement for any 
admissible theory or criterion of morally right action.  I believe these two observations 
shift the burden of proof to those philosophers who would deny that Tw expresses a 
candidate criterion of moral rightness. 
 
2.5. Isolating Moral Properties. 
2.5.1. Second objection.   
LM&D note that, given the fact that Moral Twin Earthlings are so similar to Earthlings, it 
is likely that the natural properties that regulate Earthling uses of ‘good’ and ‘right’ will 
be instantiated on Moral Twin Earth.  Likewise, the natural properties that regulate t-
‘good’ and t-‘right’ on Twin Earth will also be found on Earth (1999: 160).  If I 
understand them correctly, the following may suffice to establish their point.  According 
                                                
14 Philippa Foot’s comments are especially relevant to the present discussion.  In her “Moral Arguments” 
she considers various criteria that a proposition must meet in order to be counted as a moral proposition.  
She is emphatic that whatever criteria is adopted, it must count Nietzsche’s doctrines as part of the subject 
matter of morality: “If a moral system such as Nietzsche’s has been refused recognition as a moral system, 
then we have got the criteria wrong…We recognize Nietzsche as a moralist because he tries to justify an 
increase in suffering by connecting it with strength as opposed to weakness, and individuality as opposed to 
conformity” (1958: 33).   
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to the Earthling’s moral theory, Tc, an act is right iff it has the property of maximizing 
utility.  The same theory entails that an act is wrong iff it has the property of not 
maximizing utility.15  Given bivalence, a Tc property (be it maximizing utility or not 
maximizing utility) will inevitably be instantiated by every action in the world.  It makes 
no difference whether that action is performed in a social environment like Twin Earth 
where (it might be supposed) the moral agents do not take an active interest in the utility 
of their actions.  Consequently, all of the Twin Earthlings’ actions will inevitably 
instantiate a Tc property.  Similar considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, for Earthlings 
and Td properties.  (I am assuming that, by Td, an act is right iff it has the property of 
treating no one as a mere means and wrong iff it has the property of treating someone as 
a mere means).  The upshot of all this is that any coherently described MTE case will 
have to include the presence of Tc properties and Td properties on both planets.  By 
contrast, according to the PTE story, Earth is entirely devoid of XYZ and Twin Earth is 
entirely devoid of H2O.  Here, then, we have another disanalogy between MTE and PTE. 
 According to LM&D, this feature of the MTE story raises trouble.  If the Tc 
properties are ubiquitous on Twin Earth, and if the persons on Twin Earth really are 
psychologically similar to us, then surely they, like us, will take an interest in these 
properties just as we do.  The problem is this: 
[I]f [Earthling] moral properties occur on Moral Twin Earth (and presumably play 
much the same roles that they play here), we should expect that the Moral Twin 
Earthlings have terms for them.  The problem is that these sorts of considerations 
are likely to eclipse the facts in the Twin story about what properties “casually 
regulate” their use of terms like “good”, “wrong”, and so on.  The business about 
                                                
15 In saying this, I am countenancing negative properties.  Not everyone does so.  I am uneasy about them 
myself.  I help myself to negative properties here only because doing so makes it easier to see the basis for 
LM&D’s claim that Tc and Td properties exist on both planets.  I believe their essential point could be made 
without appeal to negative properties.  If not, and if negative properties really are indefensible, then so 
much the worse for LM&D. 
62 
what causally regulates what is bound to be ignored [by readers], given the 
overwhelming likelihood that beings so similar to us would take an interest in 
[our] moral properties.  Every other property they have lexicalized corresponds 
exactly to one we have lexicalized.  Why stop short of [our] moral properties? 
(LM&D 1999: 160) 
 
There are three key claims being made here: (i) Tc properties (such as maximizing utility) 
occurring on Twin Earth play “much the same roles” that they play on Earth, (ii) we 
should expect Twin Earthlings to have predicates that express Tc properties, and (iii) the 
expectation that Twin Earthlings possess such predicates distorts our understanding of the 
MTE scenario in such a way that we are misled into judging that Twin Earthlings really 
do express (e.g.) maximizing utility by t-‘right’ when, given the facts of the case, they do 
not.  It is because of this confusion that we mistakenly judge that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ 
express the same semantic content and can be used to engage in substantive moral 
disagreement. 
 
2.5.2. Reply to (i).   
Claim (i) is unwarranted.  If we stick to H&T’s version of MTE, then we should not say 
that Tc properties play “much the same roles” on Twin Earth as they do on Earth.  First, it 
is stipulated that Tc properties do not causally regulate Twin Earthlings uses of moral 
terms like ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ and ‘good.’  So that is one respect in which the Tc properties 
do not play the same role on Twin Earth.  More importantly, the role of Tc properties is 
rather different when it comes to the behavior of agents on Twin Earth.  Given the MTE 
story that H&T tell, it is natural to suppose that, on Earth, an action’s failure to maximize 
utility is taken by agents as strong grounds for avoiding it.  We should also expect, 
furthermore, that when acts that fail to maximize utility are knowingly performed on 
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Earth, Earthling observers take a negative moral attitude toward the agent and the act.  
However, given H&T’s stipulations, it seems clear that not maximizing utility does not 
play this role on Twin Earth.  Twin Earthlings do not take an act’s failure to maximize 
utility as strong grounds for avoiding it.  Nor do they take a negative attitude towards acts 
and agents that fail to maximize utility.  The property that plays that role on Twin Earth is 
the property of treating someone as a mere means.  In short, Tc properties and Td 
properties do not play “much the same roles” on both planets.  Their roles are most 
saliently different with respect to the attitudes and behaviors of moral agents.16  (Note the 
parallel with PTE: whereas on Earth the kind that plays the “watery” role is H2O and not 
XYZ, on Twin Earth the kind that plays the watery role is XYZ and not H2O.) 
  
2.5.3. Reply to (ii).   
Claim (ii) is also unwarranted.  Indeed, I believe LM&D’s assertion of (ii) is due to an 
oversight.  To motivate it, they write that given 
…the assumption that Moral Twin Earthlings are like their Earthling counterparts 
in almost every respect…it’s extremely natural to suppose that they have some 
way of referring to all the same sorts of things that we find significant, including 
[Earthling] moral properties.  But if they have the ability to refer to these 
properties—properties that Earthlings take quite an interest in—there would have 
to be some special compelling reason to suppose that they did not refer to them 
(LM&D 1999: 60). 
 
This claim overlooks the crucial detail that H&T include in the MTE story that prevents 
the Twin Earthlings from being exactly like their Earthling counterparts.  In order to 
explain why different properties causally regulate Twin Earthling moral terms, H&T 
                                                
16 Of course, it may be that many of the Twin Earthling acts that instantiate Td right-making properties also 
instantiate Tc right-making properties.  But this should not trick us into taking Tc properties to play the 
same role on MTE that Td properties play there.  The difference in their roles is revealed when we consider 
how Earthlings and Twin Earthlings respectively would behave in either actual or counterfactual cases 
where an action instantiates a Tc right-making property but not a Td right-making property (or vice versa). 
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stipulate that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings differ somewhat in their psychology.  They 
offer only a hint as to what this difference might be: 
The differences in causal regulation, we may suppose, are due to species-wide 
differences in psychological temperament that distinguish Twin Earthlings from 
Earthlings.  (For instance, perhaps Twin Earthlings tend to experience the 
sentiment of guilt more readily and more intensively, and tend to experience 
sympathy less readily and less intensively, than do Earthlings) (1990-91: 459). 
 
This stipulation is included precisely to account for the fact that Twin Earthlings fail to 
take an interest in the properties that are so important to their Earthling counterparts.  
Although the stipulation is not developed in much depth, it seems plausible to suppose 
that some sort of psychological difference along these lines could result in Twin 
Earthlings taking an interest in different properties found in their natural and social 
environment than Earthlings take an interest in.17 
 Furthermore, a difference of interest along these lines could easily result in each 
planet’s population failing to have a predicate that expresses the natural property that the 
other planet’s population takes to be of moral importance.  To take a less science fictional 
example, consider that a significant number of actual Earthlings take a very strong 
interest in the property of being kosher.  Despite the lengths that some communities go to 
in order to consume only kosher animals, we would not be at all surprised to find a 
community of Earthling speakers who have no term that is translatable as ‘kosher.’  Nor 
would we find their lack of such a term more surprising upon our discovery that they 
have daily contact with kosher animals (e.g. bovines and chickens) and unkosher animals 
(e.g. pigs and shellfish).  But if this is unsurprising in the case of being kosher, it is hard 
to see why it should be surprising in cases involving putative right-making natural 
                                                
17 For a review of psychological research that I believe lends empirical support to this speculation, see 
Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s Culture of Honor (1996). 
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properties.  I conclude that if there is some reason why the stipulated difference in 
psychological temperament between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings is not sufficient to 
account for the former lacking predicates for Td properties and the latter lacking 
predicates for Tc properties, then LM&D need to say what that reason is. 
 
2.5.4. Reply to (iii).   
But what if Twin Earthlings did have a predicate that expressed (a Tc property such as) 
maximizing utility?  This would add yet another feature to the MTE scenario that is not 
shared by PTE.  For, as LM&D note, in the PTE story it was supposed that XYZ entirely 
took the place of H2O on Twin Earth; no H2O was to be found there at all (1999:160).  
Because Putnam’s Twin Earthlings had no H2O in their environment, they presumably 
had no word to refer to it. 
As we saw, LM&D contend that because it must be supposed in the moral case 
that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings have predicates that express each other’s putative 
right-making properties, readers become confused in such a way that they (incorrectly) 
judge that t-‘right’ is used by Twin Earthlings to express the same content that Earthling 
uses of ‘right’ express.  In particular, readers overlook all the details about the Td 
property treating no one as a mere means causally regulating t-‘right’.  As a result, they 
erroneously suppose that t-‘right’ expresses maximizing utility, just as ‘right’ does. 18  The 
intended upshot here is that the judgment that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ share the same content 
should not be taken as a reflection of the semantic facts.  It is instead a result of readers’ 
inattentiveness to H&T’s stipulations—where this inattentiveness is abetted by the fact 
                                                
18 Or perhaps LM&D meant to suggest that readers cannot help but to assume that there is some other 
natural property that both Earthlings and Twin-Earthlings express by ‘right,’ a property whose functional 
essence is captured neither by Tc nor Td.  This hypothesis is addressed Chapter 3. 
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that the MTE story tempts readers to suppose that Twin Earthlings possess predicates that 
express the same natural properties that causally regulate Earthling moral predicates. 
 Is there any reason to think that readers are likely to become so hopelessly 
confused by the supposition that Twin-Earthlings have predicates that express Earthling 
right-making properties (and vice versa)?19  What is needed is another Twin Earth case 
against which we can calibrate our intuitions.  Since it is taken as established that 
semantic externalism is true of chemical kind terms, I suggest that we devise another 
chemical kind Twin Earth story that embodies the allegedly suspicious features of the 
MTE story.  If (contrary to what semantic externalism predicts) we find that we have the 
intuition that the target chemical kind term used by speakers on each planet has the same 
extension—and thus, their disagreements employing the term are substantive and not 
verbal—then we have reason to suppose that the MTE story is a flawed intuition pump.  
If, on the other hand, we have a firm intuition that the chemical kind term and its 
phonological twin have different extensions, then the differences between the MTE story 
and the PTE story that we are currently focused on give us no reason to doubt our 
intuitions generated by MTE. 
 Fortunately, we do not have to look far for a Twin Earth story with which we can 
calibrate our intuitions.  Putnam had already provided one in “The Meaning of 
‘Meaning’.”  Just after finishing his discussion of the twin water case, Putnam asks his 
readers to consider another Twin Earth where the inhabitants use the substance 
molybdenum for all the purposes that we use aluminum for: 
                                                
19 A more charitable hypothesis about how readers are likely to deal with this supposition is that they will 
simply assume that if Twin Earthlings want to refer to Earthling Tc right-making properties, they (the Twin 
Earthlings) will simply use a non-moral, natural property name (e.g. ‘maximizing utility’) rather than a 
moral term such as ‘rightness.’  This hypothesis does no service for LM&D; and is not addressed in their 
paper. 
67 
We will now suppose that molybdenum is as common on Twin Earth as 
aluminum is on Earth, and that aluminum is as rare on Twin Earth as 
molybdenum is on Earth.  In particular, we shall assume that ‘aluminum’ pots and 
pans are made of molybdenum on Twin Earth (1975b: 225f). 
 
In this Twin Earth story, Putnam stipulates that molybdenum is indiscernible from 
aluminum in its superficial properties.  For our purposes, we may also add the stipulation 
that, here on Earth, the term ‘aluminum’ is causally regulated by the element with atomic 
number 13 (Al) and ‘molybdenum’ is causally regulated by the element with atomic 
number 42 (Mo).  On Twin Earth, however, ‘aluminum’ is causally regulated by Mo, and 
‘molybdenum’ is causally regulated by Al.20  In line with this stipulation, we should 
suppose that the vast majority of Twin Earthling uses of ‘aluminum’ are applied to 
samples of Mo. 
 In the twin aluminum story, both Al and Mo are found on both Earth and Twin 
Earth.  Moreover, speakers on each planet have terms that putatively refer to each of 
these kinds.  Consequently, the twin aluminum story shares the feature of the MTE story 
that allegedly confuses readers.  If MTE really is misleading as a result of this feature, 
then we should expect that our intuitions about the twin aluminum case will either run 
counter to our intuitions in the twin water case or else be held with less confidence.  But 
this is not what we find.  It is obvious that the extension of ‘aluminum’ when spoken by 
Twin Earthlings is different from its extension when spoken by Earthlings.  Furthermore, 
when Earthlings say ‘aluminum is composed of atomic number 13 atoms’ and Twin 
                                                
20 For his own part, Putnam simply adds the stipulation that on Twin Earth ‘aluminum’ names molybdenum 
and ‘molybdenum’ names aluminum.  At first sight, it would appear that this stipulation is question 
begging, since he uses this case to conclude that ‘aluminum’ and t-‘aluminum’ have different extensions.  
However, Putnam’s interest in the aluminum example seems to be as a case where some members of each 
linguistic community know the underlying nature of the stuff they call ‘aluminum’ while others do not.  If 
we needed to, the example could be modified so that no one on either planet knows enough chemistry to 
distinguish the two metals.  The point presently being made would still stand. 
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Earthlings say ‘aluminum is not composed of atomic number 13 atoms,’ it is clear that 
their disagreement is merely verbal. 
 I conclude that LM&D have not shown that our intuitions are distorted by the 
feature that the twin aluminum story shares with MTE.  If there is something misleading 
about MTE, it is not the fact that instances of Tc properties exist on Twin Earth.  Nor is it 
the fact that Twin Earthlings are likely to have predicates to express such properties.  It 
follows that there is no need for the opponent of SEN to redescribe the Moral Twin Earth 
story so as to purge it of these features. 
 
2.6. Functional and Non-Functional Kinds. 
2.6.1. Third objection.   
LM&D write, “Another potentially distorting influence on the intuitions about Moral 
Twin Earth is the fact that moral properties are assumed to be functional properties.  In 
contrast, the original Twin Earth thought experiment is framed in terms of non-functional 
natural kinds” (1999: 157).  As I understand it, a property, P1, is a functional property 
when an individual’s instantiating P1 depends upon that individual’s instantiating another 
property, P2, that “realizes” a certain causal role in that its environment.  One of the 
interesting features of a functional property is that its instances may lack any intrinsic 
similarities with one another.  What unifies these instances as instances of the same 
functional property is that they all share an extrinsic feature: they realize the same causal 
role.  To take an extreme example, when instantiated in the right environments, being a 
laser disk and being a filing cabinet both realize a common functional property: being an 
information storage device.  Nevertheless laser disks and filing cabinets share almost no 
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interesting intrinsic similarities.  By contrast, I understand a non-functional kind (or 
property) to be a kind whose members (or instances) share a certain number of interesting 
intrinsic similarities (e.g., they share a similar physical structure and composition). 
LM&D contend that our intuitions are less secure in Twin Earth cases involving a 
contrast between two (putatively different) functional properties than they are in cases 
involving non-functional natural kinds.  The primary reason they offer for this insecurity 
is that, where functional properties are at issue, it may be unclear whether a functional 
predicate expresses a property, P1, or some higher-level functional property, P2, that is 
realized by P1 in certain environments.  The worry is that, because moral properties are 
assumed to be functional properties, readers may be led to suppose that ‘right’ and t-
‘right’ both express a common higher-level property that is simply realized by different 
lower-level properties on each planet.  That is, readers mistakenly suppose that there is a 
single functional property that is realized by maximizing utility on Earth and realized by 
treating no one as a mere means on Twin Earth.  This possibility grounds LM&D’s 
complaint that “H&T may gain some false leverage against ethical naturalism merely 
because at the crucial point in their argument, they compare ethical properties to non-
functional natural kinds like water” (1999: 159). 
  
2.6.2. Reply.   
Let me begin by noting that defenders of SEN are in no position to criticize H&T for 
comparing moral properties to non-functional natural kinds like water.  Many well-
known defenders of SEN have themselves made this very comparison when defending 
their view (Boyd 1988: 196; Brink 1989: 157; 2001: 160; Lycan 1988: 200f; Railton 
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1989: 157f; Sturgeon 2003: 534).  If there is a difficulty with extending to moral terms 
the semantics appropriate for non-functional natural kind terms like ‘water,’ then it is 
SEN’s proponents (rather than its detractors) who need to resolve it.   
 More importantly, however, the PTE argument should be seen as establishing—
rather than presupposing—that being water is a non-functional property.  Putnam’s 
readers have always had the option of judging that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ both express a 
single functional property found both on Earth and Twin Earth.  On such a view, the 
essence of being water is given by a certain causal role.  On Earth, the “watery role” is 
played by being H2O.  On Twin Earth, the same role is played by being XYZ.  We can 
thus say that one and the same functional property of being water exists on both Earth 
and Twin Earth.  The difference between the two planets concerns only the matter of 
which lower-level property realizes being water.  On Earth being water is realized by 
being H2O, while on Twin Earth being water is realized by being XYZ.21  That this 
interpretation of the PTE story has always been available shows that the MTE story 
cannot be reproached for leaving a similar kind of interpretation available. 
   
2.7. Conclusion. 
LM&D along with Brink elucidate four apparent differences between the MTE thought 
experiment and the original PTE thought experiment.  They claim that the respects in 
which MTE differs from PTE exert a distorting influence on our intuitions regarding the 
content of ‘right’ and t-‘right.’  I have argued that these differences are benign.  If my 
                                                
21 Indeed, some philosophers actually have endorsed this reading of PTE, or something much like it.  See, 
for example Zemach (1976) and Mellor (1977).  Although they do not use the language of functional 
properties, both philosophers maintain that the extension of ‘water’ as used on both planets includes both 
H2O and XYZ. 
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arguments are successful, then Brink and LM&D have failed to establish that MTE is any 
worse a thought experiment than PTE. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MORAL TWIN EARTH AND HIGHER-LEVEL PROPERTIES 
3. Chapter. 
3.1. Introduction. 
Towards the end of the previous chapter, we saw that LM&D raise the possibility that, 
within the MTE scenario, moral rightness is a single “higher-level” functional property 
that has distinct realizer properties on Earth and Twin Earth.  They cite this possibility in 
order to cast doubt upon the clarity of our intuitions generated by MTE.  However, 
following Eric Kraemer (1990-91), LM&D also entertain the hypothesis that moral 
rightness really is a higher-level functional property.1  If true, this hypothesis appears to 
supply ethical naturalists with a different kind of answer to H&T’s Moral Twin Earth 
argument against SEN. 
 In this chapter, I continue my defense of H&T’s moral twin earth argument 
against SEN.  I begin with a preliminary sketch of what I call the “higher-level properties 
reply” (HLPR) to MTE.  Next, to get a clearer picture of the theoretical machinery upon 
which this reply depends, I outline a functionalist theory in the philosophy of mind.  
After that, I offer a more detailed statement of the HLPR to MTE.  Finally, I argue that, 
while the metaethical theory that emerges from the HLPR avoids the chauvinistic 
conceptual relativism that results from the standard version of SEN, it is undone by a 
different form of relativism.2 
 
                                                
1 This reply to MTE is also suggested in Copp (2000), though Copp’s ideas about how the reply should be 
spelled out appear to be different from those of Kraemer and LM&D. 
2 H&T (2000: 143) make the observation that the HLPR implies a kind of relativism in their reply to 
Copp’s (2000).   
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3.2. A Prelimary Sketch of the Higher-Level Properties Reply to Moral Twin 
Earth. 
Let us call the judgment that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express the same content and can be 
used to engage in substantive moral disagreement ‘the MTE intuition.’  What explains 
why we have the MTE intuition?  One possible explanation is that, as expressivists urge, 
we take the primary function of moral predicates to consist in expressing prescriptions, or 
speakers’ attitudes, rather than intensions or properties of actions.  According to this 
expressivist-type view, we should reject the cognitivist assumptions that we have granted 
the proponents of SEN.  Earthlings and Twin Earthlings are able to have a substantive 
disagreement because both ‘right’ and t-‘right’ are used to prescribe or express approval 
of actions.  An alternative explanation is that, as ethical non-naturalists urge, we take 
moral predicates to express non-natural properties that epiphenomenally supervene upon 
certain natural properties.3  The non-naturalist can reject the claim that a predicate’s 
being causally regulated by a natural property is sufficient (or even necessary) for that 
predicate to express that property.4  She would then be free to assert that one (or even 
both) of the parties in the MTE scenario are simply mistaken about which actions have 
the non-natural property of being right. 
                                                
3 A non-natural property should be thought of as “epiphenomenal” in the sense that it is neither identical to, 
nor constituted by, the properties upon which it supervenes.  Of course, this makes it difficult to explain 
why it is that non-natural properties co-vary in a law-like way with their subvenient natural properties.  
This difficulty gives rise to Mackie’s charge that such properties are “queer” (1977: especially page 41).  
Arguably, non-natural properties are also epiphenomenal in the more traditional sense that they are causally 
inert (at any rate, their instances are causally inert).  It is unclear to me, however, whether ethical non-
naturalists would (or should) accept this latter characterization of moral properties. 
 It is worth adding that not all who call themselves non-naturalists will agree that moral properties 
are epiphenomenal.  Shafer-Landau is one example.  He agrees with synthetic ethical naturalists that moral 
properties are constituted by natural properties (2003: 72-78).  Unlike ethical naturalists, however, he 
maintains that moral knowledge depends, in part, upon synthetic a priori intuition (ibid.  Ch. 11). 
4 The non-naturalist would then owe us a different semantics for moral terms.  I do not know what that 
semantics would look like.  My brief comments about non-naturalism here are intended merely to 
acknowledge that MTE should not be seen as refuting all forms of moral realism. 
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 There may be, however, another explanation of the MTE intuition that is 
available—an explanation that renders the MTE intuition compatible with CSN.  In his 
commentary on H&T’s (1990-91), Eric Kraemer recommends the following reply to 
MTE: 
One might claim that any moral theory that would suffice to capture the 
functional essence of a community which used the words ‘good’ and ‘right’ the 
way that earthlings do would have, whatever its ideological orientation 
(consequentialist or deontological), a functional core that would remain the same 
from population to population.  Thus, the defender of CSN might claim that there 
is some ideology-neutral theory, Tn, which describes the functional essence of the 
core of any moral theory.  The CSN supporter might suggest that Tc and Td, 
though different in many obvious ways, both share Tn as a proper subset (1990-
91: 469; cf. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson 1999:157ff). 
 
Kraemer’s proposal suggests what I call the “higher-level properties reply” (HLPR) to 
MTE.  In its broadest sketch, the HLPR claims that a moral property like moral rightness 
is a multiply realizable functional property; in particular, it is a property whose essence is 
specified by an “ideology-neutral” theory).5  On Earth, this functional property is realized 
by (but is not identical with) maximizing utility.  On Twin Earth it is realized by (but is 
not identical with) treating no one as a mere means.  Furthermore, we should understand 
that it is this “higher-level” functional property—and not the lower-level properties that 
realize it—that causally regulates the use of ‘right’ and t-‘right.’6  Thus, both of these 
                                                
5 As I suggest in §3.4 below, Kraemer’s view seems to be that a theory is ideology neutral to the degree that 
its truth is compatible with the truth of a number of different competing first-order normative ethical 
theories. 
6 I should say something about my use of ‘higher-level property’ and contrast it with the notion of a 
second-order (or higher-order) property.  I have noticed that some writers use these terms interchangeably.  
My use of ‘higher-level property’ corresponds to a picture of reality as divided into levels corresponding 
roughly to the various sciences.  Some of these levels are “higher” in the sense that the items studied by the 
higher-level science supervene on the items studied by the lower-level science.  From highest to lowest, it 
is common to rank the levels of reality as follows: psychology, biology, chemistry, and physics (this list is 
not meant to be exhaustive).  With this picture in mind, we can view the higher-level property reply to 
MTE as claiming that moral properties are not to be identified with properties belonging to any of these 
levels.  Instead, moral properties belong to a distinct level of reality that is higher than these others. 
 I understand a second-order property, roughly, to be a property that quantifies over other 
properties.  A property is second order just in case it is the property of having a property of some sort.  A 
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predicates express one and the same property.  As a result, Earthlings and Twin 
Earthlings can use these predicates to engage in substantive moral disagreement with one 
another.  In this way CSN is able to accommodate the MTE intuition. 
 To get a clearer picture of how this reply to MTE is supposed to work, it will be 
useful to reflect on functionalist accounts of mental properties.7  In the next section, I 
take a brief detour through the philosophy of mind. 
 
3.3. Functionalism about Mental Properties.   
As Brink notes, functionalists about mental properties have typically thought that such 
properties are individuated by their causal roles:  
Mental states are identified and distinguished from other mental states in terms of 
the causal relations which they bear to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and 
other mental states.  To take a hoary example, functionalist theories of mind claim 
that pain is identified and distinguished from other mental states by virtue of its 
tendency result from tissue damage, to produce an injury avoidance desire, and to 
issue in appropriate injury avoidance behaviour.  The physical states which realise 
this functional state are the physical states upon which pain supervenes. (Brink 
1984: 121; cf. Boyd 1980: 90; Jackson and Pettit 1988: 384; Shoemaker 1981: 
263; Putnam 1967: 438).   
 
Drawing on the example that Brink cites, let’s sketch a toy theory of the mental property 
being a pain: 
Tp: A token state, x, is a pain iff there is a physical property, P, such that x has P 
and there is a tendency for token states that have P (i) to be caused by tissue 
damage in the organism in which the state occurs, and (ii) to result in aversive 
behavior in that organism. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
second-order property need not be of a higher-level than the first-order properties it quantifies over.  E.g., 
the property of being a pain may have the second-order property of being disliked by most people.  
Nevertheless, both properties belong to the level of psychology. 
7 Indeed, Kraemer cites functionalist theories of mental properties as inspiration for his reply to MTE 
(1990-91: 469). 
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To be sure, Tp is an impoverished theory of pain.8  It is intended for illustrative purposes 
only.   
 Perhaps the most important feature of Tp for the present discussion is that it 
allows for pain to be multiply realized.  Let me explain.  Suppose that, in humans, brain 
states with the physical property of being a C-fiber firing tend to be caused by tissue 
damage and typically result in aversive behavior.  Given Tp, we should say that C-fiber 
firings are pains.  Next, let’s suppose that there are creatures on Mars of a very complex 
sort.  Following David Lewis’s famous example,9 let us suppose that, when a Martian 
undergoes tissue damage, this tends to cause the inflation of cavities in his feet.  In turn, 
the inflation of the Martian’s foot cavities tends to result in aversive behavior.  For 
brevity, let’s use ‘being an FCI’ to denote the property of being a foot cavity inflation.  
Given Tp, we should say that FCIs are pains.  The property being a pain, then, is multiply 
realizable: in humans, it is realized by states with the property being a C-fiber firing; in 
Martians, it is realized by states with the property being an FCI.  Despite their distinct 
realizing properties, Human pains and Martian pains are instances of one and the same 
higher-level property: being a pain. 
 Jackson and Pettit note that a functionalist theory like Tp is open to two readings 
(Jackson and Pettit 1988: 384f).  Call the first reading of Tp, the “realizer reading.”  By 
the realizer reading, being a pain is identified with the property that plays the pain role—
the “realizer” property.  In our example, being a C-fiber firing and being an FCI are both 
                                                
8 The most obvious defect that comes to mind is the number of causal input and output conditions.  Surely a 
plausible account of pain would include far more conditions.  Furthermore, the most promising 
functionalist accounts of mental states include other mental states among the input and output conditions 
(see Lewis 1994).  A final defect will be noted and corrected in §3.5.  To anticipate: Tp needs to be 
modified to take account of the fact that certain lower-level properties may fail to realize being in pain if 
they are instantiated in the wrong system or environment. 
9 From his “Mad Pain and Martian Pain” (1980). 
77 
realizer properties; both play the pain role.  Now, whatever the merits of the realizer 
reading, this is not how I understand Tp.  In order to be coherent, the realizer reading of 
Tp requires acceptance of contingent identity (at least with respect to identities between 
mental and physical properties).10  However, it is clear that the principal defenders of 
SEN reject contingent identity (Boyd 1980; Brink 1989: 157-159; Sturgeon 1985: 
78n30).  Moreover, given the semantics espoused by SEN’s proponents, the realizer 
reading of Tp would lead us to deny that Martian FCIs are part of the extension of ‘pain.’  
Here is why:  If being a pain is identical to being a C-fiber firing, then presumably our 
use of ‘pain’ is causally regulated by the property of being a C-fiber firing.  But if that is 
true, then, given Boyd’s semantics, something is in the extension of ‘pain’ at a world just 
in case it has the property of being a C-fiber firing.  Since FCIs necessarily lack the 
property of being a C-fiber firing, we should conclude that FCIs are in neither the 
extension nor intension of ‘pain.’  But this is wrong.  If we see a Martian writhing on the 
floor after undergoing tissue damage and experiencing an FCI, we speak truly when we 
utter ‘The Martian is in (or has a) pain.’  This could not be so if FCIs were excluded from 
the intension of ‘pain,’ as would be the case given the conjunction of the realizer reading 
of Tp and Boyd’s causal-regulation semantics. 
 For present purposes, then, we should read Tp in the alternative way outlined by 
Jackson and Pettit.  By the alternative “role reading” of Tp, being a pain is identified with 
the second-order property of having a property that plays the pain role.  In other words, 
                                                
10 Here’s why.  Assume for reductio that identities between mental and natural properties are not 
contingent.  Such identities, then, are necessarily true, if true at all.  Now assume that being a pain = being 
a C-fiber firing.  By the necessity of identity, it follows that in all possible worlds, being a pain = being a 
C-fiber firing.  However, we have also been supposing that pain is multiply realizable.  Given the realizer 
reading of Tp, this means that there is a possible world, w, in which, being a pain = being an FCI.  By the 
transitivity of identity, we are forced to conclude that, at w, being an FCI = being a C-fiber firing.  But this 
is absurd.  We have been supposing that these are distinct properties.  Thus, if we were to suppose that pain 
is identical to its realizer properties, we should take these identities to be contingent. 
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something has the property of being a pain just in case it has some other property (e.g., 
being a C-fiber firing, being an FCI, etc.) that plays or realizes the pain role.  If we allow 
that this second-order property fixes the intension of ‘pain,’ then Martian FCIs fall within 
that intension, as they should.  For such states instantiate the property of having a 
property that plays the pain role, just as human C-fiber firings do.  (Importantly, on the 
role reading, it is a mistake to identify being a pain with either of its realizer properties.  
It is a distinct property.) 
 
3.4. The Higher-Level Properties Reply to MTE.   
Although Brink has expressed a willingness to view moral properties as multiply 
realizable functional properties (1984: 121; 1989: 157-159), it should be recalled from 
§1.6.1 that he and his fellow SEN proponents suppose that the essence of moral rightness 
will be specified by a theory in first-order normative ethics.  It is this assumption that, 
when conjoined with CSN, leads to the conclusion that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express 
different properties.  The central insight of the HLPR is that this assumption must be 
abandoned.  Instead, the defender of SEN should suppose that the essence (and functional 
role) of rightness is to be specified by a theory of a more “metaethical” flavor—a theory 
that is to a large extent neutral between first-order normative theories (this is what I take 
Kraemer to mean when he says the functionalist account of rightness should have an 
“ideology-neutral” core).  In §3.7 I offer a sketch of the sort of neutral theory that I 
believe the HLPR requires.  For the moment, I would cite ideal observer theories as 
familiar examples of metaethical accounts of rightness that are, in important respects, 
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neutral with respect to first-order normative theories.11  Whatever theory is adopted, it 
must be such that it is possible for the rightness role to be played (or realized) by 
maximizing utility on Earth and played by treating no one as mere means on Twin Earth.  
Rightness, however, is not to be identified with either of these realizer properties that play 
the rightness role.12  Like being in pain, rightness is to be thought of as the second-order 
property (that is of a higher-level than its realizers); it should be thought of as something 
like the property of having a property that plays the rightness role. 
 The HLPR to MTE can now be stated.  In their thought experiment, H&T 
stipulate that the essences of the properties regulating the use of moral terms will be 
specified by theories in first-order normative ethics.  Given the revision that Kraemer 
proposes for SEN, H&T are no longer entitled to this stipulation: by the new version of 
SEN, we expect that a higher-level, ideology-neutral property will causally regulate the 
use of moral terms.  With this new understanding of what sort of property causally 
regulates the use of moral terms, the MTE intuition—the intuition that ‘right’ and t-
                                                
11 This requires some comment.  First, it is controversial whether ideal observer accounts of moral 
properties are realist accounts.  The trouble is that they make moral facts stance-dependent: the standard 
that fixes the moral facts is made true by the beliefs and attitudes of the ideal observer.  If so, then it would 
seem that proponents of SEN (who are realists) cannot avail themselves of an ideal observer theory of 
moral rightness in pursuit of a HLPR to MTE.  Second, there may be some controversy as to whether ideal 
observer theories really are (in the required respect) neutral with respect to first-order normative theories.  
Indeed, it might be argued that an ideal observer theory is itself a competing theory in first-order normative 
ethics.  After all, like theories in normative ethics, ideal observer theories supply us with a criterion for 
morally right action (e.g.: “An act is morally right iff it would be approved of by an ideal observer”).  What 
is important for our purposes, however, is that a theory of this sort need not be seen as a competitor to 
utilitarian and deontological accounts of right action.  For it could turn out, upon investigation, that ideal 
observers approve of all and only those acts that maximize utility.  In that case, utilitarianism would be true 
alongside the ideal observer theory.  Similarly, it could turn out that ideal observers approve of all and only 
those acts that treat no one as a mere means.  In this way, the ideal observer theory is at least prima facie 
neutral with respect to (at least some of) the competitors in normative ethics.  For illustrations of ideal 
observer theories of rightness see Firth (1952) and Smith (1994). 
12 Nor should rightness be identified with any other natural property that is treated as right-making by 
theories in first-order normative ethics.  Note that, in this respect, the functionalist account of rightness 
being developed here differs from the moral functionalism of Frank Jackson (1998).  Jackson identifies 
rightness with its realizer properties.  He suggests, for example, that rightness might turn out to be identical 
to maximizing expected hedonic value (ibid. 141-143). 
80 
‘right’ have the same content and can be used to engage in substantive moral 
disagreement—is rendered compatible with CSN.  For all H&T have said (minus the 
contested stipulation) it may be that there is a single higher-level property that causally 
regulates the use of both ‘right’ and t-‘right.’  If so, then, by CSN, these predicates share 
the same semantic content.13  The remaining differences between the Earthlings and the 
Twin Earthlings can be accounted for by the hypothesis that this higher-level property is 
realized by one natural property on Earth and a different natural property on Twin Earth.  
In this way, defenders of SEN can accommodate the MTE intuition without abandoning 
their preferred externalist moral semantics embodied in CSN.14 
 In the next section, I consider some difficulties facing the synthetic ethical 
naturalist who adopts the HLPR. 
 
                                                
13 Notice that the HLPR cannot work unless it is denied that that the lower-level realizer properties are what 
causally regulate the uses of ‘right’ and t-‘right.’  This is worth taking note of, since one might be tempted 
to state the HLPR this way: although distinct natural properties causally regulate the use of ‘right’ and t-
‘right,’ they nevertheless share the same semantic content since the both of properties that regulate these 
predicates realize the same, single higher-level property.  The problem with this way of putting the HLPR 
is that the mere fact that a lower-level property that causally regulates the use of a predicate, ‘F,’ happens to 
realize a higher-level property does not, as I understand CSN, make it true ‘F’ expresses the higher-level 
property rather than the lower-level property.  To see why not, consider the predicate ‘C-fiber firing.’  That 
being a C-fiber firing realizes the higher-level property of being a pain does not make it the case that ‘C-
fiber firing’ expresses the property of being a pain.  For if that were the case, we would speak truly when 
we say of a Martian writhing on the floor after undergoing tissue damage, “That Martian is having (or 
experiencing) a C-fiber firing.”  But this is wrong.  For all that has been said, the Martian’s body may not 
even contain any C-fibers. 
14 Of course, the opponent of SEN might return with a revised MTE case.  Here, we might imagine that two 
different ideology-neutral, higher-level properties regulate the use of ‘right’ and t-‘right.’  I will leave this 
avenue unexplored for three reasons.  First, it isn’t obvious to me just how to develop such a case.  Second, 
even if I did see how to develop it, I believe it would require more space than I can afford here.  Third, I 
believe that, even if such a case could be spelled out, the judgment that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express the 
same property—despite being causally regulated by distinct ideology-neutral, higher-level properties—
would not be all that compelling. 
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3.5. Troubles for the Higher-Level Property Reply: Agent’s-Group Moral 
Relativism.   
At first glance, the HLPR looks to be a neat solution to the challenge of MTE.  
Unfortunately, it comes at a high price for moral realists.  Moral realism is typically 
intended as a form of moral absolutism.  Indeed, Brink himself characterizes moral 
realism as an “antirelativist metaethical view” (1989: 26).  In light of this, it should come 
as an unpleasant surprise—though perhaps it will be obvious to the reader by now—that 
the HLPR in defense of CSN carries a commitment to moral relativism.15  Let me 
explain. 
 In my example involving mental properties, I suppressed one important detail.  
We should not say, without qualification, that being a C-fiber firing realizes being a pain; 
for there may well be C-fiber firings that do not realize pains.  This could occur if there 
are creatures in which C-fiber firings play an entirely different neurological role than they 
play in humans.  Suppose that, in octopi, instances of being a C-fiber firing are never 
caused by tissue damage and never result in aversive behavior.  Instead the C-fiber firings 
in octopi tend to be caused by sensing prey and tend to result in hunting behavior.  It is 
obvious that, in the octopus, being a C-fiber firing does not realize being a pain.16  The 
lesson here is that a property realizes the functional role of pain only with respect to 
certain “systems” or environments.  In this example, the relevant environment would be a 
                                                
15 In fairness, Kraemer appears to recognize that some form of relativism will result from his proposal, 
though his acknowledgement is both indirect and buried in a footnote in the conclusion of his commentary 
(safely away from the section of text where the higher-level property proposal is actually presented).  
There, he calls David Lewis’s functionalism about mental properties a “relativistic approach.”  He does not, 
however, explicitly acknowledge that the relativism might carry over to the functionalist account of moral 
properties (1990-91: 472n10). 
16 It is obvious, at least, given Tp.  But note that Tp makes no claim concerning the qualitative feel of pain 
states.  Philosophers of mind who emphasize the role of qualitative feel in individuating mental properties 
may have lingering doubts that the octopus’s C-fiber firings aren’t pains.  For them, let me add the 
stipulation that octopus C-fiber firings do not have a similar qualitative feel to human C-fiber firings. 
82 
particular brain—or, perhaps more narrowly, a particular region of a particular brain.  To 
make this explicit, we should revise our toy theory of pain as follows: 
Tp2: A token state, x, is a pain iff there is a physical property, P, such that x has P 
in a system, S,17 and there is a tendency for token states that have P in S (i) to 
be caused by tissue damage in the organism in which the state occurs and (ii) 
to result in aversive behavior in that organism. 
 
Similar considerations should extend to the functionalist account of rightness under 
discussion here.  It is not sufficient to say that an act is right just in case it has whatever 
property plays the rightness role.  Given the MTE scenario, more than one property plays 
the rightness role.  What a functionalist account of rightness should say is that an act is 
right just in case it has whatever property plays the rightness role in the relevant system 
or environment in which the act is performed.  Presumably, the systems in question will 
be social groups or social environments.  Thus, it should be denied that the property of 
(e.g.) maximizing utility realizes rightness simpliciter.  Rather, it realizes rightness only 
in those social environments where maximizing utility plays the rightness role.  In the 
MTE story, it is plausible to suppose that maximizing utility plays the rightness role on 
                                                
17 By ‘system’ I mean ‘system-token.’  In this case, a system-token would be a particular individual’s brain 
at a time.  It should be noted that, by relativizing instances of pain to system (i.e., brain) tokens, Tp2 is 
unable to accommodate the phenomenon that Lewis calls “mad pain.”  The madman is a human being 
whose C-fiber firings have different causes and effects than that of nearly all other humans.  For the 
madman, C-fiber firings are caused by “moderate exercise on an empty stomach” rather than tissue 
damage.  Moreover, his C-fiber firings result in him concentrating on mathematics, rather than engaging in 
aversive behavior.  In Lewis’s view, the madman’s C-fiber firings are pains.  This is so despite the fact that 
the madman’s C-fiber firings do not play the same sort of causal role that they play in his fellow human 
beings.  To accommodate Lewis’s judgment that the madman is in pain when he undergoes C-fiber firings, 
Tp2 would need to be reformulated.  In particular, where Tp2 quantifies over system-tokens, the 
reformulated theory should quantify over system-kinds.  Something along the following lines might do the 
trick: 
 
Tp3: A token state, x, is a pain iff there is a property, P, such that x has P in a system of kind, K, 
and there is a tendency for token-physical states that have P in systems of kind K (i) to be caused 
by tissue damage in the organism in whom the physical state is realized and (ii) to result in 
aversive behavior in that organism. 
 
The madman’s brain, for all its odd wiring, is still a human brain.  Since C-fiber firings realize pain in 
human brains, the madman’s C-fiber firings constitute pains according to Tp3.  (For an argument against 
mad pain, see Shoemaker [1981: 267-272].) 
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Earth but not on Twin Earth.  Likewise, it is plausible to suppose that treating no one as a 
mere means plays the rightness role on Twin Earth but not on Earth. 
 If the functionalist theory of rightness is understood in this fashion, then it carries 
a commitment to “agent’s-group moral relativism.”  David Lyons describes agent’s-
group moral relativism (hereafter, “agent-relativism”) as the view that “an act is right if, 
and only if, it is permitted by the norms of the agent’s group” (1976: 109; cf. Sturgeon 
1994: 83).18  It should be clear that, given the functionalist account of rightness, the 
answer to the question of which norms apply to a given agent depends upon which 
property realizes the rightness role in that agent’s social environment.  Because 
maximizing utility realizes rightness in the Earthlings’ environment, the moral status of 
Earthlings’ actions depends upon consequentialist norms; and because treating no one as 
a mere means realizes rightness in the Twin Earthlings’ social environment, the moral 
status of Twin Earthlings’ actions depends upon deontological norms.   
 To illustrate the sort of moral relativism at issue, consider the performance of an 
organ harvest on Earth.  (Recall that the organ harvest is an act that maximizes utility by 
treating someone as a mere means.)  Since maximizing utility realizes rightness on Earth, 
the Earthling organ harvest is morally right.  Suppose, however, that a duplicate organ 
harvest is performed on Twin Earth.19  There, rightness is realized by treating no one as a 
mere means.  Since the Twin Earthling organ harvest lacks this latter property, it is not 
morally right.  It is immaterial that the act also maximizes utility: maximizing utility does 
                                                
18 Some may find it desirable to amend Lyon’s formulation of agent-relativism with the further claim that, 
as a matter of contingent fact, different social groups have different norms.  As it stands, his formulation is 
consistent with there being a single set of norms that applies to all moral agents.  It is unclear to me 
whether we should describe such a scenario as one in which moral relativism prevails.  
19 And, moreover, suppose that this duplicate act also maximizes utility.  (This stipulation needs to be 
added since maximizing utility is an extrinsic property of actions and need not be shared among duplicates.) 
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not realize rightness on Twin Earth.  It would seem, then, that a consequence of the 
higher-level property reply to MTE is that two actions alike in all salient non-moral 
features may nevertheless diverge in their moral status.  The moral status of either act 
depends largely upon features of the social environment in which it was performed.  In 
particular, it depends upon those features of the social environment that determine which 
natural property plays the rightness role there.20 
 
3.6. “Merely Possible” Relativism.   
Although the proponent of the HLPR must allow that a natural property realizes rightness 
only relative to a particular social environment, he may deny that this entails a full form 
of agent-relativism.  As we saw, the relativization clause in the formulation of the 
functionalist theory of rightness is needed in order to deal with possible worlds like the 
                                                
20 Could it simply be denied that the functionalist account of rightness needs to include the sort of 
relativization to environments that is needed by the functionalist account of being a pain?  I doubt it.  Such 
a denial would commit us to the claim that a natural property that realizes rightness in one social 
environment realizes rightness in all social environments.  Thus, an act-token is right iff it has a property 
(any property) that plays the rightness role anywhere in the world.  In the confines of the MTE story, this 
entails that, on either planet, an act is right iff performing it either (a) maximizes utility or (b) treats no one 
as a mere means.  Because the same disjunctive standard of rightness applies to all moral agents in all 
environments, this understanding the functionalist account of rightness avoids agent-relativism. 
 For those who do not immediately find this strategy implausible, I offer the following as reason to 
reject it.  Hitherto, I have mentioned only the predicate ‘morally right’ in my examples.  However, a full 
functionalist account of moral properties will need to say something about the properties expressed by 
‘morally wrong’ and ‘morally obligatory.’  I take it that, for the functionalist, an act is wrong (obligatory) 
iff it has a property that plays the wrongness (obligation) role.  Given the utilitarian morality of Earth, we 
should suppose that wrongness is realized by the property of failing to maximize utility.  On the other hand, 
given the deontological morality of Twin Earth, we should also suppose that wrongness is realized by the 
property of treating someone as a mere means.  By the strategy under consideration, it seems that we 
should say that, in the confines of the MTE story, an act is wrong iff performing it either (a) fails to 
maximize utility or (b) treats someone as a mere means.  The trouble is, with these disjunctive criteria of 
rightness and wrongness, it is possible for one and the same act to be both right and wrong at once.  For 
example, an act of performing an organ harvest is right because it maximizes utility; but it is also wrong 
because it treats someone as a mere means.  We are now in the throes of a practical contradiction.  To make 
matters worse, when combined with an independently plausible deontic principle, the practical 
contradiction becomes a logical contradiction.  The deontic principle in question is simply that, if an act is 
wrong, then it is not right to perform it.  From this, it follows that it is right to perform the organ harvest 
and it is not right to perform the organ harvest.  But that is absurd.  The present proposal for avoiding 
agent-relativism, then, is incoherent.    
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one containing the MTE-scenario.  Still, the proponent of the HLPR may insist that, as a 
matter of contingent fact, here on Earth in the actual world (where Twin Earth does not 
exist) there is one and only one property that realizes rightness.  Thus, as a matter of 
contingent fact, there is a single standard of moral rightness that applies to all actual 
Earthlings.  It might be claimed that this is all the absolutivity that a moral realist need 
ask for.  That there could have been multiple moral standards—or even that there may 
actually be other standards on distant planets we will never visit—is no cause for alarm.  
The only relativism this realist is bothered by is the intra-planetary and intra-worldly 
variety. 
 It is worth observing that there is really no need for H&T to stipulate that Earth 
and Twin Earth are separate planets.  That stipulation, I believe, is a mere tip of the hat to 
Putnam’s original Twin Earth thought experiment.  The MTE story could be easily be 
recast using socially isolated groups of Earthlings.21  Consequently, the realist must 
assure us that such a scenario is not how things actually are.  That is to say, he must 
assure us that, although rightness is capable of being realized by different natural 
properties in different social groups on Earth, as a matter of fact, among all actual 
Earthling social groups, there is only one rightness realizer.  Whether or not this 
assurance is to be believed will depend upon what the best functionalist account of 
rightness turns out to be and whether the empirical evidence shows the rightness role to 
be realized by a single property for all Earthling groups.   
 Given our current evidence, I see little reason for optimism on the part of the 
realist.  The existence of deep and seemingly irresolvable intercultural disagreement 
                                                
21 R. M. Hare, for example, offers an Earthbound MTE-type story involving a missionary and cannibals 
(Hare 1952: 148ff); and, of course, my example in Chapter 1 (§1.5.4) involving the Benthamanians and 
New Immanuelers provides the template for another story of this kind. 
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about which acts are morally right has long been cited as evidence that there is no single 
standard of rightness that applies to all humans (Mackie 1977: 36ff; Westermarck 
1932/1960: Ch. 7).  While Brink and others have offered alternative explanations of 
moral disagreement that are more acceptable to moral absolutists (Brink 1989: 197-210; 
Boyd 1988: 212-214), it cannot be denied that the relativist’s preferred explanations are 
dramatically favored once the concession is made that rightness is multiply realizable in 
the way that the HLPR requires.  Surely, given this concession, the most charitable 
explanation for why different cultures behave as if rightness is realized by a different 
natural property than the one that we believe realizes it is that, for some of those cultures 
anyway, rightness actually is realized by a different property.  The alternative 
explanation—the one needed by the realist—is far less charitable.  It requires us to hold 
that all of those cultures who disagree with us are simply mistaken about the moral facts 
or relevant non-moral facts.  Of course, charity is not the only theoretical virtue to be 
considered when weighing competing explanations of persistent moral disagreement.  
Still, it seems to me that once we accept the view that rightness is multiply realizable, the 
difference in charity between the competing explanations is so dramatic that it shifts the 
presumption in favor of the relativist’s explanation (especially for those cases where the 
moral disagreement does not obviously result from one party being mistaken about the 
non-moral facts).   
 
3.7. Is Agent-Relativism Compatible With Moral Realism?   
It seems likely, then, that a proponent of SEN who adopts the HLPR will find himself 
committed to (actual) agent-relativism.  At any rate, he is certainly committed to agent-
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relativism with respect to hypothetical cases such as the MTE scenario.  Although Brink 
has characterized moral realism as an anti-relativist view, nothing that has been said so 
far shows that realism logically precludes relativism.22  If it does not, then there may be 
moral realists who find agent-relativism to be a tolerable price to pay for the HLPR.  In 
the present section, I argue that there is good reason to believe that the functionalist 
account of rightness needed for the HLPR is incompatible with moral realism.23  
 The reason moral realism is thought to preclude moral relativism is that standard 
forms of relativism violate realism’s stance-independence clause.  In §1.2.1 we saw that 
in order to satisfy the stance-independence condition, it must be the case that the moral 
standard that fixes the moral facts is not made true in virtue of its being “ratified” by 
some actual or hypothetical appraisers.  As Sturgeon’s characterizes it, 
…we ought not to count a view as realist unless it holds that these moral truths are 
in some interesting sense independent of the subjective indicators—our moral 
beliefs and moral feelings, as well as moral conventions constituted by 
coordinated individual intentions—that we take as guides to them (1986b: 117; cf. 
Boyd 1988: 182; Brink 2001: 154). 
 
It is important to note that the kind of ratification that is relevant here need not be thought 
of as a conscious activity of appraisers; their mere tacit acceptance of the relevant 
standard suffices to render moral facts dependent on “subjective-indicators” of the sort 
that Sturgeon mentions.   
 For illustration, consider a version of moral relativism that holds that the moral 
status of an act depends upon whether or not it is permitted by a code of rules that are 
                                                
22 For arguments to the effect that moral realism can be reconciled with relativism, see Oddie (1999) and 
Sayre-McCord (1991)  
23 As far as I can see, the argument of the present section does not depend upon the success of my rebuttal 
to the objection raised in §3.6.  Here, I argue that whatever functionalist account of rightness the realist 
adopts for the HLPR, it will violate the stance independence clause.  Such a violation could occur even if, 
as a matter of contingent fact, only one property actually realizes rightness.  
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accepted or endorsed by the members of a given social group.  That a view like this 
violates the stance-independence clause can be seen when we consider that the moral 
status of the act would have been different had the members of the group accepted or 
endorse a different code of rules.  The truth of this counterfactual proposition is evidence 
that moral facts, as conceived by this version of relativism, are not independent of 
subjective indicators, as the stance-independence requirement demands. 
 The question before us, then, is whether the functionalist account of rightness 
needed for HLPR can preserve the stance-independence of facts about which actions are 
right.  I believe that it cannot.  When the functionalist account of rightness is fully spelled 
out, it will be seen to entail that moral facts depend upon subjective indicators.  If so, the 
HLPR is incompatible with moral realism and, hence, cannot be adopted as a means of 
defending the SEN brand of realism from the MTE argument.  While I cannot attempt to 
offer a full functionalist account of rightness here, I hope to say enough to show why it is 
doubtful that moral facts would be stance-independent on the sort of account needed for 
the HLPR. 
 Recall from §3.3, that Brink understands a functional property to be individuated 
by its causal role.  A functional account of rightness, then, will involve a specification of 
the causal role that this property plays.  As with our toy account of pain, the causal role of 
rightness will be articulated by a theory specifying the causal relations that right acts 
stand in with respect to certain inputs and outputs.  Assuming the sort of realism about 
moral properties that SEN proponents favor, let us ask what sorts of things cause and are 
caused by morally right actions.24  The most obvious answer, it seems to me, is that moral 
                                                
24 I expect that many, including some moral realists, will be skeptical of the claim that moral properties 
exert a causal influence on anything (e.g. Nagel 1986: 144; Shafer-Landau 2006: 225).  Nevertheless all of 
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facts cause and are caused by human behaviors, thoughts, and attitudes.25  After all, right 
actions are actions; and the standard causal explanations of actions invoke the beliefs, 
desires and intentions of those creatures that perform them (Davidson 1963).  It stands to 
reason, then, that the beliefs, desires and intentions that drive human behavior will figure 
in the causal profile of morally right actions.  In light of this, we might offer as a causal 
input clause the claim that sympathetic or impartial agents tend to prefer the performance 
morally right acts to their alternatives.26   
 For a causal output clause, we will need to cite the sorts of events that result from 
morally right actions.  Among the most obvious causal consequences of an action’s being 
wrong is that, often, impartial observers take a negative attitude toward both the action’s 
performance and the agent who performed it.  Indeed, the agent herself often takes a 
negative moral attitude towards her act (e.g., she feels guilt).  In turn these negative 
attitudes tend to give rise to behaviors such as the condemning of the act, or the 
punishing of the agent.  This suggests as an output clause the claim that morally wrong 
acts tend to cause observers—at least, those observers who are sympathetic and 
impartial—to condemn and take a negative moral attitude toward the act and its agent.  
                                                                                                                                            
the principal synthetic ethical naturalists affirm the causal efficacy of moral properties.  Indeed, if moral 
properties do not enter into causal relations, then we have a quick refutation of CSN.  For in that case, 
moral properties could not be what causally regulate our use of moral terms.  Moreover, in light of their 
commitment to EC, it is hard to see how they could countenance unreduced moral properties unless those 
properties had some sort of causal profile.   
 A more general worry that some may have is that it simply makes no sense to speak of any 
property—moral or non-moral—as having causal powers.  Behind such a concern is the thought that 
properties are abstract objects and abstract objects cannot enter into causal relations.  One way to deal with 
this worry is to translate talk about the causal powers of a given property, P, into talk about the causal 
powers that concrete individuals have in virtue of instantiating P. 
25 Below, I will consider human welfare as another item that stands in a causal relation to right acts. 
26 Although he takes it to be an output clause, Frank Jackson acknowledges something like this principle in 
his own sketch of a functionalist account of rightness: “The judgment that an act is right is normally 
accompanied by at least some desire to perform the act in question…” (1998: 131; Cf. Smith 1994: 39). 
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Using these proposed input and output clauses, let us formulate a toy functionalist theory 
of moral rightness. 
Tn: An act-token x is morally right iff there is a natural property, P, such that x 
has P in system S and there is a tendency for (i) act-tokens that have P in S to 
be preferred to their alternatives by sympathetic and impartial agents, and (ii) 
act-tokens that lack P to elicit condemnation and negative moral attitudes on 
the part of impartial observers. 
 
As with the toy account of pain, we are to identify rightness with the property of having a 
natural property that plays the rightness role; rightness is not to be identified with the 
realizer properties that are quantified over by ‘there is a natural property P’ (e.g. natural 
properties like maximizing utility and treating no one as a mere means).   
 If Tn (or something relevantly like it) were our best higher-level functionalist 
account of rightness, then the HLPR implies the falsity of moral realism.  The reason for 
this is that, by Tn, the standard that fixes the moral facts is itself determined by subjective 
indicators (i.e., moral attitudes and beliefs).  For example, given Tn, it is plausible to 
suppose that the reason rightness is realized by a different property on Twin Earth is that, 
unlike Earthlings, Twin Earthlings tend to prefer actions that treat no one as a mere 
means and take a negative moral attitude to actions that do treat someone as mere means.  
Furthermore, given Tn, if we Earthlings had sufficiently different preferences and moral 
attitudes, a different natural property would make our actions right than the one that 
currently makes them right.  By rendering moral facts dependent upon our attitudes and 
preferences in this way, Tn violates the stance-independence requirement for moral 
realism.  It would appear, then, that moral realists cannot avail themselves of the HLPR 
to MTE.27 
                                                
27 Note that functionalist accounts of rightness that treat the lower-level realizer property as identical with 
rightness do not have this problem and are compatible with moral realism.  For whether or not (e.g.) an act 
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 To save the HLPR, the realist needs a functionalist account of rightness that does 
not determine which natural properties realize rightness by appeal to the attitudes that 
agents and observers take towards actions with those properties.  Conspicuously absent 
from my list of things that cause and are caused by right actions is any mention of the 
causal impact right action has on human welfare.  Perhaps we should look here for a 
realist-friendly functional account of rightness.  Consider Brink’s own suggestion for the 
functional role that moral goodness plays:  
[T]he realist might claim that moral properties are those which bear upon the 
maintenance and flourishing of human organisms.  Maintenance and flourishing 
presumably consist in necessary conditions for survival, other needs associated 
with basic well-being, wants of various sorts and distinctively human capacities 
(1984: 122). 
 
One might turn this into an output clause for an account of rightness by supposing that 
when an act is right, it has a natural property, P, and occurs in a social environment, S, 
such that there is a tendency for acts with P in S to promote the flourishing of human 
organisms.  Call this the flourishing condition.   
 One worry about the flourishing condition is that, on some ways of understanding 
it, it threatens to commit us to consequentialism of some form.28  However, in order for 
the functionalist account to serve the HLPR, it must be such that a deontological property 
(such as treating no one as a mere means) can realize the rightness role.  Otherwise, t-
‘right’ would not count as being causally regulated by the same higher-level property as 
‘right.’  In that case, the reply to MTE collapses.  The same difficulty will arise for any 
                                                                                                                                            
maximizes utility does not depend upon the attitudes of observers in a way that violates stance-
independence.  Thus, if rightness is identified with maximizing utility, rightness itself (or facts about which 
acts are right) counts as stance-independent. 
28 Indeed, it looks as though it could force us to accept a normative view according to which an act is 
morally right just in case it is permitted by the moral code whose currency in our social environment would 
maximize human flourishing. 
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other functionalist account that the realist offers insofar as that account fixes right-
making properties by input and output clauses that embody substantive moral principles.   
 Of course, there is no harm in including some substantive principles among the 
inputs and outputs in our functionalist account, as long as those principles are construed 
in a broad enough way that the rightness role could be realized by any number of 
potential right-making properties.  Surely, even a deontologist could admit that right 
actions tend to promote human flourishing (even if not all right acts do so).  
Unfortunately, this means that a property’s satisfaction of the substantive input and 
output clauses will be (indeed, must be) insufficient to fix a determinate natural property 
as the rightness realizer in a given environment.  To yield determinate moral facts, the 
functionalist account of rightness must be supplemented with ideology-neutral input and 
output clauses.  It seems to me that such clauses will need to make reference to the 
attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of agents within a social environment.  I cannot see any 
other options.  If I am right, then even a functionalist account of rightness that includes 
substantive input and output clauses will violate realism’s stance-independence 
requirement; it remains true on this sort of account that, if our attitudes (or other 
subjective indicators) had been different, a different natural property would have realized 
rightness.29   
                                                
29 Horgan and Timmons themselves recognize in their (2000) that naturalist moral realists confront a 
dilemma of the sort described in this section.  They write, “The first horn is that the putatively reference-
fixing relation R might fail to fix determinate reference-relations between moral terms and certain natural 
properties because there are too many eligible natural properties that satisfy the constraints imposed by R.  
[…]  The second horn of the dilemma arises if one grants that the proposed reference-fixing relation R 
suffices to pin down some unique class of natural properties as the putative referents of moral terms.”  In 
that case, the realist’s semantics falls to an MTE counterexample (H&T 2000: 240; cf. 1996a: 32-34). 
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 It appears, then, that the realist cannot avail himself of the HLPR in order to 
defend CSN since the HLPR requires a functionalist account of rightness that is 
incompatible with realism.  
 
3.8. Conclusion. 
 The HLPR is a natural and tempting answer to the challenge that MTE poses to 
Boyd’s causal semantics for moral terms (CSN).  In this chapter, I hope to have given a 
clear picture of what the HLPR is and what its commitments are.  In particular, I have 
argued that the adoption of the HLPR carries a commitment to agent-relativism.  In 
addition, I have argued that the HLPR requires a functionalist account of moral properties 
that is incompatible with moral realism.  Since CSN is of interest to us primarily for its 
role in the defense of the naturalist moral realism, the HLPR turns out to be self-
defeating: it preserves CSN at the cost of abandoning moral realism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BRINK’S MORAL SEMANTICS  
4. Chapter. 
4.1. Introduction. 
Until now I have been supposing that the theory of content-fixing that underwrites SEN’s 
externalist semantics is Boyd’s causal regulation account.  As we have seen, this account 
is vulnerable to H&T’s Moral Twin Earth argument.  H&T contend that the MTE thought 
experiment can be used to undermine any externalist moral semantics insofar as that 
semantics succeeds in pinning down a determinate (and realist-friendly) semantic content 
for moral predicates.  They claim that any such theory will lead either to a form of 
chauvinistic conceptual relativism, or else to a form of agent (or “standard”) moral 
relativism that is in tension with moral realism (H&T 2000: 139-142).   
 Notwithstanding H&T’s contention, David Brink (2001) has recently advanced a 
novel account of content-fixing for moral terms that is promised to avoid the threat of an 
MTE counterexample.  In the present chapter, I examine Brink’s proposed moral 
semantics.  I argue that his semantics fails to yield a solution to MTE that is compatible 
with naturalist moral realism.  In particular, his semantics impales SEN on the horns of a 
dilemma.  Understood one way, his semantics is incompatible with the stance-
independence of putative moral facts; and thus, it is incompatible with moral realism.  
Understood another way, it requires the acceptance of non-natural facts, and so, is 
incompatible with ethical naturalism.  Because SEN is a form of both moral realism and 
ethical naturalism, whatever solution Brink’s moral semantics offers with respect to MTE 
is a solution that SEN cannot avail itself of. 
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4.2. Brink’s Moral Semantics. 
4.2.1.  Brink’s Moral Semantics: an initial formulation.   
Brink’s account of content-fixing for moral terms is presented in his “Realism, 
Naturalism, and Moral Semantics” (2001).  One of the main attractions of this account is 
that it is supposed to provide the ethical naturalist with an answer to the argument from 
chauvinistic conceptual relativism.  Although it is a form of semantic externalism, 
Brink’s moral semantics re-emphasizes a role for speakers’ intentions with respect to 
content-fixing.  To illustrate the role of speakers’ intentions with respect to content-fixing 
Brink begins with an example involving a non-moral, natural kind term.  He maintains 
that, when speakers introduce such a term into their lexicon, their referential intentions 
determine which feature of our environment they are naming.  For example, 
…those who introduced the term ‘water’ intended to refer to the structure, 
whatever it is, that explains the perceptible and functional features of the 
colorless, odorless stuff—found in lakes, rivers, etc.—that is suitable for drinking, 
bathing, and supporting life.  It is this intention that fixes the reference of ‘water’.  
As it turns out, it is the chemical microstructure H2O that answers this explanatory 
description (Brink 2001: 172). 
 
Thus, the referent of the kind name ‘water’ is the chemical kind H2O, while, presumably, 
the content of the corresponding predicate ‘water’ is the property of being H2O.   
(It is important to note that, for Brink, the speakers’ referential intention functions 
only to identify the content of ‘water.’  The content of the description embodied in their 
‘water’-related referential intention does not itself become the semantic content of 
‘water.’  For if it did, then the property expressed by ‘water’ would be something like 
being a colorless, odorless stuff found in lakes and rivers that is suitable for drinking, 
bathing and supporting life.  If this were the content of ‘water,’ then we would have to 
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say that Putnam’s XYZ belongs to the extension of ‘water’; but this is not what Brink 
wants to say.) 
 Turning his attention to moral discourse, Brink writes that 
…we need some parallel descriptive specification of the referential intentions of 
moral inquirers that would justify us interpreting a community of inquirers as 
engaged in moral inquiry…[B]ut it must be a description that is sufficiently 
abstract, so that a wide variety of views…might be thought to satisfy this 
description.  Moreover, what best satisfies this description must be a matter of 
substantive moral theory (ibid.). 
 
He ultimately recommends the following descriptive specification of the content-fixing 
intentions of moral inquirers: 
… we should understand perhaps all moral appraisers, and certainly those who 
introduced moral categories and terms, as using those categories and terms with 
the intention of picking out those properties of people, actions, and institutions—
whatever those properties are—that play an important role in the interpersonal 
justification of people’s characters, their actions, and their institutions (ibid. 174). 
 
If Brink is right, then we should understand speakers on both Earth and Twin Earth as 
using ‘right’ (and t-‘right) with the intention of expressing a property (or properties) that 
play “an important role in interpersonal justification.”  Only under this assumption are we 
permitted to view both groups as engaged in moral inquiry and as making moral 
judgments when they use their respective predicates.  If it were to turn out that Twin 
Earthlings use t-‘right’ without the intention of picking out properties that play an 
important role in interpersonal justification, then we would have good reason to doubt 
after all that t-‘right’ is really translatable as our ‘morally right.’  Consequently, we 
would be within our rights to conclude that the resulting conceptual relativism is neither 
chauvinistic nor otherwise objectionable. 
 So far, so good.  But if this suggestion is to succeed in steering ethical naturalism 
clear of chauvinistic conceptual relativism, then there needs to be some kind of guarantee 
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that all speakers who deploy seeming moral terms with this referential intention will 
succeed in fixing a common semantic content for those terms.  How does Brink’s 
semantics guarantee this?  Here I quote Brink at length: 
Recall that relativism appeared to be a commitment of the theory of direct 
reference [i.e., semantic externalism] insofar as this theory was unable to identify 
a common meaning and reference about which appraisers from Earth and Moral 
Twin Earth held different beliefs.  But our account of the shared referential 
intention to pick out people, actions, and institutions that are interpersonally 
justifiable, in virtue of which the judgments of Earthlings and Moral Twin 
Earthlings are both moral judgments, identifies just such a common meaning or 
reference about which the two communities have disagreement in belief.  Their 
disagreement is one about which features of people, actions, and institutions make 
them interpersonally justifiable, with Earthlings holding consequentialist views 
and Moral Twin Earthlings holding deontological views.  Moral realism and the 
theory of direct reference [i.e., semantic externalism] then, are compatible, and 
there is no reason to see a tension between ethical naturalism and moral realism 
(ibid. 174f).   
 
 Brink’s explanation of how his semantics avoids chauvinistic relativism goes by 
too quickly.  In order to see his solution more clearly, we will need to spell out his 
proposed semantics with more precision.  To keep things simple, my formulation of his 
semantics will focus only on the deontic moral predicate ‘right’ as it applies to actions.  
For the same reason, I also omit mention of content-borrowing mechanisms that Brink 
discusses earlier in his paper.1  Here, then, is one way to understand the externalist moral 
semantics that Brink proposes: 
BMS*: A predicate, ‘F,’ as used by the members of a linguistic community, C, is 
a deontic moral predicate translatable as the English ‘morally right’ and expresses 
the natural property N iff:  
 
1. The members of C use ‘F’ with the intention of expressing a unique property 
of actions in virtue of which those actions are interpersonally justifiable for 
the members of C. 
 
                                                
1 Reference to such mechanisms may be unnecessary for our purposes since my formulation concerns itself 
with uses of a predicate by an entire linguistic community, as opposed uses by individual speakers. 
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2. An action, x, is (in fact) interpersonally justifiable for the members of C iff x 
instantiates N. 
 
It is important to avoid confusion about what BMS* implies.  The descriptive content of 
the referential intention to express a property that makes actions interpersonally 
justifiable serves only to fix a natural property as the semantic content of ‘morally right.’  
The descriptive content of that intention does not itself serve as the content of ‘morally 
right.’  So, for example, if it should turn out that for the members of our community the 
property of maximizing utility makes acts interpersonally justifiable, then maximizing 
utility is the content and property expressed by our uses of ‘morally right.’   BMS* 
should not be understood as expressing the claim that the content of ‘morally right’ is the 
property being interpersonally justifiable or the property being permitted by an 
interpersonally justifiable standard of action.2 
 
4.2.2. A revised formulation of Brink’s Moral Semantics.   
If BMS* is the correct interpretation of Brink’s proposed moral semantics, then he has 
not supplied ethical naturalism with an acceptable answer to the problem of chauvinistic 
                                                
2 Two comments are worth mentioning here.  First, this incorrect understanding of BMS* yields an account 
of the content of ‘morally right’ that is similar to the one defended by David Copp (1995).  Very roughly, 
Copp’s view is that ‘morally right’ expresses the property of being permitted by a moral code that is 
justified for the action’s circumstance (ibid: 25f).  Although Copp prefers to classify his view as a form of 
moral realism (ibid: 7, 223), in a recent paper, he acknowledges that, when his account is spelled out in 
detail, it does not satisfy the stance-independence requirement for the robust form of realism that we are 
interested in here (Copp 2005: 277).   
 A second point that merits comment is this: although I emphasize that BMS* implies that ‘morally 
right’ expresses (something like) the property of maximizing utility rather than (something like) the 
property of being interpersonally justifiable, this claim oversimplifies matters.  If, as naturalists suggest 
(see §1.6.1), we are to view theories in first-order normative ethics as expressing property identities, then it 
is likely that we will need to assume that necessary co-extension is sufficient for property identity.  
However, given this assumption, it follows that if (e.g.) act-utilitarianism were true, we should probably 
conclude further that that maximizing utility is necessarily co-extensive with being interpersonally 
justifiable.  And in that case, these properties are identical.  From this, it follows that, given BMS* and the 
present assumptions, ‘morally right’ expresses being interpersonally justifiable after all.  As best as I can 
tell, whether or not this really is an implication of BMS* (or an implication of the refined BMS that I 
present below) does not significantly impact the cogency of the arguments that I marshal against the view 
below.  Thus, I will largely ignore this matter. 
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relativism.  Let me explain.  Given the description of the MTE scenario, it is natural to 
suppose that, for speakers on Earth, the property in virtue of which an act is 
interpersonally justifiable is the property of maximizing utility.  It is also natural to 
suppose that, for speakers on Twin Earth, the property in virtue of which an act is 
interpersonally justifiable is the property of treating no one as a mere means.  Unless 
these assumptions render the MTE story incoherent—and I see no reason to think that 
they do—it follows from BMS* that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express different semantic 
content and cannot be used to engage in substantive moral disagreement. 
 It isn’t difficult to see where BMS* goes wrong.  BMS* attributes to moral 
speakers the intention to express the natural property that makes actions interpersonally 
justifiable for their own community.  Moreover, the theory treats interpersonal 
justifiability a relation between actions and discrete linguistic communities.  Because of 
these two features, it is possible that there be one natural property that makes actions 
interpersonally justifiable for Earthlings, and thus, serves as the content of ‘right,’ while 
another, different natural property makes actions interpersonally justifiable for Twin 
Earthlings, and thus, serves as the content of t-‘right.’  In other words, these two features 
render BMS* vulnerable to MTE counterexamples. 
 I do not believe that BMS* represents the moral semantics that Brink means to 
advance.  However, this mistaken formulation of his view has revealed a crucial—though 
unspoken—assumption that underwrites his defense of naturalist moral realism: whatever 
natural property makes actions interpersonally justifiable, that property must make 
actions interpersonally justifiable for all possible communities of moral agents.  A 
secondary assumption is that ‘morally right’ (and any other predicate translatable as 
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‘morally right’) is used by speakers with the intention of expressing whatever natural 
property makes an act interpersonally justifiable for all possible communities of moral 
agents.3  It seems to me, then, that the moral semantics Brink means to propose is best 
captured by the following formulation: 
BMS:  A predicate, ‘F,’ as used by the members of a linguistic community, C, is a 
deontic moral predicate translatable as the English ‘morally right’ and expresses 
the natural property N iff: 
 
1. The members of C use ‘F’ with the intention of expressing a unique property 
of actions in virtue of which those actions are interpersonally justifiable for all 
possible moral agents. 
 
2. An action, x, is (in fact) interpersonally justifiable for all possible moral 
agents iff x instantiates N. 
 
This account of content-fixing for moral predicates appears to solve the problem of 
chauvinistic conceptual relativism.  If BMS is true, then it is not possible for there to exist 
a community of speakers who use a predicate that is both translatable as ‘right’ and that 
expresses a natural property distinct from the property expressed by our own use of 
‘right.’4   
 It would seem, then, that Brink has supplied ethical naturalism with a moral 
semantics that eludes MTE-type counterexamples.  In this respect, BMS represents a 
                                                
3 These two assumptions constitute very strong claims.  I suspect something weaker might do the job for 
Brink’s purposes.  It might be argued on behalf of ethical naturalism that the more psychologically different 
from us that Twin Earthlings are, the less confident we are that t-‘right’ really does express the same 
content as ‘right.’  We are troubled only by MTE scenarios in which Twin Earth is populated with moral 
agents that fall within the “normal” range of human psychology.  Fair enough.  As long as it is granted that 
the Twin Earthlings described here fall within that range, I am happy to construe the locution ‘all moral 
agents’ as short for ‘all moral agents relevantly similar to Earthlings.’  I will, however, leave this 
qualification merely implicit in the reformulation of Brink’s moral semantics that I am about to propose. 
4 In case this isn’t clear:  Suppose that, in fact, an action is interpersonally justifiable for all possible moral 
agents iff it instantiates maximizing utility.  When BMS is conjoined with this assumption, it follows that 
any community of speakers who successfully use a predicate translatable as ‘right’ express maximizing 
utility by that predicate.  If a community’s use of ‘right’ failed to express maximizing utility, but expressed 
some other property instead, that would entail that they do not use ‘right’ with the intention of expressing a 
property that makes actions interpersonally justifiable for all possible moral agents.  In that case, however, 
there is no pressure to view their predicate as translatable with our ‘right.’  Consequently, there is also no 
pressure to view their apparent disagreement with us as substantive. 
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significant improvement over Boyd’s CSN.  In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue 
that, whatever its merits as a semantics for ‘morally right,’ BMS is of no use to a sincere 
defender of realistic ethical naturalism.  Upon closer inspection, it will be seen that BMS 
embodies commitments that are incompatible with a metaethics that is at once realist and 
naturalist. 
 
4.3. Interpersonal Justification. 
Brink makes no secret of the fact that the statement of his moral semantics makes 
essential use of a baldly normative term.  He writes, 
[T]his account of moral semantics in terms of referential intentions to adopt the 
point of view of interpersonal justification is fiercely nonreductionist.  To 
characterize the moral point of view in terms of interpersonal justification is to 
characterize it in ineliminably normative terms.  This makes it a substantive 
question, which I have not addressed here, whether moral terms do refer and, if 
so, which properties they pick out (2001: 176). 
 
As we see, Brink acknowledges that, by making the content of moral terms depend upon 
substantive normative facts about which properties make for interpersonal justification, 
BMS leaves us vulnerable to moral nihilism:  If it were to turn out that there is no unique 
property that makes actions interpersonally justifiable for all moral agents, then ‘morally 
right’ would fail to express any property.  In that case, all English sentences of the form 
‘φ is morally right’ would be either false, or else lacking a truth-value. 
 The threat of nihilism from this direction is not trivial.  But I want to set it aside 
for the moment (we will revisit it below).  I am interested in a more subtle threat that 
arises for SEN as a result of the content-fixing role that BMS assigns to substantive 
normative facts about interpersonal justification.  The threat is this:  Judgments about 
interpersonal justification are themselves the subject of metaethical theorizing.  If BMS is 
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to be utilized in a defense of ethical naturalism, then the metaethics that underwrites 
judgments about interpersonal justification had better be compatible with moral realism 
and ethical naturalism itself.5  If it is not compatible, then BMS is in vain; its adoption 
would constitute an abandonment of naturalist moral realism, rather than a defense.   
 In order to evaluate the success of BMS, then, we need to examine what it is for 
an action (or for a standard of right-action) to be interpersonally justifiable.  About this 
matter, Brink offers only a very broad sketch of an account.  He writes that, according to 
the concept of morality that identifies moral standards with those that are interpersonally 
justifiable, “what is distinctive about the moral point of view is that we assess people, 
actions, and institutions according to standards that others can and should accept” (2001: 
174).  If by ‘others’ Brink means ‘all moral agents,’ his words suggest the following 
characterization of interpersonal justification: 
IJ:  An action, x, is interpersonally justifiable iff x is permitted by a standard of 
right-action that every moral agent can and should accept. 
 
With this conception of interpersonal justification in hand, I want to argue that ethical 
naturalism faces a dilemma when it is supplemented with BMS.  To see the dilemma 
more clearly, I suggest one terminological adjustment to IJ.  Instead of speaking of 
standards that agents should accept, I propose that we speak of the standards that agents 
have normative reason to accept.6  By making this terminological swap, we can now 
avail ourselves of the distinction between internal and external normative reasons.  
                                                
5 Or, to be more precise: the metaethics that correctly accounts for judgments and facts about interpersonal 
justification had better not combine with BMS in a way that undermines either moral realism or ethical 
naturalism. 
6 I follow John Broome first in treating ‘should’ as roughly synonymous with ‘ought,’ and second in taking 
claims about what an agent ought to do as being equivalent—even if not synonymous with—claims about 
what an agent has “perfect” reason to do.  Perfect (or all-things-considered) reasons differ from “pro-tanto” 
(or prima facie) reasons in that it is possible for an agent to have pro-tanto reason to φ even if it is false that 
he ought to φ.  Such a case can arise when there is a more weighty pro-tanto reason not to φ.  See Broome 
(2004: 34-42). 
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Roughly, an agent has internal reason to perform an action φ just in case φ-ing would 
contribute to the satisfaction of her (informed) desires (or other elements in her 
“subjective motivational set”).7  By contrast, external reasons obtain independently of 
agents’ desires so that an agent can have external reason to φ, even if φ-ing would serve 
none of her informed desires.  (I understand the distinction between internal and external 
reasons to be exhaustive). 
 In outline, the dilemma facing BMS is this:  Suppose that IJ is read in such a way 
that judgments about which standard an agent should accept are understood as judgments 
about what an agent has internal reason to accept.  Two problems ensue.  The first is that 
it is doubtful that there is a single standard of action that all moral agents have internal 
reason to accept.  If there is no such standard, then BMS entails moral nihilism.  The 
second problem is that facts about what internal reasons an agent has are stance-
dependent.  When the internal reasons reading of IJ is combined with BMS, the stance-
dependence of normative (internal) reasons is transferred to the moral facts themselves.  
Thus, the resulting metaethic is incompatible with moral realism.   
 For the second horn of the dilemma, we suppose that IJ is read in such a way that 
judgments about which standard an agent should accept are understood as judgments 
about what an agent has external reason to accept.  Now, facts about what there is 
external reason to do are typically held to be irreducible to facts picked out by a purely 
non-moral vocabulary.  Thus, the acceptance of such reasons appears to require that we 
                                                
7 The canonical statement of the distinction between internal and external reasons is Williams (1980).  I 
will understand ‘desire’ in a broad way so as to include all the elements Williams includes in an agent’s 
subjective motivational set.  These include “dispositions of evaluation, patters of emotional reaction, 
personal loyalties, and various projects…embodying commitments of the agent” (ibid.: 105).  It may be 
possible to offer a unifying account various phenomena included in a subjective motivational set by appeal 
to the notion of “direction of fit.”  Whereas belief is a state of mind that aims for its content to fit the world, 
elements of an agent’s subjective motivational set (i.e., her desires) are states of mind that aim to get the 
world to fit their content. 
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expand our ontology.  The trouble is, facts about what there is external reason to do fail 
to satisfy EC; they play no ineliminable role in our best available a posteriori 
explanations.  This might lead some to want to opt for a reductive account of external 
reasons.  But even if a reductive account could be made plausible, it appears that the 
resulting version of BMS is once again vulnerable to MTE and the problem of 
chauvinistic conceptual relativism. 
 Since the internal reasons interpretation and external reasons interpretation of IJ 
are exhaustive, it turns out that there is no conception of IJ that combines with BMS so as 
to solve the problem of chauvinistic conceptual relativism in a way that is consistent with 
both moral realism and ethical naturalism.  Thus, BMS fails in its task: it is of no use in 
defending naturalist moral realism.  In the remaining sections, I present the details of this 
dilemma, taking each horn in turn. 
 
4.4. First Horn: Internal Reasons. 
4.4.1. Internal reasons and the failure to converge.   
On standard versions of reasons internalism (the view that all genuine normative reasons 
are internal reasons), the desires relevant to an agent’s having a reason to φ are taken to 
be those desires that she would have, were she in ideal epistemic circumstances – e.g., in 
a condition of full information and correct deliberation (cf. Williams 1980; Smith 1995).  
Call the desires that an agent has under such idealized circumstances her ideal desires.  
For a reasons internalist, whether an agent has reason to accept a given standard of right-
action depends upon whether her accepting that standard will satisfy her ideal desires.  
The trouble for BMS on the internal reasons-reading of IJ, is that it is very unlikely that a 
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single standard of right-action serves the ideal desires of every individual moral agent.  
For example, a very strong, clever, and unsympathetic agent with Nietzschean tastes 
would probably be better served by accepting a standard different from the standard 
appropriate for someone with a slower wit and a more delicate physique and sensibility.  
In that case, however, there is no standard that all agents have reason to accept.  Given IJ, 
it follows that no actions are interpersonally justifiable. It follows further that BMS 
implies our use of ‘morally right’ expresses no property.  We are left with moral nihilism. 
  
4.4.2. Smith’s absolutist conception of internal reasons.   
This is too quick, however.  Some philosophers reject this relativistic conception of 
internal reasons in favor of an absolutist conception.  Perhaps the ethical naturalist can 
escape the present difficulty by drawing on their work.  In this section, I will consider 
what the ethical naturalist might gain by adopting the sort of absolutist conception of 
internal reasons advanced by Michael Smith. 
 According to Smith’s conception of an internal reason, an agent counts as being in 
ideal epistemic circumstances only when her entire set of desires is “systematically 
justified” in the sense that her desire-set is brought to exhibit maximal coherence and 
unity.  The process of justification among desires that Smith envisions is akin to Rawls’s 
description of the method for achieving a reflective equilibrium among one’s beliefs 
(1971/1999: 40-46): we begin with our actual stock of desires and then add and subtract 
desires until we reach a set of desires that is maximally coherent and unified.  Call an 
agent fully rational iff her desires are systematically justified, she has no false beliefs, 
and she has all relevant true beliefs.  Smith’s view is that an agent has an internal reason 
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to perform φ in circumstance C “if and only if, if she were fully rational, she would desire 
that she φs in C” (1995: 112).  Importantly, Smith believes that, under conditions of full 
rationality, “all possible rational creatures would desire alike as regards what is to be 
done in the various circumstances they might face…” (ibid. 118).  If he is right, then his 
account allows for a form of absolutism about internal reasons.  An implication of this 
account is that there will be no variation among possible agents with respect to the matter 
of which standard of right-action they have internal reason to accept.8  It would seem, 
then, that BMS can evade the threat of moral nihilism if we incorporate an absolutist 
version of internal reasons into our reading of IJ. 
 The trouble with this strategy is that it can be effective only if, in fact, there really 
would be a convergence in the desires of all possible fully rational creatures.  I do not 
share Smith’s optimism that such a convergence is forthcoming.  It strikes me as a 
genuine possibility that there could be a moral agent whose informed desires achieve 
maximal coherence and yet they are different from the desires of other fully rational 
moral agents with respect to matters of moral importance.  If it is a genuine possibility 
that there be one such agent, then I see little reason to deny that it is a genuine possibility 
that there could be an entire planet populated with billions of similar agents.9  If this is 
possible, then the internalist reading of IJ entails that there is no standard of right action 
                                                
8 Perhaps I am being too generous towards BMS.  Even granting Smith’s absolutist internalist account of 
normative reasons, it does not follow that all agents will have normative reason to accept the same moral 
standard.  This is because Smith’s account still relativizes the reasons an agent has to her circumstances. 
(What make it absolutist, nevertheless, is that she has reason to φ only if all ideal agents would agree in 
their desire that, given her circumstances, she φs).  It is compatible with Smith’s account that, given 
differences in the circumstances faced by Earthlings and Twin Earthlings, members of each group 
respectively have reason to accept a different standard of right-action. 
9 Horgan and Timmons press this point themselves in their own critique of Smith’s theory of reasons 
(1996b: 210-211).  They note that a defender of Smith’s account must reject such a possibility as 
“misdescribed” or, in any case, illusory.  For what it’s worth, in a review of Thomas Carson’s The Status of 
Morality, Brink raises what is essentially the same objection against Carson’s ideal observer theory of 
moral facts that I am raising against Smith here (1986: 146). 
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that is interpersonally justifiable for all moral agents.  Once again, the internalist theory 
of normative reasons conjoins with BMS to entail moral nihilism. 
  
4.4.3. Internal reasons and the stance-dependence of normative facts.   
To avoid the present difficulty, the naturalist moral realist must insist that the agents I 
have just described are not genuinely possible.  A reply along these lines might have 
some plausibility if there were a “normative reality” existing independently of the desires 
we actually have or would come to have via the method of reflective equilibrium.  If 
there were a single, independent, normative reality, then the naturalist could argued that, 
for every possible agent, contact with this reality constrains and guides the process of 
systematically justifying her desires.  Because each agent’s process of desire-justification 
is guided by a single normative reality, it may be argued further that, insofar as the 
process of justification is properly implemented by each agent, it is reasonable to believe 
that all agents would converge in their ideal desires.  If all of this could be maintained, 
then I am ready to grant that there would at least be some grounds for dismissing as 
mistaken the intuition that it is possible that there be a fully rational agent whose desires 
are importantly different from those of other fully rational agents. 
 Whatever the merits of the defense just sketched, it is not available to a proponent 
of reasons internalism.  For Smith, as for other defenders of reasons internalism, there 
simply is no antecedently existing normative reality to guide the process of desire-
justification undertaken by any given agent.  Instead, the facts about what there is 
normative reason for an agent to do are constituted by facts about which set of desires she 
would have, were she successfully to complete the process of systematic justification 
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among her fully informed desires (along with the non-normative facts about which 
actions would satisfy those desires).  The trouble for the absolutist version of reasons 
internalism, then, is that in the absence of an independently existing normative reality, it 
is hard to see a reason to accept that it is a necessary truth that all moral agents who 
subject their desires to the process of justification that Smith describes end up desiring 
exactly alike. 
 The preceding observations prepare us for the second major problem that arises 
for BMS when IJ is given an internalist reading:  If, as reasons internalists claim, facts 
about what an agent has normative reason to do are themselves partly constituted by facts 
about what that agent would desire, were she fully rational, then having a normative 
reason must be regarded as a stance-dependent kind of fact.  Because of this, reasons 
internalism must be classified as a form of constructivist anti-realism about normative 
facts.  In and of itself, this need not entail constructivism about moral facts, since one 
might deny that moral facts are a species of normative facts.  However, because, 
according to BMS, facts about which natural properties are morally right-making are 
determined by facts about which moral standards agents have normative reason to accept, 
the stance-dependence of the normative facts spreads to the moral facts themselves.  Let 
me try to spell out more clearly why this is. 
 When the internalist reading of IJ is conjoined with BMS, the matter of which 
property ‘morally right’ expresses is made dependent upon facts about which standard of 
right action all moral agents would desire that they accept, were they fully rational.  
Because of this, the standard that rational agents would accept is ipso facto the true first-
order theory of moral rightness.  This is because this very standard determines which 
109 
natural property is expressed by ‘morally right’ and thus, which natural property makes 
right acts right.  For example, given this reading of BMS, the property of maximizing 
utility will make right acts right if (and only if) all agents would desire that they accept 
act-utilitarianism as their moral standard, were they fully rational; and, as a result, AUh 
would be the true theory in the normative ethics of behavior.  On the other hand, if all 
agents would desire that they accept a form of Kantianism, were they fully rational, then 
(something like) the property of treating no one as a mere means would make right acts 
right instead; and in that case, CI-2 would be the true theory in the normative ethics of 
behavior.   
 It should be obvious that the internal reasons way of understanding BMS has put 
us in a situation in which the moral standard that fixes the facts about which acts are 
morally right is made true in virtue of its being ratified from within the perspective of 
hypothetical, fully rational agents.  In other words, moral facts fail to be stance-
independent on this account.10  Consequently, BMS, when combined with an internal 
reasons reading of IJ, cannot be deployed in defense of naturalistic moral realism.  Under 
the most optimistic assumptions, the most robust metaethic that it can support is an 
absolutist version of moral constructivism. 
 
4.5. Second Horn: External Reasons. 
4.5.1. BMS, IJ, and external reasons.   
In light of the troubles raised in the previous section, it looks like a successful defense of 
ethical naturalism using BMS will have to adopt an external reasons interpretation of IJ.  
On this interpretation, an act is interpersonally justifiable iff it is permitted by a standard 
                                                
10 The stance-independence requirement was discussed above, in §1.2.1. 
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of right-action that every moral agent has external reason to accept.  An agent’s external 
reasons, recall, are roughly those normative reasons that an agent has independently of 
her desires (be they actual desires or idealized desires).11  Because of this independence, 
the version of BMS that incorporates an external reasons interpretation of IJ is not 
obviously vulnerable to the charge that it renders moral facts stance-dependent.  In this 
respect, the reasons externalist version of BMS looks to be compatible with moral 
realism. 
 Unfortunately, by committing BMS to the existence of external reasons, this 
interpretation of IJ raises troubles of its own.  Note first that the internalist account of 
reasons considered in §4.4 is a reductive view: facts about what there is internal 
normative reason to do reduce to facts about what agents would desire under actual or 
counterfactual circumstances.  Provided that desires and modal facts are open to 
empirical investigation, facts about what there is internal reason to do are natural facts.12  
By contrast, few have claimed that facts about what there is external reason to do are 
similarly reducible.13  It seems, then, that a commitment to external reasons requires us to 
expand our ontology in a way that a commitment to internal reasons does not.  The 
worry, however, is that a commitment to irreducible external reasons expands our 
                                                
11 More precisely, an agent’s external reasons are reasons she has that are not constituted by anyone’s 
actual or ideal desires.  Strictly speaking, a reasons externalist can allow that some external reasons have a 
certain kind of dependence on desires: we may have external reasons to perform actions that would 
disappear if we lost certain desires.  For instance, it may be that Beth has a reason to see a horror film, but 
only if she desires to see a horror film.  If she loses her desire to view the film, she loses her reason to view 
it as well.  Even so, this reason can still be external insofar as it is grounded in an even more fundamental 
external reason.  For example, it may be that every agent has external reason to fulfill her own desires.  
Notice that this latter reason need not be thought of as dependent upon the agent’s desires: we might have 
reason to fulfill our desires even if we would not (ideally) desire that we fulfill our desires. 
12 I expect that some readers will be unsympathetic to the idea that modal facts are open to empirical 
investigation.  I cannot address this concern here; nor is there need to address it here.  If the modal facts 
that underwrite internal reasons cannot be made to fit within an empirical epistemology—either by being 
shown to be analytic or else knowable via inference to the best a posteriori explanations—then so much the 
worse for ethical naturalists. 
13 Nevertheless, in §4.5.3 I consider the prospects for BMS given a reductive view of external reasons.   
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ontology beyond what can be discovered by solely empirical means.  If so, then external 
reasons cannot be accommodated within a naturalistic ontology.  In that case, BMS will 
have purchased the stance-independence of moral facts at the price of abandoning ethical 
naturalism. 
  
4.5.2. Naturalism and external reasons.   
Is there anything to the worry that irreducible external reasons cannot be naturalized?  I 
think there is.  Recall the account of natural propertyhood from §1.3.1: 
NP: a property, P, is natural just in case a synthetic proposition to the effect that 
an individual instantiates P can be known only by way of empirical investigation, 
if it can be known at all. 
 
In light of NP, the property of being an external reason is a natural property only if 
knowledge that some consideration is an external reason can be acquired and justified 
using solely empirical methods (assuming, of course, that any such knowledge can be 
attained at all). 
 How plausible is it that knowledge of external reasons is empirical?  I think it is 
not very plausible.  In the first place, it is obvious that we do not detect external reasons 
through direct sensory perception.  (To put the same point more carefully: we do not 
detect that some considerations [i.e. states of affairs] are external normative reasons 
through the use of our five faculties of sense-perception—sight, hearing, touch, taste, and 
smell).  It may be worth noting a feature of reasons-talk that is apt to cause confusion on 
this point.  The thing that we often identify as the normative reason to φ often is 
something (in particular, a state of affairs) that is empirically knowable.  For instance, we 
might identify the fact that Carl is drowning as the reason I ought to throw him a life 
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preserver.  Here, the fact that Carl is drowning may plausibly be thought of as something 
we can observe with our senses.14  But the fact that Carl is drowning is not the sort of fact 
that we are concerned with presently.  What is at issue, rather, is how we come to 
recognize the observed fact that Carl is drowning as a reason to throw the life preserver.  
To put it another way: we are interested to discover how we come to know that Carl’s 
drowning makes it the case that we (pro-tanto) ought to throw him the life preserver.  I 
contend that we do not discover this sort of fact by way of sensory perception. 
 Moreover, because we do not perceive instances of something’s being an external 
reason, it should be obvious that we cannot arrive at the judgment that we have reason to 
φ by way of enumerative induction from our sensory observations.  The only remaining 
empirical way of discovering which states of affairs are external reasons, then, is by way 
of an inference to the best explanation of our empirical observations (i.e., abduction).15  
But what sorts of observable phenomena might external reasons help to explain?  
Certainly, such reasons are of no use in explaining phenomena such as planetary motion, 
geological processes, the life-cycles of plants and bacteria, the behavior of subatomic 
particles, etc.; or, more precisely, external reasons are no part of any plausible 
explanation of such phenomena unless those phenomena are themselves caused by the 
behavior of intentional agents.  (Note that to deny this would be effectively to accept a 
teleological view of the natural world.)  In fact, I believe that the only sort of phenomena 
                                                
14 Of course, as with any case of perception, the ability to observe that someone is drowning is theory 
laden.  In this case the perception presupposes background knowledge of mammals, respiration, mortality, 
etc. 
15 I have not said anything about a priori conceptual analysis.  Some might contend that conceptual analysis 
is an empirical way of knowing; and so, it might be thought that I ought to address whether we can come to 
know what we have external reason to do by this method.  This sort of complaint misses the mark.  Our 
present question is how we come to know the existence of irreducible external normative reasons.  Thus, 
the possibility that we could naturalize a certain kind of external reason by conceptually reducing it to some 
kind of less problematic phenomena is not relevant here.  (I consider the prospects for BMS given a 
reductive account of external reasons in §4.5.3 below). 
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for which it is even remotely plausible that external reasons play an explanatory role are 
the beliefs and intentional actions of agents. 
 Before considering the prospects of explaining beliefs and actions by appeal to 
external reasons, I want to take a moment to point out that this task is of double 
importance for the project of naturalizing external reasons.  Presently, we are pursuing 
the question of whether knowledge of the (putative) external reasons that we have is 
empirical knowledge.  An affirmative answer is needed if we are to construe external 
reasons as natural properties, in accordance with NP.  But finding ineliminable work for 
external reasons to perform in our best a posteriori explanations is also important for the 
naturalist’s project because of his commitment to the ontological criterion EC, presented 
in §1.3.2: 
EC: posit the existence of an entity (or a kind of entity) if and only if reference to 
that (kind of) entity is needed in our best available a posteriori explanations of 
observable phenomena. 
 
Unless it can be successfully argued that irreducible external reasons play an ineliminable 
role in the best explanation of the beliefs and intentional actions of agents, then, reasons 
externalism will fail ethical naturalism twice over. 
 But are external reasons needed in the best explanations of our beliefs and 
intentional actions?  To simplify, we can set aside discussion of intentional actions and 
focus on whether external reasons are needed to explain certain beliefs we hold—in 
particular, whether they are needed to explain those beliefs whose contents are 
propositions to the effect that there are external reasons to perform certain actions (call 
beliefs of this sort, normative beliefs).  The reason I say this is because paradigmatic 
cases in which an external reason plausibly forms part of the explanation of an agent’s 
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intentional act of φ-ing will be cases in which an agent φed because she believed that she 
had external reason to φ (or, what amounts to roughly the same thing, because she 
believed that she ought to φ).  This is not to insist that there couldn’t be cases in which an 
external reason bypasses an agent’s beliefs and by some subconscious process causes her 
to intend to φ.  But it seems to me that if external reasons are never part of a conscious 
process that results in an agent forming an intention to act, it is doubtful that we will find 
compelling examples of actions where no better explanation can be found than ones that 
posit external reasons operating subconsciously.  In addition, we should expect that false 
external reasons beliefs can bring about intentional action just as effectively as true 
external reasons beliefs.  If so, then all we can learn from an agent’s action is that she 
believed herself to have a reason; but it does not follow from this that she really did have 
a reason. 
 The present challenge facing the naturalist is to show that external reasons are 
part of the best a posteriori explanations of our (or anyone’s) normative beliefs.  Above, I 
argued that knowledge of external reasons—if any such thing is to be had—does not arise 
from direct perception; nor does it arise from inductive inference; nor does it arise by 
way of abductive inference from observations of inanimate objects.  As we saw, the only 
remaining phenomena that might be explained by external reasons are agent’s normative 
beliefs (and the actions they give rise to).  So perhaps it can be argued that we come to 
know the existence of external reasons because we must posit them in order to explain 
the normative beliefs of agents.  But with this, we have returned to our original question; 
we have made no progress. 
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 I think the conclusion to draw here is that our normative beliefs do not have their 
source in any empirical knowledge-gathering processes.  On the face of it, this would 
seem to decertify external reasons as natural properties or facts in light of NP.  But 
perhaps this is too quick.  Even if our normative beliefs do not have their source in 
empirical processes, it may still be the case that they can be epistemically justified using 
empirical methods (cf. Devitt 1999: 46).  If so, then a non-empirical etiology for 
normative beliefs need not be incompatible with the commitments of ethical naturalism. 
 If our normative beliefs do not have their source in empirical processes, then 
where do they come from?  Two answers suggest themselves.  First, it may be that we 
arrive at our normative beliefs by some kind of synthetic, a priori intuition through which 
we “grasp” that some considerations are external reasons for acting.  Such a process, so 
described, is incompatible with naturalism, as it renders external reasons non-natural 
according to NP.  A more promising answer for the naturalist is that normative beliefs are 
innate.  As far as I am aware, the only plausible account of innate beliefs that is 
compatible with naturalism is an evolutionary account.16  According to an account of this 
sort, a disposition to make normative (external reason) judgments arose in our species by 
way of natural selection.  Presumably, those who press this account must argue that 
having a normative sensibility (i.e., a disposition to make normative judgments) enhanced 
the reproductive fitness of our ancestors.17 
                                                
16 Examples of competing hypotheses that are not so compatible with naturalism include the hypothesis that 
God implants these beliefs in us and the Platonic hypothesis that we recollect these truths from past lives. 
17 Another possibility is that the disposition for normative judgment is a “spandrel,” a mere accidental by-
product of some different trait that was selected for.  But notice that if this disposition is a spandrel, then 
there isn’t any reason to suppose that real external reasons played a role in shaping its development; and if 
that is so, then external reasons are not needed in order to best explain the development of our innate 
disposition to make normative judgments and have normative beliefs.  Since external reasons aren’t needed 
to explain anything else, this fact along with EC implies that naturalists ought to deny their existence.   
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 I contend that even if normative beliefs are innate, this hypothesis does not bode 
well for the claim that external reasons are natural facts.  In Chapter 6, I discuss an 
evolutionary account of moral judgment in some depth.  According to that account, 
putative moral facts play no ineliminable role in the best explanation of our making the 
sorts of moral judgments that we make.  The very same account can also be extended to 
offer an explanation of our normative, external reason judgments in general.  I refer those 
looking for a more detailed discussion of the evolution of normative judgment to that 
chapter (see especially, §§6.3.2 - 6.3.4).  Here, I will briefly indicate why the 
evolutionary account of external reason judgments will not be of any help for naturalists 
looking to justify their acceptance of external reasons.   
 The trouble is that external reasons themselves (if there are any such things) play 
no ineliminable role in the most plausible evolutionary account of normative judgment.  
Normative beliefs need not be accurate—that is, they need not accurately represent some 
putative normative reality populated with external reasons—in order to enhance the 
reproductive fitness of creatures that make such judgments.  Let me explain.  To begin 
with, any plausible evolutionary account of normative judgment will have to suppose that 
there is a very strong (even if contingent) connection between judging that one has a 
reason to φ and being motivated to φ.  Without an assumption of this sort, the making of 
normative judgments (be they accurate or inaccurate judgments) may not be able to 
influence behavior to a great enough extent that it enhances reproductive fitness.  Now 
consider a human (or at least, a hominid) that is disposed to judge that the fact that 
something is her offspring is a strong reason to feed and care for it.  It is more plausible 
than not that, in the sort of environment in which our ancestors lived, the disposition to 
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make this sort of judgment (and to have one’s actions be guided by it) enhanced the 
reproductive fitness of the creatures that had it.  By contrast, we would expect to find a 
lower degree of reproductive fitness for a similar human who instead judges the fact that 
something is her offspring to be a reason to ignore it.  Notice, however, that we would 
expect the first creature to enjoy greater reproductive fitness than the second even if it 
were not true that something’s being one’s offspring is a strong reason to feed and care 
for it. 
 The upshot, then, is that a creature’s normative beliefs can influence her to behave 
in fitness-enhancing ways even if those beliefs are inaccurate.  Because of this, it is hard 
to see what ineliminable role external reasons can play in the story of how our ancestors 
evolved to have innate normative beliefs. 
 To conclude, irreducible external reasons cannot be accommodated by ethical 
naturalists.  In the first place, there is no credible account of our knowledge of such 
reasons that is compatible with a commitment to empiricism.  Consequently, external 
reasons fail to be natural properties given NP.  In addition, external reasons explain no 
observable phenomena; nor do they even explain the fact that we have beliefs with 
external reasons as part of their content.  Thus, given the naturalist’s ontological criterion, 
EC, naturalists cannot countenance irreducible external reasons.  Because of this, the 
irreducible external reasons reading of IJ cannot be combined with BMS to yield a 
semantics that honors the naturalistic metaphysical commitments of SEN. 
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4.5.3. Reductive accounts of external reasons.   
What are the prospects for BMS if we incorporate a reductive account of external 
reasons?  To examine the prospects of a reductivist maneuver, we will need some sample 
reductions of normative reasons.  Those reductivists who favor a hedonistic version of 
rational egoism might be inclined to accept something like the following reductive 
account:  
(REh) the property of an agent’s having external reason to φ = the property of φ 
maximizing its agent’s hedonic utility.   
 
I grant that REh renders external reasons acceptable from the point of view of 
metaphysical naturalism.  I am also ready to grant that REh satisfies (or could be made to 
satisfy) the stance-independence requirement.  Consequently, I accept (or at any rate, I do 
not deny) that REh could serve as a robustly realist, naturalistic account of normative 
reasons.   
 Although I have several misgivings about reductive accounts along the lines of 
REh, I will mention only one.  The naturalist who advances REh owes us a semantics of 
the predicate ‘has a normative reason.’  If that semantics is a version of descriptivism, 
then it will be easy to devise a “Normative Twin Earth” thought experiment that will 
reveal that naturalism is now committed to a chauvinistic conceptual relativism about 
‘has a normative reason.’  We need to imagine only that Earthlings subscribe to a 
hedonistic form of rational egoism while Twin Earthlings subscribe to a perfectionist 
form of rational egoism.  A similar result arises if it is suggested that we adopt a causal 
semantics for normative terms instead.  In that case, we could imagine a scenario in 
which Earthling uses of ‘has a normative reason’ are causally regulated by the property 
maximizing the agent’s hedonic utility, while Twin Earthling uses of ‘has a normative 
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reason’ are causally regulated by the property maximizes the degree of perfection of the 
agent’s essence.  Once again, Boyd’s causal semantics entails chauvinistic conceptual 
relativism. 
 To deal with this difficulty, we might try to mimic Brink’s moral semantics here 
and say that the content of ‘has a normative reason’ is fixed in virtue of speakers’ using 
this predicate with the intention of picking out a natural property that plays an important 
role in personal justification for all possible agents.  But here we are again faced with the 
worry that there may not be any such property, in which case, normative nihilism results.  
Moreover, even if there is such a natural property, we now need a metaethical account of 
judgments about personal justification.  But this puts us back where we started.  Even if 
‘personal justification’ successfully denotes a real property, that property could turn out 
to be incompatible with metaphysical naturalism, or it may turn out to combine with the 
new normative semantics in such a way as to yield constructivism about normative 
reasons.  In fact, I believe that this semantics for ‘having a normative reason’ faces 
exactly the same dilemma faced by BMS.  In short, a reductive account of external 
reasons does not answer the worries facing BMS; at best, it merely pushes them back 
another step. 
 
4.6. Conclusion. 
Brink has proposed a moral semantics whereby the content of a predicate such as 
‘morally right’ is fixed according to whichever standard of conduct moral agents can and 
should accept.  This semantics promises to avoid the problem of chauvinistic conceptual 
relativism while preserving an account of moral facts and properties that is both realist 
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and naturalist.  I have argued that Brink’s proposal cannot satisfy all three desiderata at 
once.  If the reasons we have for accepting a standard of conduct are internal reasons, 
then the moral metaphysics that results from Brink’s semantics is at best a form of moral 
constructivism and at worst a form of moral nihilism.  On the other hand, if the reasons 
we have for accepting a standard of conduct are external reasons, ethical naturalism 
cannot be sustained.  I conclude that Brink’s externalist moral semantics fails to supply 
naturalistic moral realism with a satisfactory answer to the problem of chauvinistic 
conceptual relativism. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IS GOODNESS A HOMEOSTATIC PROPERTY CLUSTER?  
 
5. Chapter. 
5.1. Introduction. 
In Chapter 1, we saw that synthetic ethical naturalists adopt an externalist semantics for 
moral predicates in order to respond to a battery of objections to traditional versions of 
naturalistic moral realism.  The primary benefit of this kind of moral semantics is that it 
makes it possible to view naturalistic definitions of moral predicates (and statements of 
identity between moral and natural properties) as expressing putative synthetic, a 
posteriori necessities.  In Chapter 2, I presented Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth 
argument against moral semantic externalism.  There, and in Chapters 3 and 4, I defended 
their argument from a number of important replies.  If my defense has been successful, 
then we appear to be justified in concluding that the MTE argument refutes moral 
semantic externalism and SEN along with it. 
 Suppose, however, that the MTE argument falls short of a total refutation of SEN.  
Even in that case, I would insist at the very least that the MTE argument changes the 
dialectical situation with respect to SEN.  In the past, when confronted with misgivings 
about the supposed analyticity of moral identity claims, ethical naturalists have thought it 
sufficient simply to note the existence of non-analytic, a posteriori identities and 
definitions that are related to natural kinds and natural kind terms that fall within the 
purview of the natural sciences.  It was presumed that, if it is an a posteriori matter that 
being water is identical with being H2O, there is no reason to deny that it is an a 
posteriori matter that moral rightness is identical with (e.g.) maximizing hedonic utility.  I 
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believe that the Moral Twin Earth argument shows that this presumption is mistaken: the 
proponents of ethical naturalism need to offer compelling, independent reasons for 
thinking that the semantics and epistemology appropriate for natural kinds and natural 
kind terms ought to be extended to moral properties and moral predicates.1 
 In “How to Be a Moral Realist,” Boyd offers a novel account of moral properties 
that has the potential to provide some of the independent justification that is needed for a 
defense of externalist moral semantics and SEN.  He suggests that some moral properties 
have the same metaphysical structure as properties that define natural kinds.  In 
particular, he proposes that moral goodness is constituted by a “homeostatic property 
cluster” (HPC).  As we will see below, the properties in an HPC are unified by 
nomological necessity, not by conceptual necessity.  Because of this, if an HPC serves as 
a kind’s essence, then the question of which properties belong to that kind’s essence can 
be answered only by discovering which properties exhibit the right nomological 
connection to the rest of the clustered properties.  This, however, is an a posteriori 
question, not to be answered by way of a priori conceptual analysis.  Thus, Boyd writes: 
“If the good is defined by a homeostatic phenomenon the details of which we still do not 
entirely know, then it is a paradigm case of a property whose ‘essence’ is given by a 
natural [i.e., a posteriori real] rather than a stipulative [i.e., analytic or nominal] 
definition” (Boyd 1988: 210).  In this way, Boyd’s HPC conception of moral goodness, if 
viable, promises an important independent justification for the central semantic and 
epistemological claims of SEN. 
                                                
1 At least one ethical naturalist seems to agree that independent justification is needed.  Boyd writes that, if 
the naturalistic moral realist is to legitimately make use of the epistemological and semantic claims 
characteristic of synthetic ethical naturalism, then there needs to be “good reasons to think that moral terms 
must possess natural [i.e.  non-analytic, a posteriori] rather than stipulative [i.e., analytic or nominal] 
definitions” (1988: 210, cf. 201). 
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 In this chapter, I argue that Boyd’s hypothesis is false: moral goodness is not an 
HPC.  In §5.2, I present Boyd’s account of HPC kinds.  In §5.3, I present his proposal 
that moral goodness is constituted by an HPC (and thus demarcates an HPC kind).  In 
§5.4, I advance two arguments against this proposal.  The first is a moral argument.  The 
second points to suspicious structural features of THE MORAL GOOD2 that are not shared by 
paradigmatic HPC kinds.  In §5.5, I offer two further arguments to the effect that 
reference to THE MORAL GOOD does not support reliable inductive inference in the way 
that it should were it an HPC kind.  In §5.6, I anticipate a reply that might be made on 
behalf of the HPC conception of moral goodness. 
 
5.2. Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds 
5.2.1. Homeostatic Property Clusters.   
Since Mill’s A System of Logic, philosophers have witnessed an intimate connection 
between natural kinds, on the one hand, and induction and explanation on the other hand 
(Mill 1867: 434; cf. Boyd 1999b: 81; Dupré 1981: 68; Kitcher 1984: 315n; LaPorte 2004: 
19; Quine 1969: 126; Russell 1948: 318).  Boyd writes: “One of the defining features of 
natural kinds generally…is that reference to natural kinds facilitates induction and 
explanation with respect to a wide variety of issues” (1999b: 81).  Hilary Kornblith adds: 
“It is precisely because the world has the causal structure required for the existence of 
natural kinds that inductive knowledge is even possible” (1993: 35; cf. Millikan 2000: 
15-32). 
                                                
2 In this chapter, I employ a convention of using small caps for terms referring to kinds and continue to use 
italics for terms referring to properties.  I have found that treating properties as distinct from the kinds 
whose membership they define helps in the exposition of Boyd’s view.  Nothing I say in this chapter 
depends upon kinds and properties actually being distinct sorts of entities, however. 
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 Boyd’s HPC account of natural kinds is intended to explain, among other things, 
how it is that certain natural kinds ground induction and explanation.  The key idea is 
that, for many natural kinds, the essence of the kind is constituted by a group of 
properties that, although logically independent of one another, are “clustered in nature in 
the sense that they co-occur in an important number of cases” (Boyd 1988: 197).  The 
clustering is the result of a certain nomological relationship among the properties.  Boyd 
describes this relationship as a “sort of homeostasis.”  He offers a disjunctive account of 
what is involved in this kind of homeostasis for a family of properties, F: 
Either the presence of some of the properties in F tends (under appropriate 
conditions) to favor the presence of the others, or there are underlying 
mechanisms or processes that tend to maintain the presence of the properties in F, 
or both (ibid.). 
 
 Two things deserve mention here.  First, it is plausible to read the phrase ‘tends to 
favor’ as meaning “makes more likely.”  Making this substitution naturally raises the 
question of just how much more likely need the presence of some of the properties make 
the presence of the others in order for there to be a homeostatic clustering of properties.  
Would any increase in likelihood, however slight, suffice for a group of properties to 
count as homeostatically clustered?  Although Boyd does not explicitly set a lower bound 
on how much of an increase in likelihood is required for a group of properties to count as 
homeostatically clustered, he does make it clear that, where HPC kinds are concerned, the 
homeostatic clustering of properties should be “causally important.”  This suggests that, 
at least with respect to HPC kinds, we should expect that the presence of some properties 
in the relevant group raises to a considerable degree the likelihood of the others being 
present.  (Indeed, if this were not so, then it would be hard to see how HPC kinds could 
fulfill their role in facilitating reliable inductive inference.)  Of course, even if this is 
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accepted, we are still left with a good deal of imprecision in the account of property 
homeostasis.  Although I cannot attempt to sharpen the account any further, I should note 
that this imprecision is relevant to the discussion in §5.6 below. 
 The second item worthy of mention is this:  The passage quoted above suggests 
that the mechanisms responsible for the homeostasis among a family of properties should 
be thought of as “underlying” in some sense.  However, in other writings, Boyd makes it 
clear that, in some cases, (some of) the relevant mechanisms responsible for property 
homeostasis are external to the individual members of the HPC kind (Boyd 1999b: 79).  
With this in mind, I propose that we drop the word ‘underlying’ from Boyd’s account of 
property homeostasis. 
 In light of these considerations, I take the following as my official statement of 
Boyd’s account of property homeostasis: 
PH: A family of properties, F, is homeostatically clustered if and only if either:  
(i) (under appropriate conditions) the presence of some of the properties in 
F makes more likely the presence of the other properties in F, or 
(ii) there exist mechanisms or processes that make more likely the continued 
presence of the properties in F, or  
(iii) both i. and ii. 
 
5.2.2. Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds.   
For Boyd, some HPCs constitute the real essences3 of certain natural kinds.4  Call such 
kinds ‘HPC kinds.’  In their capacity as essences, HPCs (along with the mechanisms that 
                                                
3 The real essences of kinds are contrasted with “nominal” essences.  Roughly, the nominal essence of a 
kind, K, is something like an analytic definition that speakers conventionally associate with the predicate or 
kind term that corresponds to K.  If a kind has only a nominal definition, then its membership conditions 
depend solely upon linguistic conventions and are discoverable by a priori conceptual analysis.  By 
contrast, the real essence of a kind determines that kind’s membership conditions independently of 
linguistic conventions and thus cannot be discovered by mere conceptual analysis (cf. Boyd 1988: 194f; 
1999a: 142, 146; Ellis 2001: 32).  (Note that Boyd uses ‘real essence’ interchangeably with ‘natural 
definition’ and ‘a posteriori definition’.). 
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bind them together) supply the membership conditions of HPC kinds.  As I understand 
Boyd, an individual, x, is a member of an HPC kind K just in case (a) x instantiates the 
properties in the HPC that defines K and (b) the co-instantiation of these properties in x is 
brought about or maintained (at least in part) by the homeostatic mechanisms definitive 
of K (if there are any such mechanisms).5   
 Homeostatic property cluster kinds are well suited to satisfy the inductive and 
explanatory role that is associated with natural kinds.  Because the defining properties of 
an HPC kind are homeostatically unified, the members of a given HPC kind will exhibit a 
significant degree of uniformity.  In turn, this uniformity facilitates reliable inductive 
inferences and explanations.  This sort of uniformity is readily seen, for example, in 
biological species.  For an individual member of a given species, its manifest properties 
flow from underlying mechanisms.  Because these mechanisms are shared by every (or 
                                                                                                                                            
4 In comments on an earlier version of this chapter, an anonymous editor for Ethics recommended a 
different reading of Boyd with respect to the relationship between HPCs and the essences of natural kinds.  
On this alternative reading, HPCs are not themselves to be identified with the essences of natural kinds.  
Instead, the HPC correlated with a natural kind constitutes something like its “operational definition” that 
can be used to pick out some other property that is the kind’s genuine a posteriori essence (or “natural 
definition”).  While there are some passages in Boyd (1988) that prima facie permit this alternative 
interpretation, other passages—especially in Boyd’s later writings—strongly favor my preferred 
interpretation according to which the HPC just is the essence or natural definition of the relevant natural 
kind.  For instance, Boyd writes: “I conclude that individual species have (homeostatic property cluster) 
essences, so that a form of ‘essentialism’ is true for species…” (1999a: 142); “…there are a number of 
scientifically important kinds…, biological species among them, whose natural definitions are very much 
like the property-cluster definitions postulated by ordinary-language philosophers except that the unity of 
the properties in the defining cluster is mainly causal rather than conceptual” (1999c: 67; cf. 1988: 196); 
“Species are defined, according to the HPC conception, by those shared [phenotypic] properties and by the 
mechanisms…which sustain their homeostasis” (1999b: 81, emphasis in the original).  For additional 
passages that favor my interpretation see note 12 below. 
5 The notion that natural kinds are defined by clusters of properties can be found in Mill (1867) and Russell 
(1948).  Russell’s own account strikingly anticipates Boyd’s.  Russell writes: “The essence of a natural 
kind is that it is a class of objects all of which possess a number of properties that are not known to be 
logically interconnected” (1948: 317).  His claim that the defining properties are not known to be logically 
interconnected suggests that he recognizes that their belonging to the kind’s essence is not a matter of our 
linguistic conventions but rather is a matter of a nomological connection.  Furthermore, Russell backs away 
from the claim that every member of a kind needs to share all of the kind-defining properties.  Like Boyd, 
he accepts indeterminacy in the extensions of natural kind terms: “Assuming evolution, there must have 
been outlying members so aberrant that we should hardly know whether to regard them as part of the 
[intension] or not” (ibid., 443). 
127 
nearly every) member of the same species, conspecifics are uniform with respect to very 
many manifest properties.  As a result of this uniformity, when we observe that all 
observed samples of a species exhibit a property G, we can often reliably infer that all 
unobserved samples will exhibit G as well.  This remains true even when our original 
sample is relatively small (Boyd 1999b: 82; Kornblith 1993: 92ff; Russell 1948: 318).  
For example, biologists were no doubt able to infer (with a high degree of epistemic 
warrant) that all female platypuses are egg layers upon observing only a few specimens 
that laid eggs.  
 Traditionally, the essence of a natural kind is thought of as a property or a 
collection of properties whose exemplification by a given individual is both necessary 
and sufficient for that individual to count as a member of the kind.  This sort of view is 
reflected in the claim that necessarily something is a quantity of WATER if and only if it 
has the property being H2O, where being H2O is understood to be the essence of WATER.   
Boyd relaxes this requirement so that an individual may belong to an HPC kind even if it 
fails to instantiate some of the properties in the kind’s HPC essence.6  He writes: 
“Imperfect homeostasis is nomologically possible or actual: some thing may display 
some but not all of the properties in [the property cluster] F; some but not all of the 
relevant underlying homeostatic mechanisms may be present” (1988: 197; 1999a: 143).  
As long as the individual instantiates “enough” of the “important” properties in F, where 
these properties are unified by “enough” of the relevant mechanisms, it is properly 
classified as a member of the kind whose essence is constituted by F and F’s homeostatic 
                                                
6 Boyd’s HPC conception of natural kind real essences also departs from more traditional views insofar as 
it denies that the essences of natural kinds must be (i) “unchanging” and (ii) composed only of properties 
that are both “ahistorical” and (iii) intrinsic to the kind’s members (Boyd 1999a: 146f, 153-157; cf. Ellis 
2001: 19-23). 
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mechanisms.  This feature of Boyd’s view allows us to class certain anomalies, such as 
mutants, within the species to which they intuitively belong.  Moreover, it permits cases 
of indeterminacy where there are  
…things that display some but not all of the properties in F (and/or in which some 
but not all of the relevant homeostatic mechanisms operate) such that no rational 
considerations dictate whether or not they are to be classed under [natural kind 
term] t, assuming that a dichotomous choice is to be made (1988: 197). 
 
If biological species are to count as HPC kinds, then this relaxed understanding of natural 
kind essences must be accepted.  Because of the gradual nature of evolution, there are 
bound to be cases in which it is indeterminate whether some particular individual is a 
member of a given species.7 
 
5.2.3. Two Examples of HPC Kinds.   
Boyd offers biological species as paradigmatic examples of HPC kinds.  He also suggests 
that certain chemical kinds are examples of HPC kinds.  To illustrate the HPC conception 
of kinds, I will consider an example from each of these domains.  Although Boyd is most 
emphatic that biological species are HPC kinds, I find it helpful to begin with an example 
from the domain of chemistry. 
 Boyd seems to accept that chemical elements such as GOLD and compounds such 
as WATER are natural kinds with real essences that conform to the more traditional (non-
HPC) conception of essences: their essences identify fully necessary and sufficient 
                                                
7 Not only is the possibility of imperfect homeostasis and extensional indeterminacy important for the 
plausibility of HPC definitions of biological species, it also plays a role in Boyd’s defense of moral realism.  
Some have thought that the existence of actions whose moral status is irresolvable is best explained by the 
hypothesis that there are no moral facts (see, e.g., Mackie 1977: 37).  Boyd’s HPC account of moral 
properties makes an alternative explanation possible.  If moral terms designate HPC phenomena, then, as 
with species, we should expect instances where it is indeterminate whether or not an individual action or 
state of affairs falls within the extension of a given moral term.  Thus, not only are such indeterminate cases 
not an embarrassment to an HPC conception of moral properties, they are predicted by it (Boyd 1988: 213). 
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conditions for membership in these respective kinds.  Still, he suggests that other, more 
general, chemical classifications may mark HPC kinds.  One example of a chemical HPC 
kind that Boyd offers is METAL (1999b: 83f).  He proposes that the cluster of properties 
that define METAL includes (among other properties) conductivity, ductility, malleability, 
and the property of having an inverse relationship between conductivity and temperature.  
These properties (and others) are regularly co-instantiated in distinct individual quantities 
of substance.  Boyd does not say what things serve as the homeostatic mechanisms that 
unite these properties in samples of METAL.  A plausible candidate for such a mechanism 
is something like the property of being composed of atoms that donate electrons.8  In 
virtue of their homeostatic relationship, the aforementioned collection of properties 
satisfies PH and thus constitutes an HPC.  Boyd’s suggestion is that this HPC, along with 
its homeostatic mechanisms, constitutes the a posteriori real essence of the kind METAL: a 
portion of substance is a piece of METAL when and only when it instantiates enough of 
these properties (weighted for importance) where their co-instantiation is due (at least in 
part) to mechanisms such as (e.g.) being composed of atoms that donate electrons. 
 Consider next the biological species TIGER.  Any individual tiger instantiates 
innumerably many common morphological, physiological and behavioral properties.  
Among these are properties corresponding to its particular skeletal structure, the 
arrangements of its organs, its behavioral dispositions etc.  For an individual tiger, its 
particular genotype is a plausible candidate for the (most central) underlying mechanism 
that causes and sustains the co-instantiation of its (intrinsic) properties.  However, when 
                                                
8 Here and elsewhere I treat the relevant homeostatic mechanisms as properties.  I do so in this case because 
the mechanism associated with the kind METAL is evidently something that has multiple instances.  
Although Boyd is not explicit about what the ontological status of the homeostatic mechanisms is supposed 
to be, his own examples are also of things that admit of multiple instantiations.  In any case, nothing much 
here turns on whether we understand homeostatic mechanisms as properties rather than individuals.   
130 
we turn our attention to the biological species TIGER itself (as opposed to its individual 
members), discerning the defining homeostatic mechanisms is somewhat trickier than it 
is for chemical kinds.  We might be tempted to suppose that the TIGER genotype is the 
sole homeostatic mechanism in the definition of the kind TIGER; but this is not Boyd’s 
view.  If I understand him correctly, one reason for rejecting such a view is this: without 
additional mechanisms, such as “gene exchange between certain populations and 
reproductive isolation from others,”9 the properties that define TIGER might fall out of 
homeostasis in a relatively short period of time.  For instance, if tigers were not 
reproductively isolated from other biological species, they might interbreed with them 
and bring new genes into the TIGER gene pool.  In turn, some of the manifest properties 
found in the defining cluster may be quickly lost.  For example, tigers might lose their 
stripes or their tails if a new dominant gene were to spread throughout their population.  
What this illustration shows is that some of the mechanisms responsible for the 
homeostatic unity of the properties that define the kind TIGER are extrinsic and external to 
individual tigers.10  These mechanisms (both internal and external ones), along with the 
morphological, physiological, and behavioral properties that are produced, maintained, 
and unified by them, constitute the HPC essence of the kind TIGER (cf. 1999a: 142; 
1999b: 81).  An individual is a tiger just in case it instantiates enough of these properties 
                                                
9 Boyd offers these and other examples of homeostatic mechanisms unifying the properties of biological 
species in his (1999a: 165; cf. Mayr 1996).  I have added italics in keeping with my convention of 
italicizing property-referring terms. 
10 Of course, given the evolution of biological species, the homeostatic unity of certain property clusters is 
bound to be disturbed over a long enough period of time.  This implies that the constituents of a biological 
kind’s HPC definition change over time.  Boyd recognizes and accepts this consequence of his view.  He 
writes, “…the properties which determine the explanatory definition of a species (and, thus, the conditions 
for membership in it) may vary over time (or space), while it continues to have numerically the same 
definition” (1999c: 68). 
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(weighted for importance) where their co-instantiation is due (at least in part) to the 
above-mentioned mechanisms. 
 
5.3. Homeostatic Consequentialism: THE MORAL GOOD as an HPC Kind. 
Boyd proposes that THE MORAL GOOD, like METAL and THE TIGER, is an HPC kind.  On 
this view, the property moral goodness11 is itself constituted by a cluster of properties 
that are homeostatically unified.12  The properties that compose goodness correspond to 
“things which satisfy important human needs” (Boyd 1988: 203).  Here, Boyd gestures 
toward what those needs are: 
Some of these needs are physical or medical.  Others are psychological and social; 
these (probably) include the need for love and friendship, the need to engage in 
cooperative efforts, the need to exercise control over one’s own life, the need for 
intellectual and artistic appreciation and expression, the need for physical 
recreation, etc. (ibid.). 
 
Boyd does not say which properties in fact correspond to the satisfactions of these needs.  
The following seems like a plausible (though perhaps not exhaustive) list of properties 
whose instances are the satisfactions of the human needs Boyd adumbrates above: being 
educated, being physically healthy, sharing friendship, sharing love, enjoying leisure, 
engaging in physical recreation, engaging in cooperative efforts, creating and 
appreciating art, and being autonomous.13  As I understand Boyd, these properties (along 
                                                
11 From here on, I will typically drop the adjective ‘moral’ from ‘moral goodness’ and ‘the moral good.’  
Unless otherwise indicated, ‘goodness’ and ‘the good’ should be taken to refer to moral goodness and THE 
MORAL GOOD. 
12 As evidence that Boyd means to identify moral goodness with an HPC of the sort that I am about to 
introduce, note that Boyd explicitly writes “…the term ‘good’ in its moral uses refers to the homeostatic 
cluster property…” (1988: 205).  Note also that my reading of Boyd as identifying goodness with an HPC 
also accords with the way Nicholas Sturgeon—himself a supporter of the HPC conception of goodness—
understands Boyd.  He writes that Boyd thinks of “…moral properties such as intrinsic goodness as 
homeostatic clusters of various natural features…” (Sturgeon 2003: 550). 
13 It should be clear from this list that I understand the properties that putatively compose goodness to be 
properties whose instances satisfy the various human needs (where, for example, instances of being in love 
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with certain homeostatic mechanisms to be mentioned shortly) are constitutive of 
goodness.  They are also constitutive of the essence and definition of THE GOOD.  Thus, 
we should think of the property being physically healthy as playing a role in the HPC that 
defines THE GOOD that is analogous to the role that (e.g.) malleability plays in the HPC 
that defines METAL and analogous to the role that (e.g.) being quadrupedal plays in the 
HPC that defines THE TIGER.  Following Boyd, I will refer to the properties that are 
constitutive of goodness as ‘the human goods’ (ibid.). 
 If the human goods are to constitute an HPC essence, they must be 
homeostatically clustered.  That is to say, they must satisfy one of the three disjuncts on 
the right-hand side of PH.  Boyd’s view seems to be that they satisfy the last disjunct of 
PH (i.e., the conjunction of clause i and clause ii): 
Under a wide variety of (actual and possible) circumstances these human goods 
(or rather instances of the satisfaction of them) are homeostatically clustered.  In 
part they are clustered because these goods themselves are—when present in 
balance or moderation—mutually supporting.  There are in addition psychological 
and social mechanisms which when, and to the extent to which, they are present 
contribute to the homeostasis.  They probably include cultivated attitudes of 
mutual respect, political democracy, egalitarian social relations, various rituals, 
customs, and rules of courtesy, ready access to education and information, etc.  It 
is a complex and difficult question in psychology and social theory just what 
these mechanisms are and how they work (1988: 203). 
 
If Boyd is right, then the human goods can be said to constitute an HPC.  It is natural to 
suppose that this means that something like the following is true: under suitable social 
and psychological conditions, whenever an individual person is (e.g.) happy and enjoys 
leisure, an education, autonomy, and cooperative efforts, there is an increased likelihood 
that that same individual is also physically healthy, engages in physical recreation, shares 
                                                                                                                                            
satisfy the need for love).   One might be tempted to read Boyd as claiming instead that the properties that 
compose goodness are instances a broader property, viz., having a need satisfied.  I do not think such a 
reading could be correct.  If it were, then there would be a single property that composes goodness: viz., the 
property having a need satisfied.  In that case, goodness could not be thought of as a cluster of properties. 
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friendship and love, and appreciates art.  Boyd, however, is anxious to point out that the 
homeostasis between instances of the human goods need not involve their all being 
possessed by one and the same individual.  He writes: “The properties in homeostasis are 
to be thought of as instances of the satisfaction of particular human needs among people 
generally, rather than [merely] within the life of a single individual” (1988: 204n).  His 
idea seems to be that, when the relevant homeostatic mechanisms (e.g., democracy, social 
equality, etc.) are in place, there is a causally sustained tendency for the having of some 
goods by one or more individuals to bring about or sustain the having of these and other 
goods by other individuals as well.  For example, under the proper social conditions, 
Bob’s engaging in artistic activity and physical recreation (etc.) will bring about, sustain, 
or otherwise enhance Carol’s appreciation for art, her education, and her own 
engagement in physical recreation (etc.).   
 Boyd’s central claim is that (something like)14 this HPC and the mechanisms that 
unify it define THE MORAL GOOD: 
[THE MORAL GOOD]15 is defined by this cluster of goods and the homeostatic 
mechanisms which unify them.  Actions, policies, character traits, etc. are morally 
good to the extent to which they tend to foster the realization of these goods or to 
develop and sustain the homeostatic mechanisms upon which their unity depends 
(1988: 203). 
 
                                                
14 It should be acknowledged that Boyd presents his particular account of the human goods and the 
homeostatic mechanisms that unify them as speculation.  He is careful to note that the question of exactly 
which properties and mechanisms belong to the cluster that defines THE GOOD is a matter for empirical 
inquiry.  The success of the HPC conception of goodness does not depend upon the correctness of precisely 
this list of goods and mechanisms (although Boyd believes that his characterization of the HPC is “close to 
the truth” [1988: 202]).  With the exception of the argument I offer in §5.5.2, my arguments against Boyd’s 
view can be directed against other HPC proposals of goodness with little or no modification. 
15 In the original text, Boyd uses ‘moral goodness’ where I use ‘the moral good.’  I have modified this 
passage in order to preserve the symmetry between moral HPC kinds and biological and chemical HPC 
kinds.  Thus, although he writes that moral goodness is defined by the cluster of goods and their 
homeostatic mechanisms, I take him to mean that the property moral goodness is constituted by this cluster 
and its mechanisms.  In turn, the HPC moral goodness defines the kind THE MORAL GOOD. 
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Although what Boyd proposes here is a theory of value and not a theory of right action, I 
will follow him in calling this account of THE GOOD homeostatic consequentialism.16 
 If THE GOOD is defined by the cluster of human goods and its homeostatic 
mechanisms, then it is natural to suppose that something (e.g. a state of affairs) is good—
i.e., is an instance of goodness—just in case it instantiates the cluster of human goods 
(where these goods are unified by the relevant mechanisms).  Let’s call this proposal 
“HC1”: 
HC1: A state of affairs, P, is non-instrumentally17 morally good if and only if P 
instantiates the HPC of human goods. 
 
The second sentence in the last passage quoted might be thought to be in tension with 
HC1.  That sentence suggests that an entity can be good even if it does not itself 
instantiate the cluster.  All that is needed is that the entity “tends to foster the realization” 
of the cluster.  This would be a very surprising possibility if THE GOOD were an HPC 
kind.  After all, we do not say that some policy that tends to foster the realization of 
tigerhood (e.g., a policy of breeding tigers or protecting them from hunting) is itself a 
tiger (i.e., an instance of tigerhood).  Only those entities that instantiate the cluster of 
                                                
16 Boyd evidently thinks of homeostatic consequentialism proper as a broader moral theory that includes 
the present HPC account of goodness as just one component.  This larger view would presumably include a 
consequentialist account of moral obligation alongside the HPC conception of value.  (Boyd discusses his 
consequentialist view of right action in greater depth in his [2003b: 24-47].)  However, since he does not 
offer a distinct name for the theory of value he proposes, it will be convenient for our purposes to use 
‘homeostatic consequentialism’ to denote only the HPC theory of value. 
17 Just below, I explain why making a distinction between non-instrumental goodness and instrumental 
goodness is desirable for the homeostatic consequentialist.  Although Boyd does not himself acknowledge 
the distinction in his (1988), fellow homeostatic consequentialist Nicholas Sturgeon attributes to Boyd the 
view that homeostatic consequentialism is an account of intrinsic goodness (Sturgeon 2003: 550).  
However, Sturgeon suggests that the kind of intrinsic goodness he has in mind is not “a property that 
depends only on the intrinsic, nonrelational properties of the things that have it” (ibid.).  Because intrinsic 
goodness is sometimes thought to be just the sort of goodness that a thing has in virtue of its intrinsic, non-
relational properties, I prefer to label the sort of goodness that Sturgeon describes as “non-instrumental.”   I 
cannot here attempt a precise account of the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental 
goodness.  Perhaps a slogan will suffice: “a thing is non-instrumentally good if and only if it is good as an 
end, rather than good merely as a means to some other good thing.”  For a useful discussion, see Kagan 
(1998).  (Note, however, that Kagan takes the label ‘intrinsic goodness’ to apply both to non-instrumental 
goodness and to the kind of goodness a thing has in virtue of its intrinsic, nonrelational properties.) 
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properties that defines the kind TIGER are tigers.  For this reason, I think it is best to read 
the second sentence in the last quoted passage as describing a phenomenon that is distinct 
from moral goodness or THE MORAL GOOD.  We might call this phenomenon 
“instrumental moral goodness.”18  Roughly, something is instrumentally morally good on 
this view just in case it tends to foster the realization of the HPC that defines THE GOOD.  
My focus will be on homeostatic consequentialism as an account of non-instrumental 
moral goodness. 
 
5.4. The Case against Homeostatic Consequentialism. 
5.4.1. Isolated goods.   
Although homeostatic consequentialism is presented foremost as a metaethical view, it 
has substantive moral implications.  Consider the following scenario.  There is a hermit, 
alone in the woods.  Although it is a relatively cool day, the sun peeks out from behind 
the clouds and warms the hermit’s back.  The hermit finds this sensation pleasurable.  
Suppose, however, that this pleasure contributes neither to his nor anyone else’s having 
friends.  Nor does it contribute to his appreciation of art, his engagement in cooperative 
efforts, his sharing love, etc.  In short, the hermit’s experience of pleasure causally 
                                                
18 Here are two additional considerations in support of this exegetical decision:  First, as we saw earlier, 
Boyd represents himself as claiming that “…the term ‘good’ in its moral uses refers to the homeostatic 
cluster property just described…” (1988: 205).  This way of representing homeostatic consequentialism is 
hard to square with the view that an act is good just in case it “tends to foster” the HPC of human goods.  
For if that were Boyd’s view, he should have said that ‘good’ (or better, ‘goodness’) refers to the property 
of tending to foster the HPC just described.  A second consideration concerns the sorts of items that Boyd 
cites as bearers of moral goodness in the passage cited above.  The three kinds of items he cites are actions, 
policies, and character traits.  However, on a standard consequentialist conception of morality, only states 
of affairs are taken to be the fundamental bearers of non-instrumental (or intrinsic) value; actions, policies, 
and character traits are typically understood to have only instrumental (or extrinsic) value.  This gives us 
yet more reason to treat the passage cited above as describing instrumental moral goodness, a property that 
is distinct from the more fundamental non-instrumental moral goodness. 
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contributes to the realization of very few, if any, of the human goods.19  It follows that the 
hermit’s being pleased does not instantiate the HPC that putatively constitutes goodness.  
Even if we thought that the property being pleased is itself a human good, the 
instantiation of only one property in a cluster is not the same thing as the instantiation of 
the cluster itself.20  Because the hermit’s being pleased fails to instantiate the HPC that 
putatively constitutes goodness (and, moreover, fails to contribute to the realization of 
that HPC), HC1 implies that the hermit’s experience of pleasure is not good.  It follows 
that the world in which the hermit experiences this particular episode of pleasure is no 
better than a world that is otherwise identical except that the hermit does not experience 
this pleasure.  This consequence of HC1 is surely counterintuitive.  The world in which 
the hermit experiences the additional pleasure is the better world.  If so, we must reject 
HC1.  Let us call this objection to homeostatic consequentialism the problem of isolated 
goods. 
 (While I have taken the property being pleased as my example of an isolated 
good, it should not be thought that the objection depends upon this choice.  For those who 
are not inclined to view being pleased as a good-making property, we can modify the 
hermit example so that the relevant state of affairs realizes some other putative good-
making property in causal isolation from the rest of the human goods.  For example, we 
might imagine instead a state of affairs in which the hermit has a preference satisfied—or 
appreciates the beauty of some landscape or contemplates some magnificent truth, etc.—
                                                
19 There is probably some correlation between experiences of pleasure and a person’s physical health.  So 
we may have to grant that this particular episode of pleasure makes a causal contribution to the hermit’s 
health, however slight.   
20 In light of the discussion of §5.2.2, it should be observed that an HPC “as a whole” may be instantiated 
by an individual even when some of the cluster’s constituent properties are not instantiated by that 
individual.  Even so, it should also be clear that an HPC itself is not instantiated in an individual that 
instantiates only one of its constituent properties, e.g. an individual’s being striped is not sufficient for it to 
be properly classified as a TIGER.   
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where this state of affairs fails to causally contribute to the realization of other human 
goods.) 
 
5.4.2. An alternative formulation.   
Hitherto, I have taken HC1 to express the core thesis of homeostatic consequentialism.  
However, there may be a different way to understand the view:   
HC2: A state of affairs, P, is non-instrumentally morally good if and only if P 
instantiates at least one of the human goods in the HPC of human goods.   
 
One benefit of HC2 is that, by allowing there to be a plurality of non-instrumental good-
making properties, it brings homeostatic consequentialism closer to more traditional 
forms of axiological pluralism.  More important, however, it promises an answer to the 
problem of isolated goods.  Here is how.  Suppose that being pleased is a human good.  
Although the state of affairs in which the hermit is pleased does not instantiate the entire 
cluster of human goods, it does instantiate at least one human good that is part of the 
cluster.  Given HC2, this is sufficient for it to be true that the hermit’s being pleased is 
non-instrumentally good. 
 Unfortunately, the problem of isolated goods returns in a slightly different form to 
threaten even HC2.  Consider a possible world, W, in which the homeostatic mechanisms 
that putatively unify the human goods in our world are absent.  In W, the socio-political 
conditions are such that it is not true that the presence of some of the human goods raises 
the likelihood that the others will be present.  (We might imagine that the human social 
environment in W is something like a Hobbesian state of nature.)  From this assumption, 
it follows that the human goods are not homeostatically clustered in W.  Next, imagine 
that the sunbathing hermit is in W.  Once again, his pleasure neither instantiates nor 
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contributes to the instantiation of a larger cluster of human goods.  More important, 
however, because the hermit is in W, his pleasure does not instantiate a property that is 
homeostatically clustered with other human goods.  From this, it follows that, even on 
HC2, this hermit’s pleasure is not good.  As before, this consequence of HC2 clashes 
with considered moral judgment.21  (And again, the objection could be restated mutatis 
mutandis with some other putative good-making property in place of being pleased.) 
 At this point, the homeostatic consequentialist might appeal to something like the 
idea of rigid designation in order to answer the “revived” problem of isolated goods.  The 
strategy is roughly this:  Let us grant that there is a homeostatically unified cluster of 
human goods here in the actual world.  The predicate ‘non-instrumentally good’ applies 
to any instance of one (or more) of those human goods.  This predicate should be 
understood to apply “rigidly.”  A predicate is a rigid applier, according to this strategy, 
just in case, if it applies to all instances of a property F in the actual world, it applies to all 
instances of F in every possible world.22  Since ‘non-instrumentally good’ presumably 
                                                
21 There is some indication that a homeostatic consequentialist would be willing to bite the bullet here.  
Sturgeon allows that “nothing would have a property such as intrinsic goodness at all, given a radical 
enough breakdown” in a certain part of the HPC that constitutes goodness (Sturgeon 2003: 550).  Since the 
Hobbesian world exhibits a breakdown of the HPC that constitutes goodness, it would appear that Sturgeon 
is willing to accept that the hermit’s being pleased is not an instance of goodness.  (On the other hand, 
Sturgeon is here speaking of a breakdown only in a specific part of the HPC.  In particular, he is 
considering the breakdown in the part of the cluster that involves “the existence of purposive, valuing 
creatures somewhat like us” [ibid.].  The claim that a world without purposive, valuing creatures contains 
no goodness strikes me as far less controversial than the claim that a world that included such creatures 
would nevertheless fail to contain intrinsic or non-instrumental value, if there were a lack of homeostasis 
between the human goods.)   
22 I do not claim that this is the best or most useful conception of rigid application.  It is, however, the 
conception that the defender of HC2 needs in order to avoid the revised problem of isolated goods.  As will 
be seen below, I think this conception of rigid application is defective.  An arguably better conception can 
be found in Devitt (2005).  Unfortunately, Devitt’s conception is of no help to HC2.  Furthermore, I doubt 
that the more traditional notion of rigid designation could be deployed in the service of HC2 without 
making questionable assumptions.  On the traditional view, a term, t, rigidly designates an entity, e, if and 
only if t designates e in every possible world in which e exists, and t designates no other entities (Kripke 
1971: 78, 79).  As an initial difficulty, it isn’t clear that predicates are the sort of items that can be rigid 
designators: if predicates (be they natural kind predicates or nominal kind predicates) designate their 
extensions, then none are rigid, since their extensions are different at different possible worlds.  If they 
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applies to all instances of being pleased in the actual world, as a rigid applier it also 
applies all instances of being pleased in every possible world.  As a result, it is consistent 
with HC2 to ascribe non-instrumental goodness to the hermit’s being pleased in the 
Hobbesian world.  This is so despite the fact that the human goods are not 
homeostatically clustered in that world. 
 It is doubtful that this conception of rigid application is defensible, at least if it is 
supposed to capture some semantic property common to natural kind terms.   Suppose 
that ‘cordate’ is a rigidly applying term.  It applies to all actual instances of the property 
of being a creature with a heart.  As a rigid applier, it also applies to all possible 
instances of being a creature with a heart.  The trouble begins when we notice that 
‘cordate’ also applies to all actual instances of the property being a creature with a 
kidney.  From this, along with the assumption that ‘cordate’ is a rigid applier, it follows 
that ‘cordate’ applies to all possible instances of being a creature with a kidney.  But this 
is false. 
 I think that this shows that this conception of rigid application is defective.  If I 
am right, then the homeostatic consequentialist will not be able to appeal to it in his 
                                                                                                                                            
designate properties, then every meaningful predicate is a rigid designator.  In that case, rigid designation 
marks no interesting distinction among predicates.  This last consequence might be avoided if we suppose 
that only those predicates that designate sparse properties (or universals) rigidly designate.  Assuming this 
restriction were defensible, it would still require some maneuvering to get this conception of rigid 
designation to do the work HC2 needs of it.  For one thing, given the pluralistic assumptions of HC2, there 
is no one property that ‘good’ designates; there is a plurality.  Thus, it is not true of ‘good’ that it designates 
an entity in every possible world in which that entity exists and designates no other entities.  One solution 
is to suppose that ‘good’ designates the conjunctive property made up of all the different good-making 
properties.  But now HC2 has no reply to the problem of isolated goods.  As we saw, the hermit’s episode 
of pleasure does not instantiate a conjunctive property that includes all the other putative good-making 
properties as constituents.  What is needed instead is an account where ‘good’ designates a disjunctive 
property.  Here we face more trouble.  We have had to assume that rigidly designating predicates designate 
only sparse properties.  However, on familiar conceptions of sparse properties, disjunctive properties do not 
qualify as sparse (Armstrong 1978: 19-23).  Perhaps there is more that can be said that would make it 
plausible that rigid designation can do the work that HC2 needs it to do.  I hope to have said enough to 
make it clear that rigid designation does not provide a quick or easy solution to the problem of isolated 
goods.    
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response to the revised problem of isolated goods.  However, it might be thought that the 
argument of the previous paragraph shows only that it was wrong to assume that 
‘cordate’ is a rigid applier.  This is a desperate tack.  As a biological kind term, ‘cordate’ 
is a good candidate for a natural kind term (and possibly even an HPC kind term).  But if 
‘cordate’ is a natural kind term, then some explanation is required for why it fails to be a 
rigid applier whereas a supposed (HPC) natural kind predicate like ‘good’ succeeds. 
 
5.4.3. Two structural disanalogies.   
Even if HC2 could avoid the revived problem of isolated goods, the move from HC1 to 
HC2 is suspiciously ad hoc; there is no precedent for a view like HC2 in the general 
theory of HPC kinds.  Let me explain. 
 Given HC2, each of the individual properties (i.e., human goods) that compose 
the HPC that putatively defines THE GOOD is such that it is proper to predicate non-
instrumental moral goodness of its instances.  For example, it is proper to say of John’s 
being in love with Mary that it is morally good.  Likewise, we can say that Sam’s 
creating and appreciating art at some particular time is morally good.  Moreover, we can 
say that Rachel’s being healthy is morally good.  
 No paradigmatic HPC kind is like THE GOOD in this respect.  Consider the 
properties that define TIGER.  We do not say of a particular tiger that its being 
quadrupedal is a tiger.  Nor do we say that its stalking behavior is a tiger.  Nor do we say 
that its being warm blooded is a tiger.  In general, the property of being a tiger does not 
belong to the instances of the individual properties that define TIGER.23  The same 
                                                
23 Of course an instance of a property like being quadrupedal might be a part of a larger state of affairs that 
constitutes some individual’s being a tiger.  But this does not mean that the state of affairs consisting in a 
141 
observation holds for other biological kinds as well as for chemical kinds (e.g., the 
malleability of this piece of metal is not itself an instance of METAL).24 
 What this shows is that, as it is characterized by HC2, goodness is structurally 
unlike the property clusters that define paradigm HPC kinds.  Goodness is a property 
exemplified by instances of the individual properties that (putatively) constitute it.  
Paradigmatic natural kinds like species and chemical substances do not share this feature.  
This ought to make us suspicious of HC2.  If goodness really were constituted by an 
HPC, we would expect it to have the same metaphysical structure as the HPCs that define 
paradigmatic HPC kinds.  Unless there is a convincing precedent for an HPC that 
functions as goodness does according to HC2, the move to HC2 would appear to be ad 
hoc.25  As far as I can see, the only motivation for HC2 is its promise to solve the first 
version of the problem of isolated goods. 
 Since both HC1 and HC2 are vulnerable to the problem of isolated goods, this 
most recent objection to HC2 would seem to make HC1 the more attractive statement of 
homeostatic consequentialism.  Unfortunately, there is another structural feature of 
paradigmatic HPC kinds that simply cannot be extended to THE GOOD without absurdity.  
(This feature creates trouble for homeostatic consequentialism on either of its 
formulations.) 
                                                                                                                                            
given individual being quadrupedal itself has the property of being a tiger.   In such a case, we should say 
instead that one and the same individual has the property of being quadrupedal and has the property of 
being a tiger.     
24 In §5.5.4 I introduce putative examples of HPC social kinds.  It should be noted here that even those 
kinds behave like the paradigm HPC kinds and not like THE GOOD.  For instance, suppose that the property 
of keeping kosher is part of the cluster of properties that defines the social kind HASIDIC JEW.  Some 
particular man’s keeping kosher does not have the property of being a Hasidic Jew. 
25 Boyd suggests that the predicates ‘healthy’ and ‘is healthier than’ express HPC phenomena (1988: 198).  
It may be that my challenge (to find a paradigmatic example of an HPC that shares the structural features of 
goodness as understood by HC2) could be answered by developing a plausible HPC account of HEALTH.  
Unfortunately, Boyd says very little about what sorts of properties might compose the HPC that defines 
HEALTH.  In the absence of a more detailed account, it is difficult to tell whether or not the example of 
HEALTH will help the homeostatic consequentialist meet the present challenge.   
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 For paradigmatic HPC kinds, most (though perhaps not all) of the properties that 
are part of the kind’s definition are properties had by individual members of the kind.  
For example, just as ferociousness and being quadrupedal are part of the HPC definition 
of the kind TIGER, individual tigers are themselves ferocious and quadrupedal.  Likewise, 
just as malleability and conductivity are part of the definition of METAL, individual pieces 
of metal are malleable and conductive. 
 By contrast, the properties that putatively define THE GOOD are not had by 
individual members of THE GOOD: no good state of affairs is pleased, educated, enjoys 
leisure, or shares love etc.26  To predicate one of these properties of a good state of affairs 
is to commit a category mistake.  Once again, we are presented with a way in which the 
cluster of properties that putatively defines THE GOOD fails to behave like the property 
clusters that define paradigmatic examples of HPC kinds.  This provides yet another 
reason to doubt that THE GOOD is an HPC kind. 
 
5.4.4. An alternative cluster of properties.   
Both of the structural disanalogies just described might be avoided if we take a rather 
different collection of properties to constitute the cluster that putatively defines THE 
GOOD.  Consider the following list of properties: being pursued by rational beings, being 
worthy of being loved, meriting realization, being approved of by ideal observers, being 
fitting, and deserving appreciation.  If properties of this sort were taken to compose the 
                                                
26 Of course, individual persons that are constituents of these states of affairs might have these properties.  
However, because states of affairs are the primary basic bearers of goodness, this is of little help.  The 
current difficulty might be avoided by noting that persons themselves may reasonably be taken to be 
bearers of moral goodness.  This reply helps if we are advancing some sort of HPC account of virtue.  Still, 
I presume that Boyd and other homeostatic consequentialists want to say that things other than persons may 
be non-instrumentally morally good.  If so, they are faced with the present difficulty. 
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cluster that defines THE GOOD, then the structural dissimilarities between the good and 
other HPC kinds would be avoided.  With respect to the first disanalogy noted above, it is 
arguably not a serious defect if we could not properly say of a particular state of affairs 
that the fact that it merits realization is (non-instrumentally) good.  With respect to the 
second disanalogy, we make no category mistake when we say that a particular good 
state of affairs merits realization, is fitting, or is deserving of appreciation, etc.  Perhaps, 
then, a collection of properties such as this could serve as the cornerstone of a different 
proposal for an HPC definition of goodness (one that would replace Boyd’s own 
proposal). 
 There are at least two reasons for thinking that this maneuver will not be 
successful for the homeostatic consequentialist.  First, all of the aforementioned 
properties contain at least one unabashedly normative property as a constituent: 
worthiness, merit, fittingness, desert, being ideal, and being rational.  An HPC definition 
of moral goodness that includes such properties does nothing to advance the naturalistic 
accommodation of moral properties that Boyd and other naturalist moral realists are 
pursuing.  After all, it is the putative normativity of moral properties that has led so many 
philosophers to think that such properties cannot be accommodated within a naturalistic 
metaphysic (Ayer 1952: 105; Blackburn 1984: 187ff; Hare 1952: 91; Mackie 1977: 38ff; 
Stevenson 1944: 336).27   Without a further naturalistic account of these normative 
properties, homeostatic consequentialism will have accomplished very little, if anything, 
in the way of showing that goodness can be admitted into a naturalistic ontology. 
                                                
27 In fact, in selecting these particular properties as potentially definitive of THE GOOD, I was inspired by 
various non-naturalist and constructivist analyses of ‘good.’  
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 A second worry is this: to the extent that properties like being fitting, deserving 
appreciation, and being worthy of being loved (etc.) are clustered in nature, their 
clustering does not seem to be a matter of causal connection.  In the first place, several of 
these properties may well be identical.  It may be, for example, that the property 
designated by ‘meriting realization’ is identical to the property designated by ‘being 
fitting.’  Second, even where distinct properties are designated by these terms, the 
connection between these properties appears to be conceptual or metaphysical rather than 
causal or nomological.  It strikes me as a conceptual truth that an ideal observer is one 
who approves of all and only that which merits realization or deserves appreciation.  To 
my ears, the claim that there is an ideal (moral) observer who, nevertheless, approves of 
that which does not deserve appreciation sounds incoherent.28  At any rate, even if the 
necessity involved is not conceptual, it is doubtful that the laws of nature could have been 
different in such a way that there exist ideal observers who approve of that which does 
not deserve appreciation or that which does not merit realization.  If so, the necessity 
binding these properties is stronger than mere nomological necessity; it is better 
characterized as a metaphysical necessity.  My point here is that a property cluster in 
which these new properties (being fitting, being deserving of appreciation, etc.) were 
given significant definitional weight would not fit Boyd’s characterization of an HPC.  
The property cluster under consideration appears to be, in most cases at least, unified by 
conceptual or metaphysical necessity.29  By contrast, the necessity that unifies the 
                                                
28 A. C. Ewing expresses roughly the same thought.  He suggests that the claim that what is good or right is 
what an impartial spectator would approve of “is equivalent to saying that something is good or right when 
it is approved by somebody who only approves what is really good or right” (Ewing 1953: 85). 
29 Of the properties I have recommended for this alternative HPC proposal, the one exception seems to be 
the property of being pursued by rational beings.  If one takes a Humean or instrumentalist view of 
rationality, then it will be at best a metaphysically contingent fact that rational beings pursue, e.g., fitting 
states of affairs.  Thus, being pursued by rational beings may well be nomologically linked to the other 
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properties of an HPC is causal or nomological.  Thus, even on this alternative proposal, it 
would not be true that moral goodness is an HPC. 
 
5.5. Inductive Inference and THE GOOD. 
5.5.1. Outline of the Argument.   
In §5.2.1, we saw that Boyd takes natural kinds to provide the metaphysical ground for 
successful induction and explanation.  His HPC conception of natural kinds is meant to 
account, in part, for how it is that (some) natural kinds play this role.  In §5.2.2, I 
explained that the homeostatic clustering of properties makes the instances of an HPC 
kind fairly uniform with respect to their manifest properties.  In turn, this uniformity 
makes reliable inductive inference possible.  If this is so, and if THE GOOD is an HPC 
kind, then we should expect that THE GOOD (and goodness) will ground significant 
reliable inductive inferences.  To the extent that this expectation is not fulfilled, we have 
reason to think that THE GOOD is not an HPC kind.  In the next two sections I argue that 
there is, in fact, reason to think that goodness does not facilitate significant reliable 
inductive inferences.  If I am right, then we have even more reason to doubt that THE 
GOOD is an HPC kind.  (As far as I can tell, my arguments remain cogent regardless of 
whether homeostatic consequentialism is understood as HC1 or understood as HC2.  Still, 
it may aid the reader to know that the following sections were written with HC1 in mind.) 
                                                                                                                                            
properties mentioned.  I doubt that this one exception can give the homeostatic consequentialist what he 
needs to get past the present worry.  However, if more properties of this sort could be found, and if there 
were a compelling case to be made that these other properties are indeed contingently clustered, then this 
worry could be put to rest.  But new difficulties are likely to arise.  My suspicion is that the sorts of 
properties that are needed here would consist primarily in various sorts of characteristic human responses to 
good states of affairs. If I am right about this, then an alternative HPC definition of THE GOOD that 
incorporated these properties would raise its own problems for Boyd’s larger project of defending 
naturalistic moral realism.  Briefly, a cluster definition involving such properties threatens to make moral 
goodness a response-dependent property.  Response-dependent accounts of moral properties, however, are 
at odds with the robust sort of moral realism that Boyd means to defend. 
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 In arguing that moral goodness does not ground significant reliable inductive 
inferences, I will be relying on anecdotal evidence.  For my argument to be conclusive, 
empirical research would be required.  In the absence of such research, I must state the 
conclusion of my argument modestly.  Here I aim to show that, pending the needed 
empirical research, we ought to be pessimistic as to whether homeostatic 
consequentialism can make good on its empirical commitments. 
 
5.5.2. Biological kinds versus moral kinds, part I.   
For comparison, consider the sorts of reliable inductive inferences that are afforded by 
biological kinds.  While walking in the woods, you see something poking up from behind 
a log.  They are two pieces of furry flesh, about four inches in length, standing straight 
up.  You recognize them as nearly morphologically identical with the ears of some 
rabbits you have seen.  Before you move any closer, you already have a pretty good idea 
of what you will find as you approach: a furry creature, with short front legs and 
powerful, kangaroo-like hind legs.  The creature will also have whiskers and a short 
fluffy tail.  If you get close enough, you will likely see its nose making a “sniffing” 
motion.  If you get too close, it will rapidly scurry away.  In addition to all this, you have 
a rough idea of what you would find if you were to catch it and cut it open.  The 
background knowledge needed to make these inferences could be culled from having 
seen only a handful of rabbits in the wild (supplemented with one or two observations of 
mammalian internal anatomy).  On the basis of only a few previous observations, you are 
able to reliably infer an impressive amount of information about a particular individual 
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by observing just a pair of ears.30  Notice, too, that, in this case, you are able to infer the 
presence of a vast number of properties in the individual from observing comparatively 
few. 
 Now consider a putatively moral case.  Suppose that, while walking through the 
park, you observe four young persons playing a game of two-on-two basketball.  You 
observe that each pair is engaged in a cooperative effort and that they are enjoying 
physical recreation as well as leisure. Each individual appears to be friends with his or 
her own teammate and, furthermore, all appear to be in good health.  Let us grant that all 
these observations are in fact true.  On the basis of these observations, which reveal the 
instantiation of five out of the nine human goods sketched above (in §5.3), what else can 
you reliably infer?  Well, very likely someone is happy or pleased, as basketball is an 
enjoyable game.  As for some of the other human goods in the proposed cluster, it is 
anybody’s guess.  There is no reason to think the game makes any contribution to 
anyone’s education, artistic development, or ability to engage in a loving relationship.  I 
doubt that we can even reliably infer whether playing the game has any impact on 
anyone’s personal autonomy (perhaps two of the players had to be nagged into joining 
the game).  It is worth adding that we do not appear to be warranted in inferring that the 
state of affairs in which these young people are playing basketball is (all things 
considered) morally good.  In fact, given our evidence, it is not too improbable that the 
young people are doing something that is, all things considered, bad: perhaps they have 
                                                
30 Of course, the reliability of this inference requires the support of some contingent features of the 
observer’s environment as well.  For instance, there must not be too many things that look like rabbit ears 
but are neither attached to rabbits nor creatures that share many (but not too many) properties that are 
characteristic of rabbits.  (Keep in mind, however, that in my example what you infer is not that this thing 
is a rabbit but rather that it has such and such morphology, anatomy, behavior, etc.   If the creature should 
turn out to be a hare, these conclusions are every bit as correct as if it turns out to be a rabbit). 
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all neglected their university studies in order to play; perhaps they have unfairly excluded 
others from joining their game; perhaps one team is in the process of hustling the other 
team out of their paychecks.  If the basketball game exhibits any of these features, then it 
may well generate enough harm that, on balance, it contributes negative non-instrumental 
value to the world.  What these considerations suggest is that, in fact, the observation of 
the properties in the cluster that putatively defines THE GOOD does not afford us much, if 
any, inductive knowledge.  In this respect, THE GOOD is nothing like a paradigmatic HPC 
kind such as THE RABBIT.31 
 Now, if the example just offered is to support the conclusion I want to draw, then 
it must be generalizable.  It will be of no use if I have simply called attention to one of 
the infrequent cases where some of the properties defining THE GOOD are present but the 
rest are not.  (After all, we sometimes witness small, furry, ear-like things, and they turn 
out not to be attached to small timid mammals.)  What I need to show, then, is that cases 
in which a number of human goods are present but the others are not constitute the norm 
rather than the exception.  Since I cannot here continue to produce examples of this sort, I 
will offer a pair of cases of a somewhat different sort to compare.  I believe the 
implications of the following cases are generalizable.  They differ from the first pair in 
that, here, the epistemic agent does not see the individual but is merely told that a given 
unseen individual belongs to a certain kind.  I then consider what sort of information he 
or she can reliably infer from this (let us grant) accurate testimony about the individual. 
 
                                                
31 To make matters worse, even if we could inductively infer the presence of some of these goods from 
others, it is not clear that it is reference to THE MORAL GOOD that facilitates these inferences.  Our 
inductions may well turn out to be grounded by the properties that cluster around sporting activities qua 
sporting activities. 
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5.5.3. Biological kinds versus moral kinds, part II.   
If a person is competent at recognizing members of a natural kind, then she should be 
able to reliably infer the presence of many properties had by an unseen individual solely 
by being (truthfully) told that the individual is a member the kind in question.  For 
example, I have seen only a handful of scorpions (real and images thereof); I have also 
learned several facts about them through the testimony of experts.  This relatively small 
number of encounters has been enough for me to acquire competence in recognizing 
members of the kind SCORPION.  Simply by being told that Snippy is a scorpion, I can 
reliably infer that Snippy is an insect-like creature, three or four inches long from head to 
the start of the tail.  His tail is roughly the same length as his body and is equipped with a 
stinger and a pouch full of venom.  Moreover, affixed to the front of his body are 
“lobster-like” claws.  In addition to these morphological features, I can reliably infer 
some behavioral properties: for example, Snippy would eat an insect if it were available; 
if a person were to agitate Snippy properly, Snippy would sting her.  I know all this about 
Snippy only by being told that he is a member of the kind SCORPION. 
 Contrast the scorpion case with a case in which we are truthfully informed that a 
state of affairs, P, that has just taken place is non-instrumentally morally good.  We are 
given no further information concerning P’s characteristics.  Given our background 
knowledge of non-instrumentally good things, what inductive inferences would we be 
justified in making?  One might be tempted to infer that P exemplifies whatever property 
one’s favorite axiological theory entails is non-instrumentally good-making.  Perhaps, 
then, P involves the satisfaction of a preference, or someone’s being pleased, or both.  On 
the face of it, this hardly seems like an example of inductive inference.  Still, if the 
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homeostatic consequentialist is granted his favored account of moral theorizing, it may 
well count as a case of inductive inference.  Let us suppose, then, that these two 
inferences concerning P are examples of epistemically justified inductions. 
 If THE GOOD is an HPC kind, we should expect that we can reliably infer more 
than this.  Unfortunately, I doubt that we can.  Consider the human goods listed in §5.3.  
Surely, the information we have been given about P does not justify us to infer that P 
involves someone’s being in love, engaging in cooperative efforts, or appreciating art, 
etc.  Even a convinced axiological pluralist must recognize that the mere knowledge that 
P is good does not justify us in inferring which of the good-making properties P realizes.  
Even less does our information justify us to infer that all (or nearly all) of these human 
goods are realized in P.  This is bad news.  If the human goods really are homeostatically 
clustered and constitutive of non-instrumental goodness, we should expect this stronger 
inference (that nearly all the human goods are realized in P) to be justified.  Perhaps there 
is empirical research that can be conducted that would show that such inferences are 
reliable.  In the absence of this research, however, we have no reason to believe that such 
a strong inference is epistemically justified.  If this is right, then we ought to be skeptical 
of the claim that goodness is constituted by an HPC. 
 So far, I have been considering the relationship between non-instrumental moral 
goodness and inductive inference.  It might be thought, however, that instrumental moral 
goodness is more promising as a ground of reliable inductive inference.  Let’s consider, 
then, what we may justifiably infer from the news that Jane has just performed an 
instrumentally morally good action.  I am inclined to think that matters are not much 
different than before.  I suspect that we are justified in inferring that someone was 
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pleased and had a preference satisfied as a result of Jane’s act.  I suppose we would be 
also be justified in inferring that, if anyone’s preferences were frustrated as a result of 
Jane’s act (or if anyone was pained by it), this frustration was outweighed by the 
preferences satisfied (or the quantity of pleasure it brought about).  Once again, however, 
I doubt that we would be justified in inferring that her act causally contributed to the 
realization of love, friendship, cooperation, physical health, and artistic appreciation, etc.  
As often as instrumentally good actions contribute to the realization of these properties, 
they contribute to their frustration.  And again, even if we are in a position to infer that 
Jane’s act contributes to the realization of some of these human goods, we are not in a 
position to infer which of these it contributes to.  Still less are we justified in inferring 
that it contributes to the realization of nearly all of them. 
 We might be encouraged to take a long-term view of Jane’s action.  While her 
good action might have immediately involved breaking a friendship, ending a love affair, 
sacrificing someone’s autonomy, etc., it may be that, in the long run, her act will 
contribute to the realization of all these things.  If so, then her act does contribute to the 
cluster of human goods after all.  But even if all this turns out to be true of Jane’s act, we 
are surely in no position now to infer this with any kind of confidence.  Such an inference 
may signal an admirable sort of optimism, but it is surely not an example of justified 
reliable inductive inference.  If I am right, then even non-instrumental goodness is of 
little value in grounding significant reliable inductive inference. 
 To summarize, it is doubtful that the human goods sketched in §5.3 enjoy the sort 
of homeostatic relationship shared by the properties that define chemical and biological 
kinds.  If the human goods did share such a nomological bond, we would expect to be 
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able to make a significant number of reliable inductive inferences upon observing that 
some (at least half) of the properties in the cluster are instantiated by some state of 
affairs.  Furthermore, we would expect that the knowledge that a given state of affairs is 
good will permit us to reliably infer a significant number of further facts about it.  I have 
argued that neither of these expectations are met.  Reference to THE GOOD does not 
facilitate significant reliable inductions.  In this respect, THE GOOD is very much unlike 
paradigmatic HPC kinds.  Consequently, we have yet more reason to doubt that THE 
GOOD is itself an HPC kind. 
 It is worth recalling that one of the appeals of Boyd’s HPC account of natural 
kinds is that it purports to explain how such kinds are able to fulfill the inductive and 
explanatory roles they are alleged to play.  In light of this, these observations concerning 
THE GOOD are no small blow to homeostatic consequentialism.  THE GOOD lacks the very 
feature of natural kinds that the HPC view is meant to account for. 
 
5.5.4. Social kinds.   
It might be objected that it is much too demanding to ask that moral kinds ground as 
numerous and reliable inductions as chemical and biological kinds do.  This is a 
reasonable objection.  A fairer comparison might contrast moral kinds with kinds that 
make up the subject matter of social sciences like psychology or sociology.  I take 
examples of social kinds to include THE STATE, RELIGION, NATIVE AMERICAN, JEW, 
PSYCHOPATH, HOMOSEXUAL, FOREIGNER, BACHELOR and ECONOMIC DEPRESSION.32  Boyd 
suggests that at least some social kinds are HPC kinds.33  It is reasonable to suppose that, 
                                                
32 The first five examples are culled from Richard Miller (2000). 
33 He offers CAPITALISM as an example of a HPC social kind in Boyd (1999b: 83). 
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if there are HPC social kinds, such kinds support significantly fewer and less reliable 
inductive inferences than biological and chemical kinds support.  Consequently, if social 
kind terms can be shown to designate HPC kinds, and if reference to THE GOOD facilitates 
nearly as many reliable inductive inferences as does reference to social kinds, then the 
arguments of §5.5.2 and §5.5.3 could be answered. 
 The first challenge facing an objection along these lines is to establish that there 
are, in fact, plausible examples of social kinds whose extensions are defined by HPCs.  
At least some of the kinds listed in the previous paragraph seem to resist a posteriori 
HPC definitions.  BACHELOR, for instance, has a fairly straightforward analytic 
definition; even if there turns out to be some properties that contingently cluster around 
bachelors (qua bachelors)—e.g., having an active night life—it is doubtful that such 
properties are part of the definition of BACHELOR.  Still, I think HPC social kinds may 
well exist.  At any rate, it seems to me that there exist social kinds that ground interesting 
reliable inductions where it can be plausibly maintained that the essential properties of 
these kinds are discoverable only a posteriori.  The trouble is that these social kinds seem 
to license a far greater number of reliable inductive inferences than THE GOOD does.  In 
the previous section, I counted only two inductive inferences that seemed to be licensed 
by the proposition that some particular state of affairs (or action) is good.  Contrast this 
with the inductive inferences afforded by the proposition that some particular individual 
is a member of the social kind HASIDIC JEW (HASIDUM).  Upon being told that Jacob is an 
adult male Hasidic Jew, we (or at least, those of us somewhat familiar with HASIDUM) 
can reliably infer that he has a beard and payas (long curls of hair growing from the 
temples).  His typical attire includes a black hat, a black suit with a white button down 
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shirt, and, on certain occasions, tallis (a prayer shawl) worn under his coat.  We can also 
reliably infer several things about Jacob’s weekly activities: he keeps kosher, does not 
work or drive on the Sabbath, and regularly studies the Torah.  Likewise, we can infer 
that Jacob believes (or at least purports to believe) that the Torah gives a literally true 
account of historical events.34 
 What this example shows is that, by observing the practices of only several 
Hasidic Jews, an epistemic agent could safely infer that these practices are shared by 
nearly all other Hasidic Jews (at least those belonging to the same sect).35  If I am right, 
then a social kind such as HASIDIC JEW provides us with an impressive metaphysical 
ground for inductive inference.  These inferences seem to be much nearer in quantity and 
reliability to inferences afforded by biological and chemical kinds than they are to a kind 
like THE MORAL GOOD.  Consequently, appeal to the existence of HPC social kinds fails to 
help the case for homeostatic consequentialism. 
 At this point, two complaints might be raised about my example.  First, it might 
be complained that Hasidic Jews make up an unusually uniform social kind.  According 
to this objection, the norms governing Hasidic life are more far reaching and pervasive 
than those governing other social groups.  A more typical social kind would be much 
                                                
34 I am here offering these sample inferences after having done only a minimum of research.  They are 
based on my own limited casual observations of Hasidic Jews (along with bits of testimony from others).  
No doubt, some of these observations need refinement or correction (for instance, I have not said—because 
I do not know—on which occasions tallis is worn).  In any case, there can be little doubt that it would 
require only a modest amount of sociological research to extend both the number and the reliability of 
inductive inferences that can be made about Jacob in his capacity as a Hasidic Jew.    
35 It should be recognized that we should expect inferences to be reliable only when they concern properties 
that are homeostatically clustered.  Suppose that my sample of Hasidic men was small, consisting of only 
five men.  Suppose further that I observed that all five men have gray beards.  I might be tempted to infer 
that Jacob’s beard will be gray as well.  It should be clear, however, that, even if this conclusion were to 
turn out to be true, this inference is not epistemically warranted.  What this observation suggests is that, if 
our practice of making inductive inferences from a small sample is to be practical, then we had better have 
some skill at detecting which properties of an individual are essential to its kind.  (For a defense of the 
claim that human beings really do possess such a skill, see Kornblith [1993: 83-107]). 
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nearer to THE MORAL GOOD in its (weak) grounding of induction.  A second possible 
objection is that the uniformity among male Hasidum is artificial since it results from 
behaviors that individuals consciously undertake in order to remain members of the 
group.  A genuine HPC social kind would not be unified by such an artificial mechanism. 
 Now, for those who subscribe to Boyd’s HPC account of kinds, the “artificiality” 
of the homeostatic mechanism ought to be beside the point.  After all, Boyd includes 
human artifacts like THE 1969 PLYMOUTH VALIANT as examples of HPC kinds (1999b: 
68).36   Nevertheless, I will offer one more illustration of a potential HPC social kind.  
The kind I will cite grounds a number of reliable inductive inferences but is not open to 
either of the above complaints.  Its members are significantly less uniform than members 
of HASIDUM and do not (as far as I know) engage in their kind-typical behaviors for the 
express purpose of maintaining their membership within it.  Consider, then, the social 
kind designated by the term ‘hippy.’  When we learn that Bill is a hippy we can reliably 
infer the following propositions: Bill owns at least one tie-dyed shirt and at least one pair 
of sandals; he listens to (or at least can appreciate) the music of The Grateful Dead and 
Phish; he has smoked marijuana and supports its legalization; in politics he opposes 
aggressive foreign policy and socially conservative domestic policies.  To be sure, the 
reliability of these inferences will be much weaker than the inferences involving 
biological kinds; there are certainly many more hippies that do not enjoy the music of 
Phish than there are scorpions without claws.  Still, I suspect these inferences are reliable 
                                                
36 It is worth adding here that Ron Mallon (2003) defends an HPC conception of certain social kinds where 
the homeostatic mechanisms include the members’ own recognition of themselves as members of a kind.  . 
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enough to meet the threshold for epistemic warrant.  We see, then, that even a social kind 
like HIPPY grounds significant inductive inference where THE GOOD does not.37 
 The comparison of THE GOOD with plausible examples of HPC social kinds 
reveals once again that THE GOOD supplies us with a very weak metaphysical ground for 
reliable inductive inferences.  Since one of the most notable features of HPC kinds (and 
natural kinds more generally) is supposed to be the role they play in grounding reliable 
inductive inferences, this observation supports the conclusion that THE GOOD is not itself 
an HPC kind. 
 Of course, I have cited only two examples of HPC social kinds.  The homeostatic 
consequentialist may hold out in the hope that some social kind will be found that both 
(a) weakly grounds inductive inference and (b) is a convincing example of an HPC kind.  
(Perhaps it will be thought that one of the other social kinds I list at the start of this 
section can fit the bill.)  I think such a hope is misplaced.  Conditions a and b are in 
tension with one another.  To the extent that a kind grounds inductive inference only very 
weakly, there will be good reason to doubt it is an HPC kind.  If so, then we should not 
expect to find any convincing examples of an HPC social kind that grounds inductive 
inference as weakly as THE GOOD does. 
 
                                                
37 Some might object that the inferences about Bill are not inductive at all.  It may be that ‘hippy’ has an 
analytic cluster definition where the properties I have attributed to Bill are just those that are analytically 
associated with ‘hippy.’  I am not inclined protest very loudly against this objection.  But note that this 
should be of no comfort to the homeostatic consequentialist.  After all, the same objection may be raised 
against any (supposedly) inductive inference involving THE GOOD (i.e., it might be objected that such 
inferences are not examples of a posteriori inductions at all, but are, instead, examples of the analytic a 
priori).  In any case, unless a clear case of a HPC social kind that weakly grounds inductive inference can 
be found, the homeostatic consequentialist cannot appeal to a comparison with social kinds in order to 
answer the arguments of §5.5.2 and §5.5.3. 
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5.6. An Anticipated Rebuttal. 
In a more recent presentation of his ethical views, Boyd suggests that the HPC that 
constitutes goodness is currently “fragmented” (2003b: 34-38).  It might be thought that 
this claim provides the homeostatic consequentialist with a reply to the arguments of 
§5.5.  In this section, I consider the prospects for such a reply. 
 As we saw in §5.3, Boyd suggests that several of the mechanisms that hold the 
human goods in a homeostatic relationship are socio-political.  They include democratic 
institutions, social egalitarianism, certain customs etc.  In different social environments, 
these mechanisms may be stronger, weaker, or even completely absent.  Boyd’s view is 
that as these mechanisms are made stronger—as a society becomes more democratic, 
more egalitarian, etc.—the human goods will become more strongly homeostatically 
unified (ibid.).  As I understand it, this amounts to the claim that, as the relevant 
homeostatic mechanisms are strengthened, there will be an even greater increase in the 
likelihood than before that, when some of the human goods are instantiated, the other 
goods are instantiated as well. 
 Boyd submits that, at present, the sorts of mechanisms expected to produce 
homeostatic unity among the human goods are not nearly as strong as they could be: 
So far we have always operated morally within social structures which lacked the 
resources (technical or social or economic or political) to achieve the sort of 
(homeostatic) unity of [goodness]38 towards which our moral concerns aim, and 
which possessed lots of features “designed” as it were (often literally designed) to 
prevent the emergence of such resources (2003b: 36). 
 
He goes on to suggest that, because of the poor present state of the relevant social 
institutions, the HPC that constitutes goodness is “not now very unified” (ibid.).  This 
claim might be thought to supply homeostatic consequentialism with a reply to the 
                                                
38 Boyd uses ‘the good’ here. 
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arguments of §5.5.  Here is how.  If goodness is constituted by a weakly or partially 
unified HPC, then we should expect that the presence of some of the goods only slightly 
raises the likelihood that the others are present.  In that case, however, we should not 
expect to find that reference to THE GOOD facilitates many reliable inductive inferences.  
These considerations show that it is possible that goodness is an HPC even though it fails 
to ground the sorts of reliable inductive inferences that are characteristic of HPC kinds.  
In light of this possibility, it might be argued that we are unjustified in concluding that 
goodness is not an HPC from the fact that it fails to ground significant inductive 
inferences. 
 It is difficult to assess this reply without a more detailed account of property 
homeostasis and of what sorts of characteristics a property cluster must have in order to 
serve as the real essence of a natural kind.  It is not obvious that just any amount of 
homeostatic clustering among a group of properties is sufficient to make that group suited 
for the role of natural kind’s real essence.  Indeed, as we saw in §5.2, Boyd takes it to be 
characteristic of HPC kinds that the clustering of their defining properties is “causally 
important.”  However, to the extent that the purported clustering of the human goods fails 
to make a noticeable difference to the inductive inferences we are licensed to draw, it 
would seem that such clustering is not all that causally important.  In addition, it should 
be recalled that Boyd himself takes it to be a defining feature of natural kinds (and so, 
HPC natural kinds) that reference to such kinds facilitates explanation and inductive 
inference.  If he is right, then the fact that reference to THE GOOD fails to ground inductive 
inference in any interesting way should be thought to give us very strong grounds for 
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denying that it is itself an HPC kind even if it should so happen that the human goods are 
weakly unified. 
 Suppose, however, that we grant that a weakly unified cluster of properties is 
capable of playing the role of a natural kind essence.  It still remains the case that the lack 
of interesting reliable inductions yielded by reference to THE GOOD leaves us with no 
assurance that the human goods, or any other collection of properties suitably related to 
the predicate ‘morally good,’ really are in fact weakly unified.  This lack of assurance 
might not worry the homeostatic consequentialist.  While he cannot confirm his empirical 
hypothesis (that the goods are weakly unified), he might suppose that the burden of proof 
is on his detractors to show that this empirical hypothesis is false.  I think this stance 
would be a mistake.  To see why, we need to revisit the dialectic. 
 In “How to Be a Moral Realist,” Boyd raises the possibility that the human goods 
are homeostatically clustered and that this cluster can be identified with the property 
moral goodness.  This hypothesis is meant to keep alive the possibility that some 
naturalistic version of moral realism is true despite a battery of anti-realist and non-
naturalist objections.  I take the arguments of §5.4 above to show that, even if the human 
goods that Boyd cites really do form an HPC, we should not identify this HPC with 
moral goodness itself.  My own view is that the arguments of §5.4 are sufficient to refute 
homeostatic consequentialism outright.  More cautiously, however, I would insist that 
those arguments at least deprive the theory of any presumption of innocence it might 
have enjoyed and give us at least some positive reason to think it false.  At this point in 
the dialectic, then, the balance of reasons is against the hypothesis that moral goodness is 
an HPC. 
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 Perhaps the best evidence that could be adduced in favor of homeostatic 
consequentialism would be an observation to the effect that reference to goodness or THE 
GOOD facilitates reliable inductive inference.  Unfortunately, the arguments of §5.5 show 
that there is at present little reason to believe that reference to goodness or the good does 
in fact facilitate reliable inductive inference.  This finding constitutes more than a mere 
failure to uncover exculpating evidence in favor of homeostatic consequentialism.  In 
light of Boyd’s claim that it is definitive of natural kinds (and thus, HPC kinds) that such 
kinds ground inductive inferences, the findings of §5.5 give us additional evidence for the 
denial of the proposition that goodness is an HPC.  As I see it, then, the score is now (at 
least) 2 to 0 against homeostatic consequentialism. 
 It is at this point that the hypothesis that the HPC of human goods is weakly 
unified becomes relevant.  This hypothesis promises to explain why it would be that 
goodness, though an HPC, fails to ground reliable inductive inference.  If this hypothesis 
turns out to be consistent with the general theory of HPC kinds, and if we allow that our 
current evidence does not rule out this hypothesis, then the conclusion of §5.5 must be 
weakened.  We could no longer take the lack of reliable inductive inferences afforded by 
reference to the good as positive evidence for the denial of the claim that goodness is an 
HPC.  Instead, the observations of §5.5 should be taken to show merely an absence of 
evidence in favor of the affirmation of that claim.  But this is too little too late.  At best, 
the homeostatic consequentialist gets to turn the scoreboard back to 1 to 0; but he is still 
losing.  In light of the arguments of §5.4, the balance of reasons still favors the denial of 
the proposition that goodness is constituted by an HPC.   
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5.7. Conclusion. 
I have argued that the homeostatic property cluster account of goodness is false.  First, it 
fails to account for the value of “causally isolated” human goods.  Next, the relationship 
between THE GOOD and its defining properties is suspiciously unlike the relationship 
between paradigmatic HPC kinds and their defining properties.  Finally, reference to THE 
GOOD does not support inductive inference nearly as well as would be expected if it were 
an HPC kind.  For these reasons, we should conclude that goodness is not an HPC and 
that THE GOOD is not an HPC kind.  As it stands, then, ethical naturalists remain without 
justification for adopting moral semantic externalism. 
 
162 
 
CHAPTER 6 
THE EXPLANATORY IMPOTENCE OF MORAL FACTS 
6. Chapter. 
6.1. Introduction. 
In Chapter 1 we saw that the main proponents of SEN endorse the method of reflective 
equilibrium as the proper way to conduct moral inquiry.  This method directs an 
epistemic agent to make modifications to her moral beliefs about particular cases, general 
moral principles and theories, and non-moral background beliefs until these three 
elements exhibit maximal coherence.  When these elements do exhibit maximal 
coherence, the agent’s moral beliefs can be said to be in reflective equilibrium.  In this 
state, her beliefs enjoy maximal epistemic justification.  Call the moral theory that would 
survive the method of reflective equilibrium for an agent (or a group of agents), S, S’s 
best moral theory. 
 Among those who endorse the method of reflective equilibrium for moral inquiry, 
there is disagreement about the metaphysical commitments of our best moral theory.  On 
the one hand, there are those, such as the defenders of SEN, who embrace a realist 
construal of moral theory (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; Daniels 1979; Sturgeon 2002).  For 
the moral realist, our best moral theory should be thought of as stance-independently true.  
Moral anti-realists, by contrast, deny that our best moral theory should be thought of as 
stance-independently true.  Some anti-realists deny that our best moral theory should be 
thought of as true at all.  They argue, instead, that we should think of our best theory 
merely as a useful fiction (Mackie 1977: ch. 5; Joyce 2001; Nolan et al. 2005).  Other 
moral anti-realists suggest that our best theory should be thought of, not as true, but as 
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“reasonable for us to accept” (Rawls 1980: 570).  Still other moral anti-realists are 
willing to view our best moral theory as true, but maintain, contra realists, that that the 
theory’s truth is stance-dependent.  Anti-realists of this stripe hold that the truth of our 
best moral theory consists in the fact that it is the theory that we would accept, were our 
beliefs in reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1980: 519).  This kind of metaethical view 
amounts to the adoption of a coherence theory of truth for moral claims. 
 What sorts of considerations might help us decide between the moral realist’s 
construal of reflective equilibrium and the moral anti-realist’s construal?  On the one 
hand, it may seem as though phenomenological considerations favor moral realism.  
When we engage in moral deliberation, it typically seems to us as though there is a 
correct answer, independent of what we happen to believe, that we are trying to arrive at.  
Furthermore, it seems to us as though our best efforts might fail to yield the correct 
answer.  More specifically, it seems to us logically possible that we achieve reflective 
equilibrium among our beliefs and yet the moral theory that we accept is false while 
some other moral theory that we reject is true (Brink 1989: 31-36).  
 Anti-realists have countered that the phenomenological evidence for a realist 
construal of moral inquiry is defeated by the “explanatory impotence” of would-be moral 
facts, where a fact is explanatorily impotent just in case it is not needed in the best a 
posteriori explanations of our observations (Harman 1977: 3-23).  Indeed, the putative 
explanatory impotence of moral facts is taken not only to defeat the presumptive 
evidence in favor of moral realism, but also—in light of Ockham’s razor-type 
considerations of ontological parsimony—to constitute positive evidence against a 
realistic construal of moral inquiry. 
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 Against the argument from explanatory impotence, some moral realists have 
objected that it begs the question against moral realism to suppose that moral facts must 
play a role in our a posteriori explanations.  Nagel writes, “The claim that certain [e.g. 
moral] reasons exist is a normative claim, not a claim about the best causal explanation of 
anything” (Nagel 1986: 144; cf. Quinn 1986; Shafer-Landau 2003: 98-114; 2006).  
Whatever the merits of this line of reply, it is not available to proponents of synthetic 
ethical naturalism.  Recall from Chapter 1 that metaphysical naturalists accept the 
following explanatory criterion of ontological commitment: 
EC: Posit the existence of an entity (or a kind of entity) if and only if reference to 
that (kind of) entity is needed in our best available a posteriori explanations of 
observable phenomena. 
 
If stance-independent moral facts are to be a welcomed part of the metaphysical 
naturalist’s ontology, then reference to such facts had better be needed in our best 
available a posteriori explanations.  In light of their commitment to EC, it is not 
surprising to find that synthetic ethical naturalists respond to the argument from 
explanatory impotence by insisting that, contrary to what anti-realists have claimed, 
moral facts really do figure in our best a posteriori explanations (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989: 
182-197; Sturgeon 1985a).1 
 In this chapter, I defend the moral anti-realist’s argument from explanatory 
impotence against the naturalists’ rebuttal.  In §6.2 below, I present Gilbert Harman’s 
argument from explanatory impotence along with Nicolas Sturgeon’s tu quoque reply to 
it on behalf of SEN.  In §6.3, I outline a revised version of the argument from explanatory 
impotence that I believe to be invulnerable to Sturgeon’s objections.  In §6.4, I consider 
                                                
1 Although Brink unequivocally affirms that moral facts explain our observations, it should be noted that he 
expresses some ambivalence about whether they really must do so in order to be a legitimate part of the 
naturalist’s ontology (Brink 1989: 182f). 
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several replies to the revised argument from explanatory impotence.  I pay special 
attention to another tu quoque-style argument to the effect that the reasoning behind the 
explanatory impotence argument against moral realism, if cogent, would commit us to the 
rejection of scientific realism.  In §6.5, I argue that scientific realism is not vulnerable in 
this respect.  (In the next chapter, I go on to show that the sort of argument discussed in 
§6.5 here, which protects scientific realism from explanatory impotence worries, cannot 
be extended to defend moral realism in a similar fashion.) 
 
6.2. The Harman-Sturgeon Exchange. 
6.2.1. Harman’s opening salvo.   
The contemporary locus classicus for the argument from explanatory impotence is 
Gilbert Harman’s The Nature of Morality (1977).  There, he argues that putative moral 
facts are not needed in order to explain why we have the moral beliefs that we do.  To 
illustrate, he has his readers imagine a case in which they observe “a group of young 
hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it.”  Upon making this observation, we are to 
imagine that we (the observers of the act) form an immediate judgment that the 
hoodlums’ act is morally wrong.  Harman asks whether we need to suppose that the act of 
igniting the cat really does have the property of being morally wrong in order to explain 
the fact that we made this moral judgment.  He answers in the negative: 
…[A]n assumption about moral facts would seem to be totally irrelevant to the 
explanation of your making the judgment that you make.  It would seem that all 
we need to assume is that you have certain more or less well articulated moral 
principles that are reflected in the judgments you make, based on your moral 
sensibility.  It seems to be completely irrelevant to our explanation whether your 
intuitive immediate judgment is true or false (Harman 1977: 7). 
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To explain our judging the hoodlums’ act to be morally wrong, we need to cite only: (a) 
our non-moral beliefs about the relevant act-token (e.g., the fact that we believe these 
young people to be lighting the cat on fire, that they have done this merely for their own 
amusement, and that it is causing the cat to experience a great amount of pain) and (b) the 
fact that we (perhaps tacitly) accept a moral principle according to which acts of causing 
suffering for mere amusement are morally wrong.  I suspect, in addition, that in order to 
adequately explain our having the non-moral beliefs that we do about the action, we will 
also need to cite (c) the non-moral facts about the act-token itself (e.g. the fact that there 
really are young people lighting a cat on fire).  The conjunction of these three items 
forms what is at least a plausible and satisfying explanation of why we judge the act of 
lighting the cat on fire to be morally wrong.   
 Some might object that an even better explanation would describe these same 
items at a more fundamental level of reality, perhaps at the level of physical particles; but 
this objection is quite compatible with the general outlines of Harman’s argument.  What 
is most important for the success of the explanatory impotence argument is that the 
explanation of our moral judgment would not be improved by expanding it to include a 
claim to the effect that the act of lighting the cat on fire really is morally wrong.  Since an 
explanation that omits reference to moral facts or properties has the theoretical virtue of 
being more ontologically parsimonious than any explanation that does make such a 
reference, Harman’s non-moral explanation of our judgment would seem to be ceteris 
paribus better than any competing moral explanation (i.e., an explanation that makes 
ineliminable use of moral vocabulary).  Unless there is some reason to think that non-
moral explanations of our moral beliefs are inferior to moral explanations in some other 
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respect, a non-moral explanation of the sort described above would seem to be the best 
available to us.  Harman’s view is that moral explanations are not superior to non-moral 
explanations in any significant respect. 
 It appears, then, that moral facts are not needed in the best explanations of our 
making this or that particular moral judgment.  If we are metaphysical naturalists, and, 
thus, we accept a principle like EC, then it would seem to follow that we should not 
believe in the existence of stance-independent moral facts.  The upshot is that 
metaphysical naturalists should deny moral realism. 
 
6.2.2. Sturgeon’s reply to Harman.   
Over the course of several papers, Nicholas Sturgeon mounts a defense of naturalistic 
moral realism against Harman’s explanatory impotence argument.2  There are two major 
components of Sturgeon’s defense.  First, Sturgeon presents several cases in which a 
moral explanation of a non-moral fact appears to be both plausible and not obviously 
inferior to any available rival explanation.3  He suggests, for instance, that the fact that 
Hitler was morally depraved forms part of a good explanation for why we believe that he 
was depraved.  Not only does Sturgeon claim that moral facts sometimes figure in (what 
are potentially) the best explanations of our moral beliefs, he argues that they also figure 
in the (potentially) best explanations of non-doxastic events or states of affairs, such as 
the fact that a given person has performed a particular action.  So, for example, Sturgeon 
suggests that the fact that Hitler was depraved forms part of a reasonable (and potentially 
                                                
2 Sturgeon’s most direct replies to appear in his (1985a) and (1986a).  Other Sturgeon papers that are 
relevant to the moral explanations debate are his (1992), (1998), and (2006). 
3 In his (1985a: 56), Sturgeon’s stated goals are modest.  He does not claim show that moral facts are in fact 
needed in our best a posteriori explanations, but only that we do not now know that they are not (or will not 
be) needed. 
168 
best) explanation of why Hitler performed the sorts of actions for which he is commonly 
reviled, such as ordering the extermination of European Jews. 
 I want to delay an in-depth examination of this component of Sturgeon’s defense 
until Chapter 7 (see especially §7.6).  Here, I will mention one reason that the latter Hitler 
example is not very compelling as a potentially best explanation of non-moral facts.  
There are a number of natural properties that could realize the property of being morally 
depraved: e.g., being homicidal, being dishonest, being sadistic, being a pedophile, 
lacking empathy, etc.  The proposition that Hitler is morally depraved does not, by itself, 
inform us as to which of these putative depravity-making properties he has.  In light of 
this, it is doubtful that Hitler’s being depraved helps in explaining his actions.  If Hitler’s 
depravity had been realized by, say, his being a pedophile, rather than by his being 
homicidal, or being sadistic, or lacking empathy, it is not likely that he still would have 
ordered the extermination of European Jews (even assuming that he would be in a 
position of power to do so).4  In light of this, it would seem that a satisfactory explanation 
of Hitler’s actions cannot simply cite the fact that he was morally depraved; rather, it 
must ascribe to him a particular depravity-making natural property.  However, since true 
ascriptions of these latter sorts of properties (e.g., being homicidal, being sadistic, etc.) 
are compatible with the falsity of all moral theories, it would seem that the best 
explanation of Hitler’s actions in terms of his character traits need not make reference to 
                                                
4 One might complain that, the social-political situation of Germany being what it was in the 1930’s, even a 
non-homicidal, non-sadistic Hitler with normal powers of empathy would have ordered the final solution 
anyway.  But if that is true, then the natural thing to conclude is that Hitler’s depravity played no role in 
causing his notorious actions.  But this conclusion, of course, is exactly the contradictory of what the 
naturalist is trying to establish. 
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any distinctly moral properties or facts; or, to put a linguistic spin on what is essentially 
the same point: such explanations can be expressed without using moral vocabulary.5 
 
6.2.3. Sturgeon’s tu quoque reply.   
To my mind, Sturgeon’s second response to Harman’s explanatory impotence argument 
is more promising.  Sturgeon observes that an argument parallel to Harman’s can be 
constructed to support an anti-realist construal of scientific theories.  In his original 
presentation, Harman contrasts the explanation of an observer’s moral beliefs with a case 
involving another observer forming a scientific belief.  In this contrasting case, a 
physicist observes a vapor trail in a cloud chamber.  Upon making this observation, the 
physicist forms the belief that a proton has just passed through the chamber.  Harman 
contends that, in contrast to the moral case, the fact that a proton passed through the 
cloud chamber really does constitute part of the best available explanation of the 
physicist’s belief.  This contrast between the moral and scientific case is meant to 
highlight the trouble with moral facts: whereas we need to assume the existence of 
theoretical facts (e.g., the fact that a proton has passed through the chamber) in order to 
explain the physicist’s judgment, we do not need to assume the existence of moral facts 
in order to explain our making a moral judgment about the torturing of the cat. 
                                                
5 The reason it may be better to speak of explanations that do not use moral vocabulary, as opposed to 
explanations that do not make reference to moral facts, is that the latter way of speaking leaves the anti-
realist vulnerable to the charge of begging the question against the ethical naturalist.  Intuitively, an 
explanation making ineliminable reference to a natural property like maximizing the balance of pleasure 
over pain should not be counted as a moral explanation (ceteris paribus).   But ethical naturalists like Brink 
and Sturgeon have claimed that it may well turn out that this natural property is identical with moral 
rightness.  If such an identity claim were true, it would follow via Leibniz’ Law that the explanation in 
question needs to make reference to a moral property after all (viz., the moral property maximizing the 
balance of pleasure over pain).  In that case, we could not say, without begging the question against the 
naturalist, that the relevant explanation makes no reference to moral properties or facts.  To avoid the 
charge of begging the question, then, it may be more appropriate to speak of moral facts as being 
explanatorily impotent in the sense that the best explanations of our observations can be stated without the 
use of moral vocabulary. 
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 Against this, Sturgeon notes that an analogue of Harman’s explanatory impotence 
argument would show that the proton is not needed to explain the physicist’s belief after 
all: 
Given her training and the theory that she has internalized, the physicist would 
have thought, “There’s a proton,” at the sight of a vapor trail, whether the trail had 
been produced by a proton or not: so it looks like assumptions about the proton 
are not needed, after all, to explain her observational judgment (2006a: 245f; cf. 
Sturgeon 1985a: 68-71; Brink 1989: 184-186). 
 
With respect to Harman’s physicist example, then, it would seem that we can explain the 
fact that the physicist believes that a proton has passed through the chamber simply by 
citing (a) the physicist’s non-theoretical, observational beliefs (e.g. her belief that there is 
a vapor trail in the cloud chamber), (b) the fact that she accepts a physical theory 
according to which vapor trails indicate protons under these conditions, and, perhaps, (c) 
the fact that there actually was a vapor trail in the cloud chamber (this explains her 
observational belief).6  If Harman’s argument from explanatory impotence is sufficient to 
motivate the rejection of moral realism, then the availability of this non-theoretical 
explanation of the physicist’s belief ought to be sufficient to motivate the rejection of 
realism about protons.  Since, however, all parties to this debate accept realism about 
theoretical entities like protons, the availability of this parallel argument shows that 
Harman’s argument against moral realism must be defective somehow.  It would seem, 
                                                
6 Some have raised the question of whether the third item, c, is really necessary in order to explain the 
physicist’s belief.  After all, given the theory that she accepts, the physicist would have judged that a proton 
passed through the chamber even if she had only experienced a visual experience of a vapor trail, but no 
real vapor trail was present.  Perhaps this is right.  Whatever the case may be, it isn’t of great importance 
for the point being made.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that, if the physicist did have a visual experience of 
a vapor trail, this is something that cries out for explanation.  One possible explanation is that she is a brain 
in a vat and that the computer generating her visual images has run a program that caused her to experience 
an appearance of a vapor trail.  Another possible hypothesis is that, due to spending long nights 
overworking at the lab, she has simply suffered a hallucination of a vapor trail.  Above, I recommend the 
hypothesis that there really is a vapor trail because this seems to me the most plausible explanation for the 
majority of actual-world cases in which a physicist has a visual experience of a vapor trail.  But again, 
whether or not a real vapor trail turns out to be part of the best explanation for her belief, the point being 
made stands. 
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then, that the explanatory impotence argument must be rejected (at least by any 
philosopher who accepts scientific realism, such as me). 
 With respect to this particular exchange, I am inclined to think that Sturgeon 
comes out on top.  But, as we will see, there is still good reason to doubt that that moral 
realism is safe from the charge that putative moral facts are explanatorily impotent. 
 
6.2.4. Lessons of the Harman and Sturgeon exchange.   
In his initial presentation of the argument from explanatory impotence, Harman selects an 
individual’s arriving at a particular moral judgment as the explanandum for which moral 
facts are potential explanans.  It is this choice that makes his argument vulnerable to 
Sturgeon’s tu quoque reply.  Harman is right to think that the best proximate explanation 
of why some moral appraiser arrives at a particular moral judgment about an action will 
need to make reference only to facts about the moral theory she accepts along with other, 
non-moral facts about the case.  As we saw, however, similar things are true mutatis 
mutandis of the proximate explanations of why a physicist arrives at the judgment that a 
proton has passed through a cloud chamber: the best proximate explanation of her 
judgment will need to cite only facts about what scientific theory she accepts along with 
other, non-theoretical facts about the case (e.g., that she observed a vapor trail, etc.). 
 The lesson for the moral anti-realist is that a successful explanatory challenge to 
moral realism will have to investigate more ultimate explanations of our moral 
judgments.  The question that needs to be asked is not whether moral facts figure 
ineliminably in the best explanation of our having made this or that particular moral 
judgment, but rather, whether moral facts figure in the best available explanations of our 
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having the moral sensibility that we have.7  In this context, we can think of a person’s 
moral sensibility as a (usually inchoate and tacitly held) moral theory or standard that she 
accepts.8  If moral realism is true, and if we possess approximate moral knowledge, then 
we should expect that stance-independent moral facts play an important role in the best 
explanation of our having the moral sensibility that we currently have.  If moral facts are 
not needed in such explanations, then we should either reject moral realism or else accept 
the skeptical view that we have no moral knowledge. 
 Notice that naturalistic moral realists themselves acknowledge this challenge, or 
something like it.  Boyd, Brink, and Sturgeon all acknowledge that, if the method of 
reflective equilibrium is to be thought of as a reliable method that guides us towards true 
moral belief, then it had better be the case that our initial stock of pre-theoretical moral 
beliefs are at least “approximately true”: 
If a dialectical process [of moral reasoning] that takes common or considered 
moral judgments as a significant part of the input is to have moral knowledge as 
output, then there ought to be reason to think that the judgments of commonsense 
                                                
7 Sturgeon appears to recognize that this is the location of an important challenge to moral realism when he 
writes, “…I think the main problem [for moral realism] arises only when we take a moral global view of 
the history of moral and scientific thought” (1986a: 70f; cf. 1992: 101; 2006: 254f; cf. Quinn 1986).  In 
some places, Sturgeon suggests that this challenge is related to worries about the existence of deep moral 
disagreement and the difficulty of settling such disagreements (see, for instance, his 1985a: 49).  I think 
there is something to this.  But it is important to see that the present challenge could be posed even if it so 
happened that everyone in the world shared approximately the same moral beliefs.  Even if there were such 
agreement, we could still ask whether stance-independent moral facts constitute an ineliminable part of the 
explanation for the convergence in moral sensibility (cf. Williams 1985: Ch 8).  Suppose, for example, 
convergence in moral sensibility has been achieved, not through argument and presentation of evidence, 
but rather, through the repression and extermination of those with dissenting moral sensibilities.  If this 
were our own situation, I suspect that most would agree the fact that the people agree in their moral 
sensibilities constitutes very little evidence in favor of moral realism.  (Certainly, we would not think it 
good evidence for the truth of some religion, R, if the entire population of the world came to accept R 
unanimously as a result of coercion and extermination of dissenters.) 
8 It might be helpful to follow Simon Blackburn and think of a person’s moral sensibility roughly as a 
function that takes non-moral observations or non-moralized descriptions of actions, states of affairs, (etc.) 
as input and yields moral judgments as output (Blackburn 1998: 5). Note that, just as a speaker of a 
language easily obeys grammatical rules that she may be unable to articulate, a moral appraiser need not be 
in a position to articulate the moral theory or standard that underwrites her moral sensibility (assuming, 
contra particularists, that there even is such a standard).  In short, an appraiser may (indeed, will) often lack 
easy introspective access to the contents of her moral sensibility. 
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morality are sufficiently close to the truth.  Dialectical inquiry can identify and 
correct various sorts of errors, even very significant and far-reaching errors, but it 
appears unable to identify or correct systematic error, because the grounds and 
direction for correction must emerge from reflection on the beliefs with which 
cognizers start.  Do we have any reason to think that the considered moral 
convictions of commonsense morality are generally reliable or at least not 
systematically seriously mistaken?  (Brink 1999: 207; cf. Boyd 1988: 201, 207; 
Brink 1989: 299; Sturgeon 1986a: 67; 2006a: 254f.)   
 
If moral facts themselves do not figure in the best explanations of our (past or present) 
moral sensibility then it is hard to see how we can answer Brink’s question affirmatively.  
In that case, we should conclude either that moral skepticism is true (i.e., that we have no 
moral knowledge), or else that some form of moral anti-realism is true.  Of course, an 
argument from explanatory impotence refocused in this way will represent an 
improvement over Harman’s original version only if it is not vulnerable—or, at any rate, 
significantly less vulnerable—to another tu quoque reply.9  After presenting a refocused 
version of the explanatory impotence argument against moral realism in §6.3 below, I 
will go on to argue in §6.4 and §6.5 that this argument is indeed much less vulnerable to a 
tu quoque reply.  Before turning to these matters, however, I need to address a worry that 
my argument neglects a possible avenue open to naturalist moral realists. 
 
6.2.5. Moral explanations of non-doxastic phenomena. 
Above, I suggested that the central question for the moral explanations debate is whether 
moral facts are needed in the best explanations of our having the moral sensibility that we 
have.  It might be thought that this neglects another possibility: perhaps moral facts are 
needed to best explain something other than our moral sensibility or moral beliefs.  If 
                                                
9 The sort of tu quoque reply that I have in mind would involve presenting a parallel argument to the effect 
that theoretical facts play no needed role in the best explanations of why we accept the scientific theories 
that we currently accept. 
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so—if moral facts are needed in the best explanations of some non-doxastic 
phenomena—then by EC, metaphysical naturalists will be permitted (indeed, required) to 
accept the existence of moral facts even if they are not needed to explain our moral 
sensibility.  Consequently, even if a good case can be made that moral facts do not 
explain our moral sensibility, it can be argued that it would be too hasty to conclude on 
the basis of EC that we should not posit their existence. 
 This line of defense can promise only cold comfort to moral realists, and perhaps 
not even that.  In the first place, if moral facts do not figure in the best explanations of 
our moral sensibility and moral beliefs, then, given some fairly orthodox epistemological 
assumptions (e.g., an anti-luck condition on epistemic warrant), it follows that we have 
no moral knowledge.  This skeptical conclusion follows even if it should happen that 
moral facts really do figure in the best explanations of some non-doxastic phenomena 
somewhere in the universe.   
 Now, moral skepticism (the view that we have no moral knowledge) is not 
logically incompatible with moral realism as I have formulated it in §1.2.1: it is coherent 
to suppose that there exist stance-independent moral facts and that human beings have no 
knowledge of these facts.  Still, a commitment to moral skepticism would surely be a 
disappointment to the general metaethical outlook of moral realists; realism is typically 
presented as part of a non-skeptical view of morality.  Indeed, in their own formulations 
of moral realism, both Sturgeon and Boyd include an anti-skeptical epistemological 
condition.  Sturgeon, for example, writes that a “core thesis” of moral realism that “…our 
ordinary methods of arriving at moral judgments provide us with at least some 
approximate knowledge of moral truths” (Sturgeon, 1986b: 117; cf. Boyd 1988: 182). 
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 A commitment to moral skepticism threatens more than mere disappointment to 
moral realists, however.  If we have no moral knowledge, then it is doubtful that we 
currently know that there are phenomena that moral facts are needed to explain—for if 
we did know this, then presumably we would have some moral knowledge.  But if we are 
aware that we do not know that there are phenomena that moral facts are needed to 
explain, then, if we accept EC, we are not within our rights to posit the existence of moral 
facts.  Thus, even if our evidence fails to entail that moral realism is false, the fact that we 
lack moral knowledge does seem to entail (at least, when conjoined with EC) that we 
ought not now accept moral realism. 
 In addition to these worries, there is also the problem of finding plausible non-
doxastic explanatory work for moral facts to do.  If moral facts do not explain our moral 
beliefs and moral sensibility, what other phenomena might there be left for them to 
explain?  One plausible suggestion is that moral facts explain human actions.  Indeed, we 
do sometimes say of a philanthropist, for example, that she donates to charity because it 
is the morally right thing to do.  However, in paradigmatic cases of this sort, we expect 
that the putative moral fact will move the agent to act only if she believes that fact.  More 
concretely, we expect that the fact that donating to charity is morally obligatory will 
move the philanthropist to act only insofar as the philanthropist believes that donating to 
charity is morally obligatory.10  Thus, even if moral facts explain human actions, such 
explanations will be plausible only if those facts also explain our moral beliefs and 
sensibility.  So we are still in search of non-doxastic phenomena that moral facts might 
                                                
10 It is not out of the question that moral facts could influence an agent to act by some kind of subconscious 
process, bypassing her beliefs and moral attitudes.  But surely this would not be an attractive hypothesis if 
we had no evidence that moral facts ever cause an agent to act because she consciously apprehends that 
such a fact.  It would be very strange indeed if moral facts exert a causal influence on our actions but only 
through subconscious processes. 
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plausibly explain.  Unfortunately, outside of human beliefs and human actions, there just 
aren’t any phenomena remaining for which facts about what is morally right or wrong, 
good or bad, etc., might plausibly be needed to explain: moral facts of these sorts are 
certainly not needed to explain planetary motion, plate tectonics, weather patterns, the 
behavior of atomic particles, etc.  If this is right, then assuming EC, the case for 
naturalistic moral realism really does hang on the question of whether putative moral 
facts are needed in the best explanations of our moral beliefs and moral sensibility. 
 
6.3. Anti-Realist Explanations of Moral Theory. 
6.3.1. Non-moral explanations.   
I have suggested that a better version of the moral anti-realists’ argument from 
explanatory impotence would focus on explanations of our having the sort of moral 
sensibility that we have, rather than on proximate explanations of our making this or that 
particular moral judgment.  (It will be useful to speak of an entire community as having a 
moral sensibility or accepting a moral theory.  Presumably, the matter of which moral 
theory a community accepts is some kind of function of facts about which moral theory 
[or moral theories] its individual members accept.)11  The anti-realist’s task is to advance 
a non-moral explanation of our accepting the moral theory that we accept.  In this 
context, an explanation counts as non-moral if it does not make reference to stance-
                                                
11 This idea of a community having a moral sensibility cries out for more elaboration.  A natural question to 
ask, for instance, is what percent of a community’s population must accept theory T in order for T to count 
as giving the content of that community’s moral sensibility?  What should we say when a community that 
accepts T is a sub-community of a larger community, the majority of which accepts a different, 
incompatible moral theory T′?  What should we say if the moral experts in a community accept T, while 
laypersons accept T′?  I must leave these questions unanswered, since I simply do not know how best to 
answer them.  My hope is that the notion of a community’s accepting a moral theory is intuitive enough to 
utilize anyway.  In an effort to avoid some of these difficulties, I recommend that we confine our attention 
to the moral sensibility that characterizes secular members of post-industrial, Western countries.   
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independent moral facts—or, at least, if it makes no use of moral vocabulary.  If a non-
moral explanation of this kind is to play a role in an argument against moral realism, then 
it must be superior to all realism-friendly moral explanations of moral theory that are on 
offer.  That is, it must be superior to all competing explanations that make ineliminable 
reference to moral facts (or that make ineliminable use of moral vocabulary). 
 There are a number of anti-realist, non-moral explanations of moral theory that 
have been proposed.  Some have long pedigrees.  In the first place, there is an old line 
according to which the moral theory that is current in any given society is a mere 
reflection of the interests or preferences of the powerful in that society.  This sort of view 
makes an early appearance in the mouth of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic: 
…[T]he just is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger.  […]  …[E]ach 
government makes laws to its own advantage: democracy makes democratic laws, 
a despotism makes despotic laws, and so with the others, and when they have 
made these laws they declare this to be just for their subjects, that is, their own 
advantage, and they punish him who transgresses the laws as lawless and unjust 
(Plato 1974: 13 [338c-e]). 
 
Although Thrasymachus identifies the property of being a just law with the property of 
being a law that is to the advantage of the strong, the thesis that is of interest here is his 
claim that the content of any polity’s principles of justice is determined by whatever 
considerations the powerful in that polity deem to be to their own advantage.  (Note that 
accepting this latter claim does not commit one to Thrasymacus’s identity claim.)  The 
same kind of view is also advanced by Marx and Engels’ in The German Ideology: 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force.  The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so 
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it.  […]  For each new class which puts itself in the place 
of the one ruling before it, it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its 
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aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, 
that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, 
and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones (1933/1978: 172, 
174, emphasis in the original). 
 
The sort of picture suggested by Marx and Engels is one in which the moral standard 
propagated by the thinkers of a given society is the standard that best (or, at least, largely) 
serves the interests of their social class.  Since only those thinkers that belong to the 
ruling class are in a position to propagate these ideas on a large scale, the moral standard 
that is accepted by a given society will always be reflective of the interests of the ruling 
class.  It is not clear whether Marx and Engels suppose that the adoption of a standard by 
thinkers is a cynical plot.  A more plausible story would have it that their selection of 
these principles is sincere, a mere result of their projecting their personal interests as they 
understand them onto the rest of their compatriots or onto their country as a unified 
whole. 
   If, as Thrasymachus and Marx and Engels suggest, the content of the moral 
principles or the tacit moral theory that we accept really is fixed by whatever happens to 
be in the interests of the powerful in our society, then it would seem to be unnecessary for 
us to invoke stance-independent moral facts in the explanation of why we accept those 
principles.  This is so, at least, provided that there is no problem with the supposition that 
the thinkers of a society project their interests into putatively universally applicable moral 
rules. 
 A similar (although perhaps less crude) kind of non non-moral explanation of 
moral sensibility can be found in the writings of Freud and Nietzsche (Leiter 2001: 83-
85).  On the Freudian picture, roughly, each person’s moral conscience (i.e., moral 
sensibility) arises as a result of her internalizing both the rules and expectations that her 
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parents (or some other external authority) imposes upon her, and the punishments 
expected as a result of breaking these rules (cf. Freud 1931/1961: 83-96; 1933/1965: 71-
100; cf. Nietzsche 1887/1967: 84f).  Again, genuine moral facts are not needed in this 
picture.  Thus, if the Freudian explanation of moral sensibility is the best available, then 
by EC we ought to deny the existence of stance-independent moral facts. 
 
6.3.2. A Darwinian account of moral sensibility.   
Whatever the merits of the aforementioned anti-realist explanations of moral sensibilities, 
it seems to me that the most promising kind of non-moral explanation is of a different 
sort.  In recent years, a number of philosophers have looked to Darwinian natural 
selection in order to explain the content of our moral sensibility.  It should be noted at the 
outset that this sort of explanation is quite compatible with the claim that the sorts of 
considerations mentioned above exert an important influence the content of our moral 
sensibility.  One advantage of the Darwinian account that is worth noting, however, is 
that it offers a plausible explanation not only of the content of our moral sensibility, but 
also of the origin of our concept of moral obligation.   In the remainder of this section, I 
offer a brief sketch of a kind of Darwinian account of our moral sensibility. 
 To start, it must be observed that individual organisms can enhance their 
reproductive fitness12 by cooperating with other individuals.  This is readily evident with 
respect to predatory species that hunt prey that is too strong, too quick, or too endurant 
for a single predator to capture.  Under certain circumstances, predators that cooperate 
                                                
12 There is some disagreement among philosophers of biology concerning how the term ‘fitness’ should be 
understood.  For our purposes, Alan Gibbard’s rough definition should suffice: “An organism’s fitness is its 
expected degree of reproductive success, given its characteristics and its environment”, where “[a]n 
organism’s reproductive success is roughly the number of descendants it has in the distant future” (Gibbard 
1990: 62). 
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will tend to be significantly more successful on hunts than their more solitary 
conspecifics.  Greater success in hunting leads to greater access to nutrition and to a 
greater likelihood of survival.  In turn, this gives the predator more time to breed, and a 
superior ability to provide nutrition for offspring; and these lead to a greater likelihood of 
leaving behind more surviving progeny than would otherwise be possible.  Assuming that 
tendencies to behave cooperatively are heritable, we can expect that the genes responsible 
for cooperative behavior will be even more widely represented in each subsequent 
generation of this predatory species. 
 Two of the mechanisms most commonly cited in evolutionary explanations of 
cooperation are kin selection and reciprocal altruism.  In cases of kin selection, 
cooperative behaviors (and even “self-sacrificing”13 behaviors) are directed at closely 
related family members.  To the extent that such behaviors result in a number of closely 
related family members enjoying greater reproductive fitness, the genes of the sacrificing 
individual will be passed on in greater numbers than would be the case if the individual 
had refrained from cooperating (Hamilton 1964a; 1964b; Ruse 1986/1998: 220).  Where 
a tendency to cooperate arises between non-kin, it is standard to explain this by appeal to 
the mechanism of reciprocal altruism.  In cases of reciprocal altruism, roughly, 
individuals help others at a cost to themselves, but with an “expectation”14 that 
beneficiaries will reciprocate when the tables are turned (Trivers 1971).  The 
reproductive benefits of cooperation accrue to those altruists who limit their helping only 
                                                
13 ‘self-sacrificing’ is in scare quotes here because, from a biological perspective anyway, it is not entirely 
clear that behavior of this sort constitutes a genuine sacrifice.  A parent who dies protecting her young from 
predation, assuming her efforts succeed and her young go on to reproduce themselves, has arguably 
sacrificed nothing from the point of view of reproductive fitness (assuming she could not have lived long 
enough to replace the young that would have perished but for her efforts). 
14 In lower animals, we need not think of the individual’s “expectation” of reciprocity as a propositional 
attitude had by that individual.  What is important is that the individual has a behavioral disposition to 
discontinue behaving altruistically when the altruism is not reciprocated. 
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to reciprocating individuals.  Because cooperating with cheaters (individuals who do not 
reciprocate) imposes a cost in fitness to altruistic individuals, natural selection favors 
those altruists with an ability to detect and exclude (and even punish) such cheaters. 
 Note that, according to the account being sketched here, the proximate 
mechanisms eliciting altruistic behavior in non-human organisms are affective or 
conative states.  At least, this is so in those organisms sophisticated enough to count as 
capable of having such states.  What natural selection gives to these organisms, then, is 
something like a desire to care for one’s kin or to cooperate with those who have helped 
in the past.   
 So far, I have discussed the evolution of cooperative behavior.  I have not said 
anything about the emergence of a genuine moral sensibility.  How might this 
evolutionary account be extended to explain the fact that we make moral judgments and 
accept moral principles?  Several philosophers advancing evolutionary explanations of 
moral thought have suggested that distinctly moral sensibilities evolved in large part as a 
solution for combating the individuals’ temptation to defect from cooperation (Kitcher 
1998: 302ff; Joyce 2006: ch. 4; Ruse 1986/1998: 221ff).  The background for this 
suggestion is this:  Even individuals who are generally cooperative have egoistic desires 
that compete with their altruistic desires and concerns.  Presumably, this is because an 
individual with a mixture of altruistic and egoistic desires and dispositions enjoys an even 
greater reproductive fitness than individuals who behave in a purely altruistic way in all 
circumstances (Kitcher 1998: 299-302).  However, the existence of egoistic desires in an 
individual will sometimes tempt her away from reciprocating, even in those 
circumstances in which it would be to her disadvantage to defect and act selfishly.  
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Indeed, an individual’s failure to reciprocate could be quite costly to her as it may trigger 
nearby altruistic conspecifics to exclude her from future cooperative ventures and, in 
some cases, lead them to form an alliance against her.15  Moreover, in groups in which 
defections from cooperation are common, the cooperative scheme will be less stable than 
that of groups whose members more reliably toe the party line.  This instability both 
limits the size of workable cooperating groups and also results in a need for members to 
invest a large amount of time and effort into peacemaking (Kitcher 1998: 302f).  
Consequently, members of these groups lose out on advantages in reproductive fitness 
that could be theirs, but for a more effective cooperative scheme. 
 According to the evolutionary account of moral judgment, in order to combat 
failures to cooperate in the appropriate circumstances, our hominid ancestors evolved a 
moral sensibility.  On this picture, an individual with a moral sensibility sees certain 
situations as demanding a certain response.  To judge that one morally ought to cooperate 
is not simply to feel an inclination or desire to cooperate (as might be the case with non-
moralizing altruistic animals); it is to see cooperation as something that is required of 
oneself irrespective of what one may happen to desire (Joyce 2006: ch. 2).  In addition, it 
also involves seeing transgressors of moral rules as deserving condemnation or 
punishment (even if that transgressor is oneself).  Important for the account being 
sketched here is the assumption that there is a strong link between the moral judgments 
that an individual makes and her motivation to perform (or refrain from) actions that are 
the subject of such judgments (Blackburn 1988: 363; Gibbard 1990: 76-80; Joyce 2006: 
                                                
15 Some of the philosophers who propose this style of evolutionary story point to studies of chimpanzee 
behavior for clues about the behavior of our primate ancestors.  To the extent that present day chimp 
behavior really can give us some insight into the behavior of our ancestors, Frans de Waal’s research 
provides us with evidence that our pre-moralizing ancestors formed cooperative alliances (see de Waal 
1982). 
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108-118; Street 2006: 157n13).16  What is being claimed, then, is that by seeing certain 
kinds of behavior as morally obligatory, individuals with moral sensibilities turn out to be 
more effective and reliable cooperators than non-moralizers; and, as a result, they enjoy 
greater reproductive fitness. 
 Something needs to be said now about what this account implies about the content 
of our moral sensibilities.  What does this account imply about the matter of which tacit 
moral theory or principles we accept?  No one who advances this evolutionary picture 
claims that the content of our moral sensibilities is wholly determined by natural 
selection.  Most proponents do, however, claim that natural selection has influenced that 
content to a significant extent (Joyce 2006: 140; Ruse 1986/1998: 235-247; Street 2006: 
113-121).17  To begin with, note that, by this picture, altruistic and cooperative behavior 
develops before moral sensibilities emerge.  As we saw, moral sensibility and moral 
judgment evolve as a way of making individuals more effective cooperators.  In light of 
this developmental order, we should expect that the contents of the moral sensibilities of 
the earliest moralizers reflected the cooperative tendencies and preferences that were 
already prevalent among non-moralizing ancestors.  For example, whereas our non-moral 
ancestors felt a strong desire or urge to feed and defend their young, our moralizing 
ancestors would, in addition, judge themselves to be under a moral obligation to do these 
things; they would see such actions as demanded by the situation; and they would see 
                                                
16 This need not—indeed, should not—be read as an assumption of the truth of moral judgment internalism.  
According to (one version of) moral judgment internalism, it is a necessary truth that any agent who judges 
herself to have a moral obligation to φ is to some extent motivated to φ.  I am not assuming anything so 
strong here.  All that is needed for the evolutionary story is the much weaker claim that normal moralizing 
agents, under normal conditions, are to a fairly strong extent motivated to perform the acts they judge 
themselves morally obligated to perform.  Even naturalists who famously deny moral judgment internalism 
have seen fit to grant something like this weaker assumption (e.g., Boyd 1988: 215f; Brink 1989: 49). 
17 One outlier is Kitcher, who writes, “I have made no explicit claims about the emergence of morality from 
proto-morality, but it seems to me overwhelmingly plausible that this history has been guided mainly, if not 
exclusively, by forces of cultural, rather than natural selection” (1998: 305). 
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their own failure to comply with this demand as deserving condemnation.  To the extent 
that non-moralized cooperative dispositions and behaviors were the result of natural 
selection, then, it is plausible to suppose that the content of the moral sensibilities of our 
earliest moralizing ancestors were greatly influenced by natural selection as well.  Indeed, 
it should be observed that the basic contours of our own moral sensibility seem to favor 
kinds of behavior that would likely have enhanced the reproductive fitness of early 
humans, if not ourselves.  To extend the previous example, we tend to judge that our 
moral obligations to aid our own children are much more stringent than our obligations to 
aid the children of strangers.  It is not hard to see how agents who incorporate this 
judgment into their sensibility are likely to have greater reproductive success than those 
who do not.18 
 It is worth reiterating that this evolutionary account of the origin of our moral 
sensibility does not preclude the claim that other factors, such as cultural forces and the 
sorts of factors mentioned in §6.3.1, have exerted an influence its content as well.  The 
evolutionary account, for example, is consistent with Philip Kitcher’s proposal that the 
content of our moral sensibility has been largely shaped by a process of cultural 
evolution (as opposed to evolution by natural selection): 
During at least fifteen thousand years, different lineages of our Paleolithic and 
Neolithic ancestors explored virtually all the systems of rules and ideals for 
regulating conduct that have figured in the every day conduct of most people 
(including most contemporary people).  Many of these systems did badly in 
cultural competition: the groups that adopted them were not very good at 
transmitting their ideas to contemporaries and descendants.  The systems that 
survived were absorbed in later moral practices and figured in the codes that 
emerge in the Mesopotamian and Egyptian texts.  Cultural evolution continued as 
                                                
18 I borrow this example from Ruse (1986/1998: 238-242) and Street (2006: 115).  For more examples of 
moral judgments that appear likely to enhance the reproductive fitness of individuals who tend to make or 
subscribe to them, see Street’s paper. 
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the central themes are transmitted to the Hebrews and Greeks (Kitcher 2005: 
174).19 
 
Note also that the evolutionary account is compatible with the claim that content of our 
current moral sensibility has been greatly influenced by the kind of coherence reasoning 
favored by many contemporary ethicists (such as Boyd [1988], Brink [1989], Daniels 
[1979], Sturgeon [2002], and Rawls [1971/1999]).  This is consistent with the 
evolutionary account insofar as it is allowed that the content of the moral sensibility had 
by our earliest moralizing ancestors serves as the starting point from which coherence 
reasoning (thought of as a collective social enterprise) began. 
 
6.3.3. From the Darwinian account to moral anti-realism.   
Most importantly, it should be observed that in the evolutionary account sketched above, 
no mention is made of genuine, stance-independent moral facts (Blackburn 1988: 363; 
Gibbard 1990: ch. 6; Joyce 2006: ch. 6; Kitcher 2005: 175; Ruse 1986/1998: 250-256; 
Street 2006: 125-135).  According to this account, the capacity for moral judgment did 
not confer advantages on our ancestors because it allowed them to detect important facts 
about their environment that were awaiting discovery; rather, the advantages were reaped 
because of the effect that this capacity had on restraining certain behaviors that were 
maladaptive or otherwise risky from the point of view of reproductive fitness.  The moral 
sensibilities of our ancestors could fulfill this function (of motivating adaptive behaviors) 
even if there were no facts that their sensibilities represented.  Because this evolutionary 
explanation of our moral sensibility and its contents does not require that we posit the 
                                                
19 Another proponent of cultural evolution as a mechanism for shaping moral norms is Shaun Nichols.  In 
his (2002), he argues that moral (and other) norms that prohibit actions that tend to elicit negative emotions 
have a higher likelihood of surviving to later generations than those that do not.  
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existence of stance-independent moral facts, it follows that, if it offers the best available 
explanation of our moral sensibility, and if we accept EC, then we must accept an anti-
realist construal of moral inquiry.   
  
6.3.4. Evidence favoring the Darwinian explanation of moral theory.    
Of course, the account I have sketched here is speculative.  It is also coarse-grained and 
incomplete.  Why believe that it, or something sufficiently close to it, is correct?  A fully 
satisfactory answer to this question would require a comparison with competing 
hypotheses about the origin and content of our moral sensibility.  Unfortunately, there 
isn’t the space to pursue such a task here, at least with respect to all the competing non-
moral explanations of moral sensibility that might be adduced.  I will, however, address 
one realist hypothesis below in §6.4.1.  But before turning to that hypothesis, I want to 
indicate several considerations that reflect favorably on the present hypothesis, even if 
they fall far short of confirming it.   
 In the first place, as Richard Joyce observes,  the tendency to make moral 
judgments “exists in all human societies we have ever heard of” and “exists in virtually 
every human individual,” and develops within “virtually every human 
individual…without formal instruction, with no deliberate effort, and with no conscious 
awareness of its special features” (2006: 134, 135).  According to Joyce, these 
observations “strongly suggest that the tendency to make moral judgments is innate” 
(ibid. 137).  The evolutionary account nicely explains how such an innate tendency might 
arise.  Indeed, it is hard to see how anything other than a Darwinian account even could 
187 
plausibly explain the innateness of this (or any other) tendency, given a commitment to 
metaphysical naturalism.20 
 A second consideration favoring the evolutionary hypothesis is this:  According to 
this account, human moral sensibility developed out of the conative states of our pre-
moral ancestors.  If it should turn out that our own moral judgments are driven largely by 
emotion, this would seem to favor the evolutionary account over those accounts that 
suggest that our moral sensibilities developed as a matter of detecting stance-independent 
facts (Joyce 2006: 128, 130).  As it happens, the psychological evidence seems to 
indicate that emotion is the driving force behind moral judgment (see, for example, Haidt 
2001). 
 Finally, the evidence from primatology seems to favor the evolutionary story.  
Present-day chimpanzees exhibit an impressive array of altruistic and cooperative 
behaviors (de Waal 1982).  This fact gives us some reason to expect that our non-
moralizing hominid ancestors had affective dispositions that produced altruistic behavior.  
If so, it is hard to see why we should doubt that these dispositions have survived in us and 
have exerted an influence on our present-day moral and evaluative judgments. 
 I believe that the considerations mentioned above give us reason to conclude that 
the evolutionary account, or something relevantly like it, is (at the very least) a contender 
for the title of best available explanation of our current moral sensibility (at least, when 
this account is supplemented with a description of further cultural influences, including 
                                                
20 I can think of only two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that God implants these tendencies 
in our minds at birth.  The second is something like a Platonic theory of recollection: these tendencies were 
acquired in past lives and are merely “recollected” by each living human.  Setting aside the question of 
whether these hypotheses are plausible (it is not at all clear how one could recollect a tendency, as opposed 
to a proposition), neither seem compatible with naturalism, at least granting widely held assumptions that 
many naturalists accept (viz., that neither God nor past lives are needed in the best explanations of our 
observations).  
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our engaging in coherence moral reasoning).  It should be noted that, because it does not 
require that we posit the existence of moral facts, this evolutionary explanation is very 
likely to be more parsimonious than any explanation of our moral sensibility that would 
be more congenial to moral realism.  Consequently, even if the realist is able to produce 
an account that is equally plausible, the evolutionary story would retain a theoretical 
advantage since it requires us to posit fewer kinds of entities than a realism-friendly 
explanation would require.  In that case, the best explanation of our moral sensibility 
would not require that we posit the existence of stance-independent moral facts; and so, 
in accordance with EC, we should reject moral realism. 
 
6.4. Return of the Tu Quoque? 
6.4.1. Tracking accounts of moral sensibility.   
How might a moral realist reply to this revised argument from explanatory impotence?  
He could reject EC, of course.  But as we saw in §6.1, this maneuver is not available to 
ethical naturalists.21  Another line of reply would deny that the evolutionary account 
sketched above offers the best available explanation of the origin and content of our 
moral sensibility.  For this strategy to be persuasive, the realist needs to offer his own 
competing account of the development of our moral sensibility.  Such a story must have it 
that our ancestors’ moral sensibilities (or proto-moral sensibilities) were shaped by and 
                                                
21 But even if a realist rejects EC and accepts ethical non-naturalism, it is far from clear that the threat 
posed by the evolutionary account of moral sensibility has been defused.  The non-naturalist would still 
owe an account of the epistemic processes or mechanisms by which we transcend the influences of 
evolution on our moral sensibilities in order to grasp the non-natural moral facts.  The non-naturalist cannot 
simply allow that our present moral knowledge is merely the result of our subjecting our innate moral 
sensibility to coherence reasoning.  For, in that case, we would have no reason to think that our moral 
beliefs accurately represent the non-natural facts.  Thus, while the evolutionary account of moral inquiry is 
not per se incompatible with non-naturalistic realism, it certainly seems to encourage moral skepticism. 
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responsive to stance-independent moral facts.  Following Sharon Street (2006), we can 
call accounts of this sort tracking accounts of moral sensibility. 
 There are at least two salient forms that tracking accounts of moral sensibility 
might take.  In one form, it is conceded that humans and their ancestors have innate moral 
sensibilities.  Such an account, presumably, would take the form of an alternative 
evolutionary story.  According to this kind of story, the ability to detect moral facts 
conferred a reproductive advantage on our ancestors and, thus, developed as a result of 
natural selection.  A tracking account need not suppose that humans evolved an innate 
moral sensibility, however.  One might argue, instead, that we are able to detect—and, 
thus, track—moral facts using the same cognitive equipment that we use to detect non-
moral facts.  According to this kind of tracking account, we are able to perceive moral 
facts either through direct observation, or else by abductively inferring them from our 
observations. 
 With respect to tracking accounts of the latter sort, I take it that there is little hope 
that our moral sensibilities could have arisen by way of direct perception of moral facts.22  
The more promising question to pursue is whether we might have arrived at our current 
moral sensibility by way of abductive inference from our observations of non-moral 
facts.  To ask this, in essence, is to ask whether moral facts are needed in the best 
explanations of observable phenomena—where the phenomena in question are something 
other than the mere fact that we have a moral sensibility.23  I will consider whether there 
                                                
22 Even if we allow that there are cases of moral perception, as Sturgeon notes, those perceptions would 
depend upon the existence of a background moral theory (perhaps tacitly) held by the agent (1985a; Boyd 
1988).  But in that case, the perceptions of moral facts cannot be the explanation for the development of our 
moral sensibility; the existence of the sensibility is ontologically prior to our supposed moral perceptions. 
23 The reason for this exclusion is that the very purpose of our search for explanandum is in order to show 
that moral facts figure in the best explanation of our sensibility.  If we include the existence and content of 
our sensibility among the possible explanandum, the tracking account that emerges will be circular.  The 
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is any serious abductive work for moral facts to do in Chapter 7.  My discussion there 
centers on the question of whether moral theories yield interesting empirical predictions; 
nevertheless, the very same putative predictions double as examples of phenomena that 
are potentially best explained by moral facts.  
 Let us turn our attention, then, to the innate sensibility version of the tracking 
account.  The trouble for this kind of account is that there does not yet exist a plausible 
story of how the capacity to detect stance-independent moral facts (and to recognize them 
as moral facts)24 might have conferred a reproductive advantage on organisms.  Nor is it 
easy to see how an illuminating story of this kind might go.  But even if we were 
confident that one could be given, it must be noted that it would have to be noticeably 
superior in certain respects to the anti-realist’s account sketched in §6.3.  As we saw, the 
anti-realist’s explanation does not require that we posit the existence of moral facts.  
Because of this, it is more parsimonious than any tracking account of moral sensibility 
that might be offered.  Consequently, a viable tracking account will need to be superior to 
the anti-realist account in some other respect, if it is to lay claim to the title of the best 
explanation of our moral sensibility.25 
                                                                                                                                            
account would say, in essence, that the evidence for holding that moral facts are needed to best explain our 
moral sensibility is the fact that we need to posit such facts in the best explanation of our sensibility. 
24 This qualification is needed because, again, some naturalists identify moral properties with natural 
properties such as maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain.  I contend that it is not enough that a 
tracking account provides some story about how the ability to detect whether something maximizes the 
balance of pleasure over pain yields a reproductive advantage.  A creature with no moral sensibility 
whatsoever could be a flawless detector of this kind of fact.  Because of this, it should be clear that an 
explanation merely of how we detect natural properties of this sort will not suffice to explain how our 
ancestors developed their moral sensibility.  What is needed is a story about how the supposed fact that a 
natural property of this sort is identical with moral rightness played a role in the evolution of our supposed 
ability to recognize this property “under the guise” of rightness.  The question, then, is this: “how and why 
did the ability to see a property such as maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain as right-making 
increase the reproductive fitness of creatures with this ability?” 
25 Street makes the same point in her (2006: 129) 
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 In light of the high bar of theoretical success that any tracking account of moral 
sensibility must meet, it seems that, while we await the development of such an account, 
we are justified in being pessimistic about its prospects for success.  Let us turn our 
attention, then, to a different kind of response to the revised argument from explanatory 
impotence.  
 
6.4.2. Debunking explanations of scientific thought. 
As we saw in §6.2.3, Harman’s original argument from explanatory impotence is 
vulnerable to a tu quoque reply.  I have suggested that the revised argument from 
explanatory impotence, which incorporates an evolutionary explanation of moral 
sensibility, is not vulnerable to this sort of reply on behalf of moral realism: whereas the 
revised explanatory impotence argument shows that moral facts are not needed in the best 
a posteriori explanations of our moral sensibility, a similar line of reasoning cannot be 
used to show that scientific or theoretical facts (e.g., facts about the existence and nature 
of theoretical entities such as protons, electrons, quarks, etc.) are not needed in our best a 
posteriori explanations of our accepting the scientific theories that we accept.  But 
perhaps this is not so.  Perhaps the same kind of argument could be employed in the 
service of scientific anti-realism.  If it could, this would show that the argument from 
explanatory impotence cannot be wielded against moral realism by philosophers such as 
Harman and me, who accept scientific realism (i.e., realism about the sorts of facts and 
entities posited by our best scientific theories). 
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6.4.3. Railton’s evolutionary tu quoque.   
In response to evolutionary explanatory impotence arguments of the kind that I sketched 
in §6.3, Peter Railton writes: 
…[T]his seemingly hard-headed argument is really more of a threat to itself than 
to morality.  For it presupposes a normative premise that it tends by its own 
reasoning to undercut.  Why is it ‘facing facts’ to force moralists to confront 
theories of natural selection? – Because these theories are epistemically well 
confirmed.  Who confirmed them, and how? – Humans did, by using scientific 
methods.  But this assumes that humans are psychologically and socially equipped 
to carry out scientific inquiry, to produce and test hypotheses in ways that yield 
impartial epistemic justification, despite the fact that our perceptual, cognitive, 
linguistic, and deliberative capacities have all been shaped by a process of natural 
selection in which opportunism—not impartiality, warrant or truth—rules.  Why, 
then, isn’t human epistemic pretense illusory?  The hard-headed argument 
hammers itself into the same ground into which it had previously pounded 
morality (2000: 57). 
 
This counter to the evolutionary explanatory impotence argument fails.  There is no doubt 
that Railton is correct that our perceptual, cognitive, linguistic, and deliberative capacities 
have been shaped by natural selection.  The trouble is that, unlike the case of moral 
thought, there is simply no plausible story to tell about the evolution of these capacities 
according to which they enhanced reproductive fitness without delivering (or at least 
facilitating) a roughly accurate representation of reality to the organisms that have them.  
This is most obvious in the case of perception.  The capacity to experience perceptual 
representations of a prey animal in location L won’t enhance a predator’s reproductive 
fitness much unless this perception regularly correlates with a prey’s actually being in L.  
This example suggests that the best evolutionary explanation of our perceptual faculties 
will be a tracking account.  Indeed, it is hard to see how any non-tracking explanation 
could even be plausible. 
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 A similar thing can be said of our basic inferential capacities.  Assuming that our 
basic inferential capacities were formed by a process of natural selection, we need some 
explanation of how it is that these capacities enhanced the reproductive fitness of our 
evolutionary ancestors.26  It seems to me that there is reason for optimism about tracking 
accounts on this front as well.  To begin with, it is at the very least doubtful that a 
tendency to make mostly false inductive inferences could have enhanced reproductive 
fitness.  It is almost certain that such a tendency would instead diminish a creature’s 
fitness.  Quine is surely correct when he writes, “Creatures inveterately wrong in their 
inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing for their 
kind” (Quine 1969: 126).  If this is right, then to the extent that natural selection explains 
our having the inferential tendencies that we have, it is most likely the evolutionary 
pressure has been directed towards producing largely accurate or cogent inductive 
inferences.27 
 Richard Joyce, responding to the same passage from Railton, makes a similar 
point with respect to basic arithmetical beliefs.  Suppose that simple arithmetical beliefs, 
such as 1 + 1 = 2 are innate, and thus, are likely the result of natural selection.28  Even if 
                                                
26 It is possible, of course, that our inferential capacities are a “spandrel”, a mere by-product of some 
different trait that was selected for.  All I want to suggest below, however, is that, to the extent that a 
capacity to make inferences is fitness-enhancing, the most likely account will be one in which the degree to 
which this capacity is fitness-enhancing is positively correlated with the degree to which it produces 
accurate conclusions. 
27 To avoid misunderstanding, note that I am not suggesting that natural selection has produced (or must 
produce) in us perfectly accurate inferential tendencies that are reliable no matter what sort of physical 
environment we may find ourselves in.  Indeed, it is well known that human beings have a number of 
inferential habits that are unreliable in many contexts.  But this should not discourage us from thinking that 
that our inferences are often fairly reliable—or at any rate, that they are not “inveterately wrong.”  (For a 
discussion of human inferential failures, see Nisbett and Ross [1980]). 
28 Although Joyce cites evidence for the view that “natural selection has provided humans with an inbuilt 
faculty for simple arithmetic,” he does not claim that the belief that 1 + 1 =2 in particular is innate.  The 
innateness of this belief is assumed merely for the purposes of illustration (Joyce 2006: 182). 
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we conclude that these beliefs really have come to us via natural selection, Joyce argues, 
it does not follow that we have reason to doubt their accuracy: 
…[W]e have no grasp of how this belief might have been selected for, how it 
might have enhanced reproductive fitness, independent of its truth.  False 
mathematical beliefs just aren’t going to be very useful.  Suppose you are being 
chased by three lions, you observe two quit the chase, and you conclude that it is 
now safe to slow down (Joyce 2006:182). 
 
Joyce does not treat his readers to an ending to this little illustration, but his point is 
obvious: the creature that fails to conclude that three lions in pursuit minus two leaves 
one lion still giving chase does not live another day to reproduce.  The upshot here is that, 
if basic mathematical beliefs come to us via natural selection, then any plausible 
genealogy of those beliefs will be a tracking account.  It is hard to see how a tendency to 
draw largely false mathematical beliefs would enhance the reproductive fitness of 
organisms. 
 I conclude then, that in the absence of further argument, the fact that the cognitive 
capacities grounding our scientific practices have been shaped by natural selection gives 
us no reason to worry that these capacities fail to deliver a roughly accurate picture of 
reality.  Furthermore, the fact that these capacities have an evolutionary genealogy gives 
us no reason to worry that the scientific practices we have built on top of them are not 
truth-conducive.   
 
6.4.4. The social-historical case against scientific realism.   
Moral realists looking for debunking arguments against scientific realism to use in a tu 
quoque reply to the moral anti-realist revised argument from explanatory impotence 
might expect more success by co-opting the arguments that scientific anti-realists have 
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themselves offered.  Recall that the revised argument from explanatory impotence rests 
on the fact that the best explanation of how we arrived at our current moral sensibility is 
one that does not require the positing of stance-independent moral facts; the forces 
shaping our moral sensibility do not in any obvious way depend upon—nor do they seem 
to be responsive to—supposed moral facts themselves.  Some opponents of scientific 
realism have made a similar charge about our current scientific theories: the best 
explanations of how we arrived at our present day scientific theories do not require that 
we posit the existence of mind-independent theoretical facts and entities.  Because of this, 
it is argued that we are unjustified in believing that our current scientific theories are 
stance-independently true. 
 The scientific anti-realist’s argument begins with the claim that the choice of 
which theory to accept from a range of alternatives is underdetermined by our 
observational evidence.  For any theory T1 that accurately accounts for the observable 
data, it is possible to construct another theory T2 that accounts for the same data but 
avoids a commitment to the unobservable entities posited by T1.  Because of this, our 
acceptance of a given theory out of a range of possible alternatives must always rest on 
something beyond that theory’s mere success in conforming to the observable data.  The 
anti-realist argues that the sorts of factors that lead us to accept of a given theory over its 
“empirically equivalent” rivals—that is, over rival theories that issue the same predictions 
about observable phenomena29—are epistemically irrelevant: they fail to justify us in 
thinking that our preferred theory, rather than its empirically equivalent rivals, is stance-
independently true.  In this vein, Thomas Kuhn writes, 
                                                
29 I draw this definition of ‘empirical equivalence’ from Boyd (1983: 46; cf. Boyd 1982: 618).  
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Observation and experience can and must drastically restrict the range of 
admissible scientific belief, else there would be no science.  But they cannot alone 
determine a particular body of such belief.  An apparently arbitrary element, 
compounded of personal and historical accident, is always a formative ingredient 
of the beliefs espoused by a given scientific community at a given time.” 
(1962/1996: 4). 
 
 What sorts of arbitrary and accidental factors might have influenced the 
acceptance of our scientific theories?  In the most extreme formulation of this kind of 
argument, the anti-realist claims that the major factors determining theory acceptance are 
political, ideological, and/or personal.  Convincing examples in which some area of 
scientific research and its conclusions is driven by these considerations are not hard to 
find.  It hardly comes as a surprise to us that environmental research funded by petroleum 
companies or right-wing think tanks tend to conclude either that global warming is not 
anthropogenic, or else that it is not as serious a threat to the interests of mankind as other 
scientists claim.  It is plausible to suppose that these conclusions have more to do with 
the financial interests of petroleum companies and the political ideology of right-wing 
think tanks than they have to do with stance-independent facts about the real trajectory 
and causes of global warming.  (Or perhaps this example gets it backwards.  Some on the 
right contend that environmental research in the academy is driven less by the quest for 
truth than by the desire of left-wing academics to provide a rationale against unfettered 
capitalism.)30  Another putative example of this phenomenon is provided by evolutionary 
psychology.  Critics argue that the conclusions arrived at by evolutionary psychologists—
namely, claims to the effect that certain psychological traits are innate and the result of 
natural selection—are little more than an attempt to justify existing power structures.  
                                                
30 Thus, Ayn Rand writes, “The immediate goal [of environmentalists] is obvious: the destruction of the 
remnants of capitalism in today’s mixed economy, and the establishment of a global dictatorship” (Rand 
1971/1999: 280). 
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Along these lines, the Sociobiology Study Group writes, “It is not surprising that the 
model of society that turns out to be ‘natural’ bears a remarkable resemblance to the 
institutions of modern market society, since the theorists who produce these models are 
themselves privileged members of just such a society” (1977: 133).   
In general, the greater the role that ideological considerations of these sorts play 
in the best explanations of our collective acceptance of current scientific theories, the less 
of a need there is to posit the approximate truth of these theories in order to explain our 
acceptance. 
 Other putatively non-epistemic factors that influence the acceptance of scientific 
theories make for a somewhat less cynical case against scientific realism.  Among the 
factors that determine theory acceptance, according to Kuhn, are “aesthetic” (or 
“pragmatic”) considerations.  For example, we change our allegiance from one theory to 
another because we judge the new theory to be “simpler” or more “elegant.”  Citing 
factors of this sort is especially needed to explain theory acceptance in cases where a 
scientist must choose between two or more empirically equivalent theories.  The trouble 
that this phenomenon poses for the scientific realist is that, according to his anti-realist 
opponents, the aesthetic or pragmatic features of a theory are of no epistemic 
significance: 
In so far as they go beyond consistency, empirical adequacy, and empirical 
strength, [pragmatic considerations] do not concern the relation between the 
theory and the world, but rather the use and usefulness of the theory; they provide 
reasons to prefer the theory independently of questions of truth (van Fraassen 
1980: 88).  
 
More than this, judgments about which theory is simpler or more elegant are sometimes 
held to be subjective, admitting of no single correct standard.  Because choices about 
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which theory to accept are made by appeal to these subjective aesthetic standards, there 
are no grounds for saying that one scientist’s favorite theory has a greater claim to being 
correct than another scientist’s favorite theory, at least where those theories are 
empirically equivalent.  Because of this, Kuhn writes, “There is no neutral algorithm for 
theory choice, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead each 
individual in the group to the same decision” (1969/1996: 200, cf. 184ff). 
 For the scientific anti-realist of this stripe, then, the best explanation of why we 
currently accept the scientific theories that we do does not require that we understand 
those theories to be approximately stance-independently true.  The best explanation of 
why we accept a theory T1 over its empirically equivalent rivals must cite primarily 
aesthetic, personal, or political factors.  However, these factors could motivate our 
adoption of T1 even while some other theory T2 is true (where T2 has different 
ontological commitments from T1).  Because of this, have no reason to suppose that the 
entities posited by T1 are part of the best explanation of our accepting T1.  Thus, in light 
of EC, we are not justified in positing the existence of the theoretical entities that our 
current scientific theories apparently commit us to (e.g., protons, quarks, electromagnetic 
fields, etc.).  If this kind of argument is no less compelling than the argument of §6.3, 
then we must conclude that the revised explanatory impotence argument against moral 
realism fails to avoid the realist’s tu quoque complaint.  Either the moral anti-realist must 
also reject scientific realism—which he is loath to do—or else he must concede that the 
revised explanatory impotence argument against moral realism is a failure. 
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6.5. Breaking the Tu Quoque: The Case for Scientific Realism. 
6.5.1. Overview.   
Are the anti-realists’ explanations of our current scientific theory really the best 
available?  According to one standard argument in favor of scientific realism, they are 
not: anti-realists cannot provide satisfactory explanations of the “success” of scientific 
theories and scientific practice.  The scientific realist contends that the best explanation 
for the success of science is that our current scientific theories are approximately true and 
that the putative entities to which theoretical terms putatively refer really exist.  This 
argument—the so-called “ultimate argument” for scientific realism—has been advanced, 
in one form or another, by Boyd (1982), Kitcher (2001), Jarrett Leplin (1997), Alan 
Musgrave (1988), Hilary Putnam (1975c), and J.J.C. Smart (1963), among others.  If 
successful, this argument would block the tu quoque reply to the revised argument from 
explanatory impotence against moral realism.  In §6.5.2 and §6.5.3 I present what could 
be called the standard version of this argument for scientific realism.  In §6.5.4 I go on to 
present Boyd’s own particular version the argument.  In §6.5.5 I consider the prospects 
for the revised explanatory impotence argument against moral realism, should all forms 
of the ultimate argument for scientific realism fail. 
 
6.5.2. The standard case for scientific realism.   
Scientific realism can be understood roughly as the view that there are theoretical facts 
(e.g., facts about unobservable, theoretical entities posited by scientific theories) and that 
these facts obtain independently of the beliefs and theories of scientists (and others).  
Boyd adds to this characterization the further claim that “scientific theories should be 
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understood as putative descriptions of” these theory-independent facts (1988: 181).  
Assuming that our current physical theories are (approximately) true, we should 
understand the scientific realist to be committed to the claim that there exist things such 
as protons, neutrons, and electrons, and that the existence of these things—and the 
properties that they have—depend neither on our believing that they exist, nor on the fact 
that we would believe that they exist were we in ideal epistemic conditions.   
 The standard version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism begins with 
the premise that our current scientific theories are instrumentally reliable to a high 
degree.  As Boyd characterizes it, the instrumental reliability of a theory is a measure of 
“its ability to provide…approximately accurate predictions about the behavior of 
observable phenomena” (1982: 616).  For example, the theory of relativity is 
instrumentally reliable to a certain extent in virtue of its ability to predict accurately the 
deflection of light passing by the Sun and to predict accurately the perihelion precession 
of Mercury (Leplin 1997: 78-80; Will 1986: chh. 3, 4).  Several philosophers who 
advance the ultimate argument emphasize the importance of “novel” predictions when it 
comes to assessing the instrumental reliability of a theory.  Following Musgrave, we can 
say, roughly, that “a predicted fact is a novel fact for a theory if it was not used to 
construct that theory—where a fact is used to construct a theory if it figures in the 
premises from which that theory was deduced” (Musgrave 1988: 232; cf. Boyd 1983: 54; 
Leplin 1997: 77).31  By this characterization, the theory of relativity’s prediction of the 
Sun’s deflection of light and Mercury’s perihelion precession count as novel.32  By 
                                                
31 I would also include Paul Thagard’s discussion of “conservative dynamic consilience” as an endorsement 
of novel prediction as an important element of theory confirmation (Thagard 1978: 83f). 
32 As Leplin characterizes novel prediction, the Sun’s deflection counts as novel for the theory of relativity, 
but the precession of Mercury’s perihelion does not.  He takes the latter prediction to be non-novel because 
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contrast, the predictions of the Ptolemaic model of the solar system concerning the 
positions of the Sun, Moon, and planets do not count as novel; for the Ptolemaic theory 
was constructed precisely in order to fit the known data concerning the recurring 
positions of such bodies.33  Consequently, to the extent that these latter sorts of 
predictions allow us to say that the Ptolemaic theory is instrumentally reliable at all, we 
should say they confer on it only a modest degree of instrumental reliability. 
 The more controversial premise figuring in the scientific realists’ ultimate 
argument is this: the best—indeed, the only credible—explanation for the high degree of 
instrumental reliability exhibited by our current scientific theories is that such theories are 
approximately (stance-independently) true.  More specifically, the claim is that the best 
(and perhaps the only plausible) explanation of the instrumental reliability of our 
scientific theories is that the central theoretical terms utilized by those theories 
successfully refer to stance-independent theoretical entities, and that these entities by and 
large have the properties that our theories ascribe to them.  In short, in order to best 
explain the instrumental reliability of our current scientific theories, we must construe 
these theories realistically.  Along these lines, scientific realists write: 
If the phenomenalist [i.e., anti-realist] about theoretical entities is correct we must 
believe in a cosmic coincidence.  That is, if this is so, statements about electrons, 
etc., are of only instrumental value: they simply enable us to predict phenomena 
                                                                                                                                            
it fails his “uniqueness condition,” which requires that no existing plausible alternative theory predicts a 
qualitatively similar result.  Because Newtonian theory also predicted a precession of Mercury’s 
perihelion—albeit with less quantitative accuracy than relativity does—the prediction of the precession by 
the theory of relativity is not unique, and so not novel according to Leplin’s account.  By contrast, although 
Newtonian theory could also be used to predict the bending of light, it required discredited auxiliary 
hypotheses about the nature of light to do so.  For this reason, Leplin claims that relativity’s prediction of 
the bending of light passing by the Sun satisfies his uniqueness condition for novelty (Leplin 1997: 77-80). 
33 To ward off objections, I recommend that we read Musgrave’s criterion of novelty as concerning fact-
types, rather than fact-tokens.  Because every prediction is directed towards hitherto unobserved future 
token-events, there is a trivial sense in which no interesting fact that we could care to predict figures in the 
premises of a putatively empirical theory.  (In this vein, a defender of Ptolemy could object that her 
successful predictions about an eclipse that is to occur in 2024 ought to count as novel, since Ptolemaic 
astronomers could not have appealed to this token-fact in the construction of their theory.) 
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on the level of galvanometers and cloud chambers.  They do nothing to remove 
the surprising character of these phenomena.  […] On the other hand, if we 
interpret a theory in a realist way, then we have no need for such a cosmic 
coincidence: it is not surprising that galvanometers and cloud chambers behave in 
the sort of way they do, for if there really are electrons, etc., this is just what we 
should expect (Smart 1963: 39). 
 
The positive argument for [scientific] realism is that it is the only philosophy that 
doesn’t make the success of science a miracle.  That terms in mature scientific 
theories typically refer…, that the theories accepted in a mature science are 
typically approximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even 
when it occurs in different theories – these statements are viewed by the scientific 
realist not as necessary truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of the 
success of science, and hence as part of any adequate scientific description of 
science and its relations to its objects (Putnam 1975c: 73). 
 
[The ultimate argument for scientific realism] is, I suggest, an inference to the 
best explanation.  The fact to be explained is the (novel) predictive success of 
science.  And the claim is that realism (more precisely the conjecture that the 
realist aim for science has actually been achieved) explains this fact, explains it 
satisfactorily, and explains it better than any non-realist philosophy of science.  
And the conclusion is that it is reasonable to accept scientific realism…as true 
(Musgrave 1988: 239, emphasis in the original). 
 
 I find the scientific realist’s argument persuasive.  But there are at least two 
concerns that deserve to be addressed.  The first concerns the notion of “approximate” 
truth.  The second concerns the extent to which the standard version of the ultimate 
argument addresses the scientific anti-realist’s objections surrounding the use of non-
epistemic considerations when deciding between theories.  I will address these concerns 
in the next two sections. 
 
6.5.3. Approximate truth.   
If the ultimate argument is to be plausible, it must be formulated utilizing the notion of 
approximate truth rather than precise truth, or truth simpliciter.  Boyd writes that “No 
realist conception that does not treat theoretical knowledge and theoretical progress as 
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involving approximations to the truth is even prima facie compatible with the actual 
history of science” (1990: 216).  Perhaps what Boyd has in mind is the sort of worry 
described by Thomas Weston: 
The history of science provides abundant evidence for what Newton-Smith calls 
the “dismal induction”: Theories which have gained and deserved acceptance 
have almost always turned out to be false.  Past experience would indicate that 
even if a theory is sufficiently supported to warrant acceptance, the probability 
that it is precisely true is roughly zero (Weston 1992: 54). 
 
In addition, Leplin, who cashes out the notion of approximate truth in terms of “accuracy 
of representation,” notes that “there is no reason to suppose that complete or 
unimprovable accuracy of representation is required for the explanatory or predictive 
adequacy of the mechanism that a theory postulates” (1997: 103).  If he is correct, then a 
scientific realist could not claim that the only plausible explanation for the instrumental 
reliability of our current scientific theories is that these theories are precisely true.  Such a 
claim would be much stronger than the evidence warrants.  Thus, the key premise (and 
the conclusion) of the ultimate argument must be formulated in terms of approximate—
rather than precise—truth. 
 The ultimate argument for scientific realism cannot succeed, then, unless we can 
make sense of the notion of approximate truth.  Unfortunately, the notion of approximate 
truth is both controversial and difficult to formalize.  Here are several attempts at a rough 
account of approximate truth: 
 [A sentence] P is approximately true at [world] u if and only if P is true in some 
world similar to (or close to) u (Hilpinen 1976: 24)34 
 
…[T]o talk of respects of approximation to the truth is to talk of respects of 
similarity and difference between actual causal situations and certain possible 
ones (Boyd 1990: 239). 
 
                                                
34 In the original, Hilpinen italicizes the entire sentence.  I have removed those italics. 
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The basic idea of the definition of approximate truth is that a statement will be 
approximately true under interpretation I if there is an interpretation J which is 
“near” I, and under which it is actually true (Weston 1992: 60f). 
 
A realist interpretation attributes some measure of truth to the theory, where truth 
is understood as accuracy of representation.  As accuracy comes in degrees, it is 
natural to speak of “partial” or “approximate” truth, or of truth in “some measure” 
(Leplin 1997: 103) 
 
Roughly, we may say that a theory is approximately true just in case the processes and 
mechanisms that it posits and describes are “sufficiently similar” to actual processes and 
mechanisms in the world.  This is not the place to attempt a defense or formalization of 
approximate truth (for the latter, see Hilpinen [1976] and Weston [1987]).  Fortunately, in 
the context of the current dialectic, a defense is not needed.  We have already seen that 
Boyd is committed to the legitimacy of approximate truth in his defense of scientific 
realism.  More importantly, both he and the rest of the principal defenders of synthetic 
ethical naturalism make use of the notion of approximate truth in their defenses of moral 
realism (Boyd 1988: 201, 207, 209; Brink 1984: 24; 1989: 129, 299; 1999: 207; Sturgeon 
1985a: 67f, 72; 1986a: 73f; 1992: 99, 108; 2006a: 254f).  In the present context, then, the 
legitimacy of approximate truth is not in question.  If approximate truth should turn out to 
be an unworkable notion, then so much the worse for the naturalist’s case for moral 
realism. 
 
6.5.4. Non-epistemic methodological principles and Boyd’s version of the ultimate 
argument.   
Boyd agrees the standard version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism succeeds 
in showing that there is something wrong with the denial of scientific realism.  He 
observes, however, that the argument does not offer a direct rebuttal to the scientific anti-
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realist’s argument that our reliance on non-epistemic methodological principles in 
deciding between empirically equivalent theories implies that we are unwarranted in 
supposing our preferred theories are approximately true.  A satisfactory version of the 
ultimate argument should address this claim (Boyd 1983: 54). 
 In advancing his own version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism, 
Boyd contends that it is not merely the instrumental reliability of scientific theories that 
needs explaining, but also the instrumental reliability of scientific methods.  For Boyd, a 
collection of methodological principles is instrumentally reliable to the degree that the 
implementation of these methods tends to lead scientists to accept instrumentally reliable 
theories (Boyd 1982: 16; 1983: 76; 1990: 221).  As examples of instrumentally reliable 
methodological principles, he offers the following:  
(1) Conservatism: “…new theories should, prima facie, resemble current theories 
with respect to their accounts of causal relations among theoretical entities” 
(1973: 7; cf. 1982: 618f). 
 
(2) Principle of experiment design: “…a proposed theory T must be 
experimentally tested under situations representative of those in which, in the 
light of collateral information, it is most likely that T will fail, if it is going to fail 
at all” (1973: 10; cf. 1982: 629f). 
 
(3) Principle of measurement procedures “…one should follow the dictates of the 
best confirmed theory in (re)designing measurement procedures” (1983: 79; cf. 
1982: 19f).    
 
Boyd notes that all three of these principles are “theory-dependent.”  This is obvious in 
the case of conservatism: whether or not a new theory is acceptable from the point of 
view of conservatism depends upon what theory (or theories) we presently accept.  But 
even the principle of experiment design is theory dependent: judgments about the sorts of 
conditions under which a new theory is likely to fail must be made on the basis of our 
current scientific background knowledge, which may include propositions arrived at on 
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the basis of the current theory we are looking to replace.  Finally, the principle of 
measurement procedures explicitly directs us to consider the theories we presently accept 
when designing measurement procedures. 
 According to Boyd, the fact that methodological principles that are so theory-
dependent are nevertheless instrumentally reliable—the fact that they continually lead us 
to accept increasingly instrumentally reliable theories—stands in need of explanation 
(1973: 3).  He argues that the only scientifically plausible explanations for the 
instrumental reliability of methodological principles like those mentioned above require 
us to judge that our scientific theories are approximately (stance-independently) true.  
According to Boyd, it is because our background scientific theories are approximately 
true that the implementation of these theory-dependent methodological principles is able 
to guide us towards accepting increasingly instrumentally reliable theories.  Boyd 
contends that no other hypothesis can make adequate sense of the instrumental reliability 
of these methods (Boyd 1973: 11f; 1982: 621f; 1983: 64ff). 
 If Boyd is correct, then an important consequence follows: because our theory-
dependent methodological principles are operating on approximately true background 
theories, there is reason to expect that the application of these principles will be reliable 
in guiding us towards new theories that are themselves approximately true.  In short, the 
application of these methodological principles is part of a reliable process of true belief 
production.  As a result, such methodological principles have epistemic import after all, 
contrary to what anti-realists like Kuhn and van Fraassen have claimed: that a new theory 
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has been arrived at and endorsed through the application of these principles is evidence 
that the theory is approximately true (Boyd 1982: 622f; 1983: 67).35 
 Naturally, Boyd’s argument promises to explain only why aesthetic 
considerations or seemingly pragmatic considerations such as parsimony and elegance 
are capable of contributing to the epistemic warrant of scientists’ acceptance of certain 
theories.  Since it is doubtful that ideological considerations for selecting theories are 
likely to be truth-conducive, Boyd’s argument may do little to confer epistemic value 
upon those kinds of considerations.  But this is hardly cause for alarm.  To the extent that 
our current theories are highly instrumentally reliable, it is doubtful that a credible case 
can be made that mere ideological considerations have been the most significant grounds 
upon which such theories are accepted by scientists.  It is surely too incredible to be 
believed that the principle “select the scientific theory that whose acceptance would most 
benefit the interests of capitalists over workers” would tend to produce instrumentally 
reliable scientific theories in the long run (especially in the natural sciences).  More 
likely, instrumentally reliable scientific theories are arrived at in spite of—rather than 
because of—the influence of political ideology. 
 
6.5.5. What if the ultimate argument is a failure?   
As with the standard version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism, I find Boyd’s 
argument to be persuasive.  If his argument is indeed successful, then there would seem 
to be little reason to worry that the kind of reasoning behind the revised explanatory 
impotence argument against moral realism could be used to upset our commitment to 
                                                
35 This inference should be uncontroversial if we follow Boyd in assuming that a reliabilist account of 
epistemic warrant is correct.  Again, since Boyd and his fellow ethical naturalists do accept epistemological 
reliabilism in one form or another, this assumption is safe in the context of the present dialectic.  
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scientific realism: the best explanation of our accepting the scientific theories that we 
accept is a realist explanation.  Consequently, moral anti-realists and ethical non-
naturalists can advance the explanatory impotence argument against naturalistic moral 
realism without fear of endangering their commitment to scientific realism, if they have 
such a commitment. 
 As I said, I am inclined to think that the ultimate argument (in at least one of its 
forms) is sound.  But it must be acknowledged the ultimate argument for scientific 
realism has not produced consensus among philosophers of science.  Scientific anti-
realists point to numerous cases in the history of science where a theory proved to be 
instrumentally reliable despite the fact that its central terms failed to refer, and thus, the 
theory was not even approximately true.  In addition, they have raised objections to the 
very notion of approximate truth and its use by realists.36 
 While I continue to find the realist’s case to be persuasive despite these 
objections, I must be frank and admit that I do not have the scientific expertise to 
evaluate the anti-realist’s replies to either form of the ultimate argument.  In place of a 
further defense of scientific realism, I want to consider what the fallout would be for the 
explanatory impotence argument against moral realism, if it were it to turn out that the 
ultimate argument for scientific realism is a failure.   
 Boyd suggests that the ultimate argument probably “reconstructs the reason why 
most scientific realists are realists” (1983: 54).  I believe that this is true in my own case: 
it strikes me as very unlikely, for instance, that scientists could have developed an atomic 
bomb if the physical theory that they were working with was not approximately correct—
at least, correct to the extent that the world really contains entities that have a legitimate 
                                                
36 Both of these lines of objection to scientific realism are advanced by Laudan (1981). 
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claim to being the referents of ‘proton,’ ‘neutron,’ and ‘electron.’  In that respect, I am 
convinced that the best explanation of how mid-20th century physicists were able to 
produce an atom bomb requires that we posit the existence of protons, neutrons, and 
electrons.  In short, I believe that we must suppose that the prevailing physics of the time 
was at least approximately true in a stance-independent way.   
 Now, in light of the importance of the ultimate argument (even in unarticulated 
and inchoate forms) in persuading philosophers and laypersons of scientific realism, it 
seems to me that, if the ultimate argument could be shown to be a failure, then it would 
be perfectly reasonable to give up on scientific realism.  But in that case, the moral 
realist’s deployment of the tu quoque carries no force: if no version of the ultimate 
argument for scientific realism succeeds, then those of us who accept EC really ought to 
reject scientific realism along with moral realism.  If scientific anti-realism is the price 
that a metaphysical naturalist must pay for advancing the explanatory impotence 
argument against moral realism, then, assuming the failure of the ultimate argument, it is 
a price that he would have had to pay anyway.  To conclude this section: even if no 
version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism succeeds, the moral realist’s tu 
quoque reply still fails as a reply to the argument from explanatory impotence. 
 
6.6. Conclusion. 
Harman’s original argument from explanatory impotence against moral realism is 
vulnerable to a quick tu quoque reply: just as moral facts are not needed to explain our 
making this or that moral judgment in response to observing an action, theoretical facts 
are not needed to explain a physicist’s theoretical judgments in response to observable 
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phenomena.  I have suggested that a better argument from explanatory impotence would 
focus on the explanations of the origin and content of our collective moral sensibility as a 
whole.  I have argued that the most promising explanation is a Darwinian account.  Since 
the Darwinian account makes no essential reference to genuine stance-independent moral 
facts, and since moral facts do not seem to potentially explain any other phenomena, 
metaphysical naturalists ought to deny the existence of moral facts. 
 I have argued, in addition, that this revised argument from explanatory impotence 
is not vulnerable to the sort of tu quoque reply that undoes Harman’s original version of 
the argument.  Because of the high degree of instrumental reliability of our best scientific 
theories and methods, there is no compelling explanation of the origin and content of our 
acceptance of those theories that does not recognize their approximate truth. 
 In the next chapter, I will consider whether moral realists can mount a 
counterattack against the revised argument from explanatory impotence that is modeled 
on the defense of scientific realism that I sketched in §6.5.  According to this line of 
thinking, there may yet be phenomena that moral facts are needed to explain: namely, the 
instrumental reliability of moral theories.  I will argue that this sort of reply on behalf of 
moral realism fails. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ULTIMATE ARGUMENT FOR MORAL REALISM 
7. Chapter. 
7.1. Introduction.   
Although the failure of the ultimate argument for scientific realism would do no favors 
for naturalist moral realists, my own view, again, is that the ultimate argument (in at least 
some of its versions) is sound.  Thus, I believe that a debunking argument of the kind of 
advanced against moral realism in §6.3 fails when it is directed against scientific realism.  
But even if we grant the success of the argument for scientific realism, the moral realist 
has one more hand to play.  As we saw, the central argument in favor of scientific realism 
rests on two claims: (i) our best present-day scientific theories (and methods) exhibit a 
high degree of instrumental reliability, and (ii) the best explanation of this instrumental 
reliability requires that we construe those theories realistically.  Perhaps the moral realist 
could utilize a similar argument in order to respond to the argument from explanatory 
impotence.  An argument of this sort would begin with the premise that our best current 
moral theories are instrumentally reliable to a high degree.  To this the realist would add 
the claim that the best available explanation for the instrumental reliability of such 
theories requires that we construe them realistically.1  Let us call this the ultimate moral 
argument.  In this chapter, I aim to refute the ultimate moral argument—or, to state my 
goals more modestly, I aim to raise a good amount of doubt about the prospects for the 
success of such an argument. 
                                                
1 To keep things simple, I am going to set aside discussions of claims to the effect that the methodological 
principles underwriting moral inquiry (as opposed to particular moral theories) are themselves 
instrumentally reliable.  From my discussion of the putative instrumental reliability of moral theories 
below, my hope is that it will be evident than such methodological principles—at least in their application 
to moral matters—do not exhibit an impressive degree of instrumental reliability. 
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7.2. Moral Theories and Empirical Predictions. 
7.2.1. On the instrumental reliability of moral theories. 
Recall from §6.5.2 that a theory is instrumentally reliable to the extent that it yields 
“approximately accurate predictions about the behavior of observable phenomena.”  
Recall also that a theory’s ability to yield accurate novel predictions carries an especially 
heavy weight in determining the degree of instrumental reliability that it enjoys.  Our 
present task is to examine whether moral theories exhibit a significant degree of 
instrumental reliability.  We must search, then, for observable phenomena that moral 
theories might help us to predict.  On the face of it, this might seem like a fool’s errand: 
moral theories do not aim to tell us what is the case or what will be the case; rather, they 
aim to tell us what ought to be the case.  This sort of consideration might lead 
philosophers, including moral realists, to doubt the propriety of asking of a moral theory 
that it be instrumentally reliable (cf. Nagel 1986: 144; Quinn 1986; Shafer-Landau 2006).  
Be that as it may, at this point in the dialectic, moral realists who accept naturalism, and 
thus, accept EC, do not have the luxury of dismissing the demand that moral theories 
yield predictions about observable phenomena; they desperately need to find explanatory 
work for moral facts to do. As it happens, SEN proponents have offered several examples 
of predictions derived from moral theories.  After dealing with a preliminary concern, I 
will discuss three of these examples below. 
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7.2.2. A bad argument against the instrumental reliability of moral theories.   
Here is an argument against the instrumental reliability of moral theories that moves too 
quickly.  Let us suppose that our best moral theory is hedonistic act-utilitarianism (AUh).  
Consider a case in which an agent, Ann, has several alternative actions open to her.  
Suppose, further, that only one of Ann’s alternatives maximizes hedonic utility.  Given 
our assumptions so far, this alternative is morally obligatory according to our best moral 
theory.  Let us now ask what sort of event AUh predicts will occur in this case: will Ann 
choose to perform the morally right action or not? 
 It should be obvious that, in the absence of further premises, AUh yields no 
predictions about which action Ann will perform.  In the face of this fact, one might be 
tempted to conclude that AUh is not at all instrumentally reliable.  It may be, of course, 
that this failure indicates only that AUh is itself a flawed theory.  However, it is easy to 
see that matters are no different for any rival theory of morally right action: no such 
theory by itself yields empirical predictions about how any agent will behave.  Since it is 
hard to see what other kinds of facts such a theory might predict besides the actions of 
agents, it would seem that no theory of morally right action is instrumentally reliable.  If 
this is really the case, then the ultimate moral argument is unsound.  (At least, this is so 
insofar as the argument attempts to establish realism about deontic moral properties such 
as rightness and obligation.  Further argument would be needed to show that evaluative 
properties such as goodness and badness share the same fate.) 
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7.2.3. Three examples of prediction by moral theory.   
I said that the argument sketched in the previous section moves too quickly.  Here is why:  
As Brink and Sturgeon observe, theories in general (be they moral theories or non-moral 
theories) do not yield empirical predictions in isolation.  In order to derive a prediction, a 
theory must be conjoined with “auxiliary premises.”2  Putnam, for example, notes that 
Newton’s theory of universal gravitation issues no empirical predictions without auxiliary 
premises that give an inventory of what objects there are in space and what additional 
forces besides gravity are present (Putnam 1974: 255).  Both Brink and Sturgeon contend 
that, if we allow ourselves to utilize auxiliary premises, we can in fact derive empirical 
predictions from moral theories and principles:  
Candidate moral principles—for example, that an action is wrong just in case 
there is something else the agent could have done that would have produced a 
greater net balance of pleasure over pain—lack empirical implications when 
considered in isolation.  But it is easy to derive empirical consequences from 
them, and thus to test them against experience, if we allow ourselves, as we do in 
the scientific case, to rely on a background of other assumptions of comparable 
status.  Thus, if we conjoin the act-utilitarian principle just cited with the further 
view, also untestable in isolation, that it is always wrong deliberately to kill a 
human being, we can deduce from these two premises together the consequence 
that deliberately killing a human being always produces a lesser balance of 
pleasure over pain than some available alternative act; and this claim is one any 
positivist would have conceded we know, in principle at least, how to test” 
(Sturgeon 1985a: 51; cf. Brink 1989: 137; Sayre-McCord 1988: 436f).3 
 
Presented more formally, Sturgeon’s example is this:   
Example A: 
 
A1. For any act, x, x is morally right iff x maximizes hedonic utility (moral 
theory). 
                                                
2 This is insight is commonly credited to Pierre Duhem (1906/1914: 183-188) and Quine (1951: 38f). 
3 Brink appears to hold that the auxiliary premises that conjoin with moral principles to yield empirical 
predictions must themselves be moral propositions (Brink 1989: 137, 183).  I am not so sure that he is right 
about this.  His own example (represented by B below), contains at least one non-moral auxiliary premise.  
Furthermore, example C below appears to contain only auxiliary premises that are non-moral.   
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A2. For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a human being, then x is not 
morally right (auxiliary moral proposition). 
A3. For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a human being, then x does not 
maximize hedonic utility (empirical prediction). 
 
The prediction A3 is entailed by A1 and A2.  Now, it may not be quite right to say that 
A3 is an empirical prediction, since it can’t be confirmed by direct observation.  Its 
confirmation would have to proceed, instead, by way of enumerative induction from 
direct observations of act-tokens of deliberate killings.  I propose that we ignore this 
complication.  In any case, it would do just as well for the purposes of the naturalistic 
moral realist to substitute A3 with the claim that all observed acts of deliberately killing a 
human being fail to maximize hedonic utility.4 
 Another type of example offered by SEN proponents derives predictions from 
claims about the moral character of agents.  This kind of prediction is illustrated most 
clearly by Brink: 
My moral belief that good people keep their promises when doing so involves 
great personal sacrifice has no observational consequences when taken in 
isolation.  But when I conjoin it with my independently supported moral belief 
that Zenobia is a good person (i.e., my evidence not including Zenobia’s promise-
keeping behavior), I can obtain the observational consequence that Zenobia will 
keep her promise to Zelda, even though doing so will involve great personal 
sacrifice on Zenobia’s part (Brink 1989: 137). 
 
From this passage, let us construct a second example of a moral prediction: 
Example B: 
 
B1. For any person, x, if x is morally good and x has made a promise that 
requires great personal sacrifice, then x will keep x’s promise (moral 
theory). 
                                                
4 A further complication is this: in order to know that a given act-token maximizes hedonic utility, it is not 
sufficient that we know the hedonic utility of the observed act; we must also know the hedonic utility of all 
of its alternatives that go unperformed; but this information certainly cannot be acquired by direct 
observation.  I think this fact may well be a serious problem for those who would use example A as 
evidence in support of an ultimate moral argument.  Nevertheless, as with the previous difficulty, I am 
prepared to set it aside. 
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B2. Zenobia has made a promise that requires great personal sacrifice (non-
moral auxiliary proposition). 
B3. Zenobia is morally good (auxiliary moral proposition). 
B4. Zenobia will keep her promise (empirical prediction). 
 
 In other passages, Brink and Sturgeon suggest that the property justice plays a 
causal role in the world.  Sturgeon writes: “A widespread and longstanding assumption 
about social justice is that it is a stabilizing condition and injustice a destabilizing one, at 
least under circumstances common enough to be interesting” (1991: 29).  Similarly, 
Brink writes: “We think that political vices (e.g., social injustice) sometimes cause, and 
so help explain, instability, protest movements, and revolutions; and we think that the 
political virtues of a society’s laws and institutions (e.g., its social justice) can help 
explain its stability” (1989: 187; cf. Railton 1986: 191f).  If they are correct, then our best 
theory of social justice—assuming it is stance-independently true—ought to facilitate 
reliable predictions concerning the stability of a given society, at least when that theory is 
conjoined with this and other auxiliary propositions.   
 In order to produce an example of a prediction of this sort, we need a sample 
theory of justice.  Because of its familiarity and its plausibility, I will use John Rawls’s 
two principles of justice for my illustration.  According to Rawls, the basic structure of 
society is just if and only if it satisfies the following two principles (with the first given 
priority over the second): 
[1] Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. […] 
 
[2] Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
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principle,5 and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971/1999: 266). 
 
I will refer to the conjunction of these principles as ‘RPJ’ (for ‘Rawls’s Principles of 
Justice’).   
 With this theory of justice in hand, I can sketch the third and final example of an 
empirical prediction generated by a moral theory: 
Example C: 
 
C1. For any society, x, x is just if and only if the basic structure of x satisfies 
RPJ (moral theory). 
C2. For any society, x, if x is just, then x is stable (non-moral auxiliary 
proposition). 
C3. The basic structure of society S satisfies RPJ (non-moral auxiliary 
proposition). 
C4. Society S is stable (empirical prediction). 
 
 Examples A, B, and C represent the most significant examples of empirical 
predictions derived from moral theories that are found in the writings of the principal 
defenders of synthetic ethical naturalism.  I believe that, as Brink and Sturgeon contend, 
these examples succeed in showing that moral theories really do have empirical 
consequences, at least when conjoined with certain auxiliary assumptions.  Thus, there is 
nothing in principle that prevents a moral theory from being instrumentally reliable to 
some degree.  Unfortunately for ethical naturalists, this finding is not enough to ground a 
successful ultimate moral argument.  In the first place, it is not enough that some moral 
theories have empirical consequences.  What the ultimate argument requires is that our 
best current theories have such consequences, and, moreover, that these consequences are 
in fact born out by our observations.  In other words, our best theory must not only 
                                                
5 A just savings principle specifies the kinds and amounts of things that any given generation must save for 
future generations (Rawls 1971/1999: 252ff).  The matter of which savings principle really is just is not 
important for my purposes here. 
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predict; it must predict successfully.  But even this does not go far enough.  For it must 
also be the case that a realist construal of our best theories offers the best explanation of 
this predictive success.  To some extent, whether or not a realist explanation is best will 
depend upon the character of the predictions and their relationships with the relevant 
theories.  Scientific realists and scientific anti-realists alike acknowledge that some false 
theories are able to generate reliable predictions.  For instance, after it was discovered 
that metals weigh more after combustion, the phlogiston theory of combustion was 
amended so as to include the proposition that phlogiston—which was supposed to be 
released from an object during combustion—had “negative weight” (Thagard 1978: 78; 
Kuhn 1962/1996: 71).  With this amendment, the phlogiston theory would now correctly 
“predict” of any piece of metal that it would weigh more after it was burned (with the 
explanation being that, during combustion, the metal releases its phlogiston and hence, 
loses some of its negative weight).  It should be obvious, however, that the best 
explanation of the amended phlogiston theory’s predictive “success” here does not 
require us to read that theory realistically.  (This should be obvious, at the very least, 
because we now know that phlogiston does not exist.)  Indeed, this sort of phenomenon 
illustrates one reason why scientific realists have held novel predictions to be of special 
importance in confirming a theory.  In the phlogiston example, the prediction that metals 
lose weight upon combustion is clearly not novel to the mature phlogiston theory; the 
amendment that makes these successful predictions possible would have been completely 
unmotivated if the relevant data concerning the weight of combusted metals had not 
already been known. 
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 In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine examples A, B, and C.  I will 
argue that none of these provide a compelling example of a (i) currently best moral 
theory that (ii) yields successful empirical predictions, where (iii) the best explanation for 
this success requires a realistic reading of that theory. 
 
7.3. Example A: Predictions Grounded in Two Deontic Moral Principles. 
7.3.1. The implausibility of premise A2.   
An initial difficulty with example A concerns the auxiliary premise A2.  If A is to be a 
compelling example of a successful moral prediction that supports a realistic construal of 
a moral theory, then the relevant auxiliary premises used to generate the predictions 
ought to be plausible.  Unfortunately, A2 is not all that plausible.  It is surely only the 
rare pacifist (or perhaps someone who is already in the grip of an explicit moral theory) 
who thinks that it is in all cases morally wrong to kill another human being.  I believe that 
a more plausible auxiliary proposition would allow that killing is permitted in cases of 
self-defense.  Moreover, those of us who think that not all human beings are persons will 
not find A2 plausible, even when it is amended to permit self-defense.  Perhaps then, the 
auxiliary hypothesis we are looking for is this: 
A2': For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a person in a non-self defense 
scenario, then x is not morally right. 
 
While some philosophers might find A2' plausible, others might contend that it is false 
insofar as it fails to accommodate certain “doomsday” scenarios.  For instance, one might 
think that it is morally permissible to deliberately kill a non-threatening person if that 
person’s sacrifice by us is required in order to avert a catastrophic disaster (e.g., the 
destruction of 90% of the Earth’s human population).  One way to deal with this sort of 
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case is to reformulate A2 as a ceteris paribus principle.  Another solution, which I will 
utilize below, is simply to amend it with a “non-doomsday” clause. 
 In addition to the non-doomsday clause, I would recommend another amendment.  
As it stands, A2' implies that many—if not most—cases of voluntary active euthanasia 
are morally wrong.  For my own part, I have a firm intuition that many such cases are not 
morally wrong.  In light of these considerations, I recommend the following auxiliary 
proposition to replace A2: 
A2'': For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a person against her will in a 
non-self defense and non-doomsday scenario, then x is not morally right. 
 
A2'' is close enough to a plausible moral principle for our purposes.  When conjoined 
with A1, it entails the following empirical prediction: 
A3': For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a person against her will in a 
non-self defense and non-doomsday scenario, then x does not maximize 
hedonic utility. 
 
 
7.3.2. AUh predicts unsuccessfully. 
With the trouble over the auxiliary premise of example A settled, we can now turn to a 
more serious problem: AUh is more likely to be disconfirmed by the prediction A3' than 
to be supported by it.  It is a longstanding objection to AUh that it is too indiscriminate in 
countenancing as morally right the deliberate killing of persons when such killing would 
maximize hedonic utility.  Typically, this objection simply points to possible worlds in 
which the killing of a person against her will (even in a non-doomsday, non-self defense 
situation) would maximize the balance of pleasure over pain.  However, if it should 
happen that no such possible world is near to our own, then the naturalistic realist who 
defends AUh might be able to escape the present worry.  After all, it is observations of 
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the actual world that confirm or disconfirm empirical predictions.  Unfortunately, there 
isn’t very good reason to think that it never happens in the actual world that killing a 
person against her will maximizes hedonic utility in non-doomsday scenarios.  In fact, an 
anti-utilitarian who is hell-bent on giving the theory an empirical refutation could arrange 
to make the prediction come true herself!  She could arrange for someone who gets 
intense joy from killing to kill an isolated and very depressed hermit.6  
 The trouble with example A, then, is that it is a case in which a representative 
moral theory is likely to be refuted by its empirical prediction, rather than supported by it.  
Thus, it is not an example that could be used to support the ultimate moral argument.7   
 
7.3.3. Example A restated using a different moral theory.   
Those who are inclined to retain the auxiliary hypothesis A2'' will perhaps doubt that 
AUh really is our best current moral theory.  As it so happens, neither Sturgeon, nor 
Brink, nor Boyd is a proponent of AUh.  As we saw in Chapter 5, Boyd and Sturgeon 
endorse a view called ‘homeostatic consequentialism.’  Brink endorses a view that he 
calls ‘objective utilitarianism.’  Let us consider, then, how one of these more 
sophisticated theories of morally right action fares when it is conjoined with A2'' to 
                                                
6 Or perhaps it would not be so easy for the malevolent anti-utilitarian: some have argued (usually as an 
objection to AUh) that it is nearly impossible to make reliable utility calculations about actual act-tokens 
and their alternatives with any kind of accuracy (see, for example, Lenman 2000).  If so, the anti-utilitarian 
would have a very hard time ensuring that the killing she is planning really will be an act that maximizes 
hedonic utility.  Fair enough.  But this only raises a further problem for example A: if it really is that 
difficult to assess the hedonic utility of an act and its alternatives, then we will find ourselves unable to 
know whether AUh is vindicated by prediction A3'; we would never know whether or not the act of killing 
that we observe really maximizes hedonic utility  In that case, example A cannot be used to show that AUh 
is a highly instrumentally reliable theory; we would never know whether its predictions are successful or 
not. 
7 In fairness to Sturgeon, example A works well enough for his immediate purposes in his (1985a).  He 
presents the example merely to show that moral theories have empirical consequences when conjoined with 
auxiliary hypotheses.  His goal in that paper is not to show that our best moral theories are, in fact, 
instrumentally reliable. 
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produce an empirical prediction.  Because Brink’s objective utilitarianism is better 
developed and less unwieldy than homeostatic consequentialism, I propose to use it as the 
sample moral theory for my discussion.  Unfortunately, since the value component of 
objective utilitarianism eludes a concise formulation, and since Brink’s own formulation 
of the view is sketchy and incomplete, my formulation of the theory will be very rough.  
Here it is:8 
OU:  (1) For any act-token, x, x is morally right if and only if x maximizes 
objective utility. 
 
 (2) The objective utility of thing (e.g. an action, a motive, a state of affairs, 
etc.), x, is a quantity that increases with the degree to which x 
“expresses” at least one of the following: 
 (a) the pursuit of an admissible project by an agent; or 
 (b) the realization of an admissible project by an agent; or 
 (c) personal and social relationships that exhibit respect for persons. 
 
(3) For any project, x, and moral agent, S, x is admissible if and only if: 
 (a) the formation and pursuit of x by S is reflective; i.e., S attempts to 
integrate x into a “coherent life plan” that realizes S’s human 
essence 
 (b) x shows respect for other persons; i.e., S’s pursuit of x does not 
cause other persons “significant and avoidable harm” and involves 
the recognition that other person’s well-being matters. 
 
                                                
8 Objective Utilitarianism is introduced in Brink (1989: ch. 8, especially pp. 231-237, although refinements 
are made throughout the chapter).  My formulation of OU centers around the following passage in which 
Brink lays out what I take to be the core of his axiology: “As components of human welfare, pursuit and 
realization of admissible projects and personal and social relationships exhibiting respect for persons are 
intrinsically valuable.  Actions, motives, and other things that express these values are themselves 
intrinsically valuable, while actions, motives, and other things that causally contribute to the realization of 
these values are extrinsically valuable” (ibid. 234).  He conjoins this theory of value with an act-utilitarian 
theory of right-action: “an action is right just in case it contributes to human welfare at least as much as any 
alternative action available to the agent” (ibid. 237); “…rightness is identical with the maximization of 
welfare…” (ibid. 238).  The specification of admissible projects can be found in (ibid. 232f).  Clause 3b is 
also fleshed out in two additional passages: “But there are moral constraints on valuable projects; in order 
for the pursuit or realization of a project to be of value, that project must, among other things, respect other 
people at least in the minimal sense of not causing significant and avoidable harm” (ibid. 264); “…[A]n 
agent’s projects cannot be valuable if they fail to show respect for others.  Respect for others requires 
recognition that others matter, and this requires that we recognize their claims to basic well-being and 
overall welfare in certain ways” (ibid. 289). 
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There is no doubt that much needs to be said in order to elucidate OU.  However, I will 
confine myself to only three comments.  First, my formulation of OU takes at least one 
liberty with Brink’s own presentation of the theory: in order to cast OU as a full criterion 
of morally right action, I have presented conditions 3a and 3b as jointly sufficient for a 
project to count as admissible.  In Brink’s presentation, he explicitly allows that there 
might be additional constraints on projects; but he declines to outline what they might be 
(1989: 232).  Nothing that I say below turns on whether or not there are additional 
conditions that a project must meet in order to be admissible.  Second, it should be 
noticed that while clauses 2 and 3 of OU spell out what sorts of considerations give 
positive intrinsic value to a state of affairs, Brink offers no account of what sorts of 
considerations, if any, confer negative intrinsic value upon a state of affairs.  Finally, the 
axiological component of OU (constituted by clauses 2 and 3) is to some degree circular.  
This is because the notion of well-being appears in the specification of the conditions of 
admissibility for projects.  Unfortunately, this last feature of OU complicates things with 
respect to the claim that it is empirically observable (or at any rate, empirically 
confirmable) whether an act maximizes objective utility.  I propose that we simply 
overlook this complication and give Brink and the ethical naturalists the benefit of the 
doubt by assuming that whether an act maximizes objective utility is something that, at 
least in principle, can be empirically confirmed. 
 I am not interested in criticizing OU as a theory of morally right action.  For the 
purposes of this discussion, I am ready to grant that it is the best available theory of its 
kind.  Instead, my present concern is with the question of whether OU, when conjoined 
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with auxiliary premises such as A2'', yields enough interesting successful predictions to 
render a realistic reading of the theory superior to any anti-realist readings. 
 Now, the conjunction of OU and A2'' yields the following (putatively) empirical 
prediction: 
A3'': For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a person against her will in a 
non-self defense and non-doomsday scenario, then x does not maximize 
objective utility. 
 
Let us use ‘example A-II’ to refer to the set of propositions whose members are OU, A2'', 
and A3''.  In assessing the prospects of using A-II as the foundation of an ultimate moral 
argument, we must begin with the question of whether the prediction captured in A3'' is 
true.  Again, because A3'' is a universally quantified proposition, no single observation 
can confirm it.  What we are interested in is, rather, whether it is the case that all 
observed acts of killing a person (against their will and in a non-doomsday scenario)9 
have been acts that fail to maximize objective utility. 
 I suspect that few people have ever, upon witnessing a killing, stopped and tried 
to discern with any accuracy whether or not no alternative action expressed to a greater 
degree the pursuit or realization of projects or relationships that exhibit respect for 
persons.  Thus, I doubt that the kinds of predictions yielded by A3'' have been directly 
confirmed by empirical observation.  Nevertheless, I am ready to concede that a plausible 
case can be made that such predictions are likely to be vindicated.  Here is how such a 
case might go:  Any act that involves the deliberate killing of a person against their will 
can plausibly be argued to be an instance of pursuing a project that fails to “show respect 
for other persons.”  In particular, it can plausibly be maintained that all such acts cause 
                                                
9 From here on, let it be understood that by ‘acts of killing a person,’ I mean ‘acts of killing a person 
against their will in a non-doomsday scenario.’ 
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“significant and avoidable harm” of the kind that Brink takes to be constitutive of failing 
to respect other persons (Brink 1989: 264).  If so, then all actions that involve killing 
persons fail to express the pursuit or realization of an admissible project or a relationship 
that exhibits respect for others.  From these considerations, it follows that the objective 
utility of any such action is, at best, 0.  A defender of OU might be able to argue 
successfully that, in all actual world cases, there will always be some other alternative 
open to an agent that has greater objective utility.  Because of this, we have good reason 
to think that the prediction that all acts of killing a person fail to maximize objective 
utility will ultimately be born out. 
 
7.3.4. The approximate truth of OU is not needed to explain its predictive success. 
Let us grant, then, that A-II is example of a successful empirical prediction by what is our 
best theory of morally right action.  This is a start towards constructing a viable ultimate 
moral argument; but it is not enough.  If A-II is to ground such an argument, then it must 
also be the case that the best explanation of our ability to predict A3'' using OU requires 
us to hold that OU is (approximately) true.  I think there is reason to doubt that the best 
explanation really requires this.  Let me explain. 
 Unlike cases of scientific prediction, the relevant moral theory (OU conjoined 
with A2'') offers no explanation of why A3'' obtains.  Those of us who think A3'' is true 
certainly do not think it is true because all acts that maximize objective utility are morally 
right and no act of killing a person is morally right.  Instead, we expect that the 
explanation for why A3'' obtains will be of a psychological or sociological sort: e.g., 
people desire not to be killed; being killed usually conflicts with a person’s projects and 
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values; etc.  (The exact form of the psychological explanation will depend upon how we 
cash out the notion of harm and well-being in clause 3b of OU).  Most importantly, we 
have every reason to expect that, if there is a fully satisfying explanation of why A3'' 
obtains, it will be one that makes no ineliminable use of moral vocabulary.  The upshot 
here is that we should have a very high degree of confidence that we will be able to 
satisfactorily explain why A3'' is true without having to assume that OU (or the 
conjunction of OU and A2'') is approximately true. 
  
7.4. Example B: Predictions Based on Moral Character. 
7.4.1. The independence of the prediction.   
The first difficulty with example B concerns the independence of the prediction B4 from 
the moral theory or principle captured by B1.  This worry arises primarily with respect to 
the role that B1 (or a more general moral theory that implies B1) plays in our arriving at 
B3, the judgment that Zenobia is morally good.  Here is the problem: suppose that our 
evidence for Zenobia’s being morally good is our past observation that she always keeps 
her promises, even at great personal cost.  Notice now that the very same evidence is 
sufficient to justify the conclusion, simply by way of enumerative induction, that B4 is 
likely to be true: Zenobia will keep her promise.10  Given the evidence already in our 
possession, the knowledge that B1 is true adds nothing to our ability to predict Zenobia’s 
                                                
10 Below, we will see that there is reason to doubt that such an inductive inference is cogent, at least if we 
are trying to predict whether Zenobia will keep her promise in a novel situation—i.e., a situation that is 
importantly different from the past situations in which she was observed to keep her promises.  But, as I 
argue below, these doubts only make things worse for those who would use B1 to make predictions.  My 
present claim, then, proceeds from assumptions about personality and behavior that the ethical naturalist 
already needs to accept if example B is to be successful in grounding the ultimate moral argument.  
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behavior.11  Obviously, then, the approximate truth of B1 is not needed in our best 
explanation of our ability to successfully predict B4. 
 Although Brink’s own reasons for producing his version of example B do not 
directly concern the role it might play in a constructing an ultimate moral argument, he 
does notice the threat of dependence between B3 and B1.  To address it, he suggests that 
our evidence for B3 ought to be independent of Zenobia’s promise-keeping behavior 
(1989: 137).  This requirement can be satisfied, perhaps, if the judgment that Zenobia is a 
morally good person is arrived on the basis of observations that reveal her to have 
virtuous character traits that are suitably distinct from promise-keeping.  For example, we 
might have judged Zenobia to be good in response to our observation that she is (or that 
she generally behaves in ways that are) kind, courageous, and/or temperate.  For this 
maneuver to be plausible, it must be the case that we are warranted in inferring that a 
person is morally good merely from the observation that she is kind, courageous, and 
temperate, etc.  Thus, for the purposes of building an ultimate moral argument, we must 
see B1 as part of a broader theory of moral character according to which characteristics 
besides promise-keeping or fidelity (e.g., characteristics such as courage, temperance, 
kindness, etc.) are constitutive of a person’s being morally good.  But more than this, it 
also requires such a theory to incorporate a kind of “unity of the virtues thesis.”  This 
unity thesis need not be as strong as some traditional versions whereby a person counts as 
morally good only if she has all of the good-making character traits (i.e., virtues).  But it 
                                                
11 It is true that, since the observation of Zenobia’s past promise-keepings have led us to judge her to be 
morally good, we must already be committed to accepting a moral theory that incorporates something like 
B1.  But this fact does not show that the approximate truth of B1 is needed in the best explanation of our 
success in predicting Zenobia’s behavior.  If, instead of accepting B1, we thought that keeping promises 
was a bad character trait to have, we would still have been able to successfully predict Zenobia’s behavior 
by enumerative induction on the basis of our observation of her past promise keepings.  The only difference 
in this case is that is that, instead of accepting B3, we would have judged Zenobia to be morally bad.   
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does require, at the very least, that there is a strong nomological connection between the 
having of some of the virtues and the having of the rest.  (In other words, the virtues must 
be homeostatically clustered).  This connection must be strong enough so that the 
observation that a person is kind, temperate, courageous, etc., warrants an inductive 
inference to the proposition that that person is also disposed to keep promises, even at 
great personal cost. 
  
7.4.2. Trouble from social psychology. 
On the face of it, it seems plausible enough that a person who is kind, courageous, and 
temperate is also the sort of person who honors her promises even at great cost to herself, 
and that this latter disposition will be reflected in her behavior on the occasion that we are 
trying to predict.  Unfortunately, there exists a body of psychological research that casts 
doubt on the cogency of such an inference.  This research suggests that stable character 
traits are much less predictive of agent’s behavior than are the features of the particular 
situation that the agent finds herself in.  Among the classic studies that support this 
conclusion is one by Alice Isen and Paula Levin (1972).  In one experiment they found 
that subjects were significantly more likely to offer help to a person who had dropped 
papers on the floor of a shopping mall if, moments before, the subject had found a dime 
in the coin return of the public phone from which she had just made a call.  Of the 
subjects who did not find a dime after checking the coin slot, only 4% stopped to offer 
help.  By contrast, 87% of those who found a dime in the coin slot offered help.  This 
data supports the conclusion that, in this sort of case at least, facts about the agent’s 
situation (such as whether she found a dime) are a greater predictor of her behavior than 
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are facts about the agent’s moral character.  Other classic studies that have been invoked 
to support this “situationist” view of behavior are Stanley Milgram’s (1963) famous 
obedience study and the Stanford  prison simulation (Haney, et al. [1973]).  In his attack 
on virtue ethics, the philosopher John Doris argues that these and other studies establish, 
among other things, that  
Personality is not often evaluatively integrated.  For a given person, the 
dispositions operative in one situation may have an evaluative status very 
different from those manifested in another situation; evaluatively inconsistent 
dispositions may “cohabitate” in a single personality” (Doris 2002: 25). 
 
In other words, virtuous character traits such as kindness, courage, and temperance are 
not strongly connected to other virtuous character traits such as, e.g., honesty or fidelity.  
If this is correct, then we should not expect that the judgment that Zenobia is good—
when made on grounds other than her honesty or promise-keeping tendencies—will be of 
help in predicting how she will behave when her fidelity to her promises is tested.  But in 
that case, it is hard to see how those who want to make use of example B can maintain 
the requisite independence between theory and auxiliary hypotheses without undermining 
their ability to make a successful prediction about how Zenobia will act. 
 But things may be even worse for example B.  Doris argues that these studies 
show more than just that that we cannot accurately predict a person’s behaving in 
accordance with one kind of virtue (e.g. honesty) in a particular situation on the basis of 
evidence that they possess virtues of a different kind (e.g., courage, charitableness).  The 
studies also show that, in general, we cannot predict how an agent will behave in a novel 
situation in which a virtue is tested, even if that agent has always acted in accordance 
with that virtue in more familiar situations (Doris ibid.; Nisbett and Ross 1991).  In other 
words, upon observing that an agent has always behaved honestly in her personal 
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dealings (even when there has been temptation to lie), we cannot reliably predict that she 
will also behave honestly in, say, a business setting.  Suppose, then, that we have judged 
Zenobia to be good precisely because we have observed her always to keep her promises.  
If the situationist account of behavior is correct, then we will not be able to predict that 
she will keep her promise the present situation unless this situation is relevantly similar 
to others in which we have observed her to keep her promise.  If the situation with respect 
to which we are trying to predict Zenobia’s behavior is one in which she has made a 
promise to keep a secret—and not one in which she has promised to look after a friend’s 
child, to repay a debt, to be faithful to her spouse, to donate her kidney, etc.—then we 
should expect our prediction to be reliable only if we have previously observed Zenobia 
to keep her promises not to tell secrets.  However, we cannot reliably predict she will 
keep this promise if our basis for this prediction is merely our past observations of her 
having always kept her promises to care for her friend’s children. 
 Although I cannot here defend the situationist account of human behavior from its 
critics (for example, Epstein and O’Brien 1985), the very presence of a vibrant 
situationist research program in social psychology should be sufficient at least to raise 
significant doubts about how useful example B is as a foundation for the ultimate moral 
argument.  If situationism is correct, then example B-type predictions—predictions about 
how a person will behave based on observations about their moral character—are not 
likely to prove reliable and accurate.  Consequently, example B is not likely to be an 
example of a successful empirical prediction.  Thus, it does not offer promising evidence 
that our best current moral theories are instrumentally reliable to such a high degree that 
their reliability is best explained only by supposing  them to be approximately true. 
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7.4.3. A competing non-moral explanation of the predictive success of B1.   
For a defense of the situationist theory in social psychology, the best I can do is to refer 
readers to Ross and Nisbett (1991).  Since I have neither the space nor the expertise to 
mount such a defense myself, it might best that I do not rest the entirety of my case 
against example B on the success of situationism.  Fortunately, example B fails as a 
foundation for an ultimate moral argument for additional reasons that are independent of 
situationist considerations. 
 To see why example B fails, we will need to make several assumptions, all of 
which are concessions that favor the ethical naturalist in this context.  To begin, let us 
assume that there are character traits such as fidelity, and that persons who have these 
traits really do exhibit an unwavering tendency to behave in accordance with them across 
all the kinds of situations that human being normally encounter.  Let us grant, further, 
that several of these character traits are homeostatically clustered.  And let us suppose 
that there is at least one clustering of such traits such that all of the traits in that cluster 
are ones that we commonly think of as virtues.  To fill out this assumption with some 
detail, let us suppose that the properties or character traits fidelity, courage, temperance, 
humility, and kindness are homeostatically clustered for human beings: if a person has 
four of these traits to a high degree, then there is a much greater than average likelihood 
that they will have the fifth trait to at least a significant degree.  Finally, granting that 
these five properties are natural properties, I will use the non-moral term ‘N1’ to denote 
this natural property cluster. 
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 Above, I suggested that B1 should be viewed as a part of—or else as an 
implication of—a more general theory of morally good personhood.  We can now see 
what such a theory would look like.  If the above assumptions are granted, then the 
following moral theory could be used to underwrite B1: 
GP: a person, S, is morally good if and only if S instantiates N1. 
 
The question before us, as I see it, is whether the best explanation for our ability to 
successfully predict B4 on the basis of GP and the auxiliary premises B2 and B3 requires 
us to view GP as approximately true.  Can we explain the predictive success of GP just as 
well if we suppose that GP is false, and not even approximately true?  I think we can. 
 In order to explain how it is that proponents of GP are able to successfully predict 
B4, we need only to take on a commitment to the existence of the property cluster N1 and 
a commitment to the proposition that proponents of GP identify morally good 
personhood with N1.  These commitments do not require us to suppose that this identity 
claim is true.  What explains the ability of GP proponents to predict B4 is simply (i) the 
fact that they ascribe morally good personhood to all and only persons who instantiate N1 
and (ii) the fact that all persons who instantiate N1 always keep their promises, even at 
great cost to themselves.  I see no reason to think that this explanation is any worse than 
an explanation that takes GP to be approximately true.  Thus, the predictive success of 
GP does not commit us to realism about morally good personhood.  
 There is a potential objection to this line of argument that I need to address.  The 
objection is that my supposed explanation of GP’s success is not really a non-moral 
explanation, as I claim.  The trouble is that, in describing N1, I made use of the terms 
‘fidelity,’ ‘courage,’ ‘temperance,’ ‘humility,’ and ‘kindness.’  These terms are often 
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thought of as part of our moral vocabulary.  Perhaps one reason for this thought is that at 
least part of the linguistic function of these terms is evaluative: under normal 
circumstances, to call someone courageous is to praise her.  Unless there is a satisfying 
explanation of GP’s predictive success that can be stated entirely without recourse to 
moral vocabulary, it looks like we will find ourselves committed to moral realism after 
all.12 
 My own view is that, in their typical uses, terms like terms like ‘fidelity’ and 
‘courage’—the so-called “thick” moral terms—perform a dual function: first, they pick 
out a syndrome of behavioral or psychological dispositions; and second, they function 
either to praise the having of these dispositions, or else, to represent the possession of 
them as praiseworthy.  I believe that in certain contexts, these terms can be used in such a 
way that their second, evaluative function is suppressed or canceled.  When one of these 
terms is used in such a way, I contend, it no longer functions as part of moral vocabulary, 
but rather, as part of the vocabulary of psychology or some other social science (cf. 
Blackburn 1998: 101-104; Gibbard 1990: 112-115; Hare 1963: 24f).  As evidence that 
thick moral terms can be used in non-evaluative ways, consider the fact that we 
sometimes debate whether the character traits they denote really are virtues, i.e., whether 
or not they really are praiseworthy.  Now, in order to render GP plausible, I chose 
character traits whose status as virtues are unlikely to be disputed by contemporary 
secular ethicists (although I would not be surprised if some doubt whether humility is a 
virtue).  Consider, however, the following character traits, all of which have at one time 
or another been suggested to be virtues by speakers in our intellectual tradition: 
                                                
12 Sturgeon raises a similar objection against Harman’s supposed non-moral explanation of the judgment 
that setting the cat on fire is wrong (Sturgeon 2006a: 251). 
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cleanliness, chastity, frugality, humor, industriousness, loyalty, manliness, modesty, 
patience, patriotism, pride, religious faithfulness, selfishness, and tolerance.  It seems to 
me that there is nothing at all odd about asking of any item on this list whether it is a 
virtue.  If I am right, then there is no reason why the terms used to refer to these character 
traits cannot be construed as part of non-moral vocabulary, at least if we decide that the 
trait it picks out is not, upon reflection, a virtue.13  And if we allow this, then there seems 
to be no reason why an ethical nihilist (who holds that no character trait has the property 
of being a virtue) cannot utilize these terms as part of a lay psychological vocabulary that 
functions to pick out interesting behavioral and psychological dispositions.  It seems to 
me, then, that there should be no trouble with construing the five terms used to describe 
N1 as non-moral or non-evaluative, as I intended them. 
 For those who remain unconvinced, however, I recommend a different strategy: 
when describing N1, we should simply replace the thick moral terms with 
uncontroversially non-moral descriptions that pick out the very same character traits.  For 
instance, in place of the suggestion that one component of N1 is the property courage, we 
may instead pick out the relevant component property using the term ‘being disposed to 
remain calm and be steadfast in the face of great danger.’  This latter term, I take it, is 
uncontroversially non-moral.  In addition, it picks out the same character trait that most 
                                                
13 Note that I am not claiming—nor do I need to claim—that all putatively thick terms can be purged of 
their evaluative import.  I have doubts about whether one can use a racial epithet or ethnic slur non-
ironically without being understood by others to be denigrating people of the relevant race or ethnicity.  
The evaluative function of such terms is not cancelable in our language, as our language currently is.  But 
even if this is true for epithets and slurs, I do not think the same must be true for terms denoting character 
traits.  (On the other hand, it is worth observing that epithets sometimes evolve so as to lose their negative 
connotations.  This is arguably the case with the term ‘queer,’ which, despite seeing no significant change 
in the extension that it picks out, no longer implies a negative evaluation of those to whom it is applied, at 
least in many common contexts.  I hesitate to push this point too far, since it might be argued that these 
uses of ‘queer’ are merely ironic.  Still, it does seem to me that the term certainly is on a trajectory where it 
may eventually have an evaluatively neutral use that is perfectly earnest.) 
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uses of ‘courageous’ pick out.14  At any rate, I believe it comes close enough to give us 
confidence that some nearby non-moral property term will do the job.15  Utilizing this 
strategy, I believe it is possible to offer an explanation of the predictive success of GP 
using purely non-moral vocabulary. 
 
                                                
14 It might be objected that thick moral terms denote more than just a syndrome of behaviors.  What makes 
the term apply to those behaviors is that those behaviors are either appropriate or inappropriate, where 
‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ are moral terms, each denoting an irreducible moral property.  For 
example it might be said that ‘cowardice’ does not denote (something like) the property of feeling fear in 
situations that do not cause the average person to feel fear; instead, it denotes something like the property 
of taking fear in things that are inappropriate objects of fear.  If this is so, then we cannot replace 
‘cowardice’ with a thoroughly non-moral, non-normative term.  (And the problem, of course, is that it 
would be difficult to resist the conclusion that something similar holds for virtue terms, like ‘courage’ and 
‘fidelity’.)  Whatever the merits of this kind of argument, it does little good for the naturalist’s cause.  The 
problem is that what explains and predicts the coward’s behavior (e.g., her fleeing from the sight of a 
spider) is the fact that she is disposed to take fear in objects of a certain sort (e.g., spiders, or animals, or 
things that bite, etc.) and not the fact that these objects are inappropriate objects of fear.  That is to say, if 
cowardice is an irreducibly normative or evaluative property, then cowardice is never what explains or 
predicts a person’s behavior.  Similarly for other thick moral terms that are given this sort of analysis. 
15 I should acknowledge that some philosophers have expressed doubts about the prospects for such a 
maneuver to succeed.  For example, John McDowell writes, “It does not follow from the satisfaction of [the 
requirement that evaluative classifications are supervenient on non-evaluative classifications] that the set of 
items to which a supervening term is correctly applied need constitute a kind recognizable as such at the 
level supervened upon.  In fact supervenience leaves open this possibility…: however long a list we give of 
items to which a supervening term applies, described in terms of the level supervened upon, there may be 
no way, expressible at the level supervened upon, of grouping just such items together” (McDowell 
(1981/1998: 202).  To avoid confusion, I should make it clear that my proposal does not require that the 
extension (or, perhaps better: intension) picked out by the relevant non-moral term forms a natural kind 
from a non-moral point of view.  All it requires is that we can pick out that intension using non-moral 
vocabulary.  To do this, it is not required that the relevant intension corresponds to a natural kind from the 
non-moral point of view.  After all, most agree that there is no natural kind corresponding to ‘grue’; but for 
all that, it is not controversial that there is an intension that ‘grue’ picks out.   
 The more serious charge against my proposal, then, is that the natural property that ‘courage’ 
picks out has such a wildly heterogenous extension that it is simply beyond human capacity to describe this 
extension from anything other than a moral perspective.  I think it is plausible that this kind of situation 
arises with respect to the vocabularies of some sciences or disciplines that describe a certain class of facts 
and the vocabularies of those disciplines that describe the facts upon which the former facts supervene.  I 
would not be surprised, for instance, if there is no humanly possible way to pick out the intension the 
psychological predicate ‘pain’ using only the vocabulary of fundamental physics.  But that is not the 
situation that we are in with respect to moral vocabulary.  I am not suggesting that we pick out the natural 
property denoted by ‘courage’ by limiting ourselves to the vocabulary of fundamental physics; I am 
suggesting that we do so using (primarily, but not exclusively) the resources of personality psychology.  Of 
course, it could turn out that when we attempt a fully adequate non-moral description of the kind of person 
to whom ‘courageous’ is applied, we will find that the vocabulary of psychology and the rest of the 
sciences simply aren’t up to the task.  It seems to me, however, that the more natural position here is the 
optimistic one. 
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7.5. Example C: Predictions Grounded in a Causal-Moral Generalization. 
7.5.1. Does justice really cause social stability? 
Sturgeon himself locates the major weakness of example C.  The plausibility of C rests 
on its auxiliary premise, C2.  According to C2, the justice of a society implies (because it 
causes) social stability.  Sturgeon acknowledges, however, that “there is…a tradition that 
attacks this latter claim as a pious fiction” (1992: 106).  While I would not quite call C2 a 
pious fiction, I do think there is reason to doubt it.  As Brian Leiter writes, “it seems that 
justice provokes opposition as often as it produces allegiance: many people have little 
interest in just arrangements, and so resist them at every step” (Leiter 2001: 95).  Indeed, 
if, as I believe, a just society in the United States would more closely conform to RPJ 
than it does to its present socio-political arrangement, then it would be nothing short of 
naïve to suppose that movements towards justice would strengthen—rather than 
weaken—social stability, at least in the short term.  In order to satisfy Rawls’s principle 
2a (the so-called “difference principle”), there would surely need to be far greater 
taxation on the wealthiest individuals for the purposes of redistribution.  Unfortunately, 
there is a sizable constituency in the United States (which includes, not surprisingly, 
many of its wealthiest citizens) who view heavy taxation for such purposes as an affront 
to liberty and as deeply unjust.  These citizens would surely offer vocal—and very 
possibly destabilizing—resistance to any proposal to enact policies that would push the 
U. S. towards greater conformity with RPJ.  If this is correct, and if Rawls’s theory is our 
best theory of justice, then we cannot accurately predict that a society will be stable upon 
our observing that it satisfies RPJ. 
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7.5.2. Is C2 a non-negotiable condition of adequacy for theories of justice? 
Of course, if a society that is observed to satisfy RPJ is found to be unstable, then, rather 
than reject C2, we might reject Rawls’s theory of justice instead.  Indeed, Sturgeon 
suggests that we could use C2 as a means for selecting between alternative theories of 
justice.  By this methodology, if there is some plausible rival theory of justice, T, and if 
societies conforming to T exhibit stability (whereas societies conforming to RPJ do not), 
then we have reason to think that T, rather than Rawls’s theory, is true (cf. Sturgeon 
1991: 29).  Rawls himself appears to accept something like this as part of his own 
methodology: 
“It is…a consideration against a conception of justice that, in view of the laws of 
moral psychology, men would not acquire a desire to act upon it even when the 
institutions of their society satisfied it.  For in this case there would be difficulty 
in securing the stability of social cooperation” (Rawls 1971/1999: 119). 
 
It needs to be recognized, however, that both Rawls and Sturgeon suggest only that the 
tendency to stabilize is just one consideration among others for selecting a theory of 
justice.  Neither philosopher denies that there might be competing reasons with enough 
strength to justify our acceptance of a theory of justice that would not have a stabilizing 
effect when it is satisfied.  In other words, under certain circumstances, social instability 
is an acceptable theoretical (and practical) cost of a theory of justice.  But if we accept 
this possibility, then we have rejected C2. Consequently, it is not clear, after all, that 
Rawls (and, for that matter, Sturgeon) really accept C2; both philosophers allow the 
possibility that our best theory of justice fails to exert a stabilizing influence on society. 
 But suppose it is argued that C2 is a non-negotiable part of our criterion of theory 
selection when it comes to theories of justice.  By this way of thinking, we must reject 
any principles of justice that fail to make (or keep) a society stable when that society 
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satisfies them.  If we take this stance, then it all but guaranteed that our best theory of 
justice will make it possible to predict that certain societies are stable.16  But again, this 
approach compromises the independence of the moral theory from the relevant auxiliary 
hypotheses: C2 would become an important premise in the argument that leads to the 
construction and acceptance of our best theory of justice, whatever that turns out to be.  
Consequently, any prediction concerning the stability of a society on the grounds that it is 
(un)just would not be a novel prediction.  Because of this, we can again expect to have 
serious doubts about whether a realistic construal of the best theory of justice is really 
needed to explain its success in “predicting” the stability of societies that satisfy its 
conditions. 
 More importantly however, I think there is no good reason to hold C2 to be a non-
negotiable condition of theory selection.  I certainly agree, of course, that we should hope 
that the best theory of justice is such that the satisfaction of its principles has a stabilizing 
effect on societies.  At any rate, we should hope that our best principles of justice do not 
have a destabilizing effect on societies.  Since most of us very strongly want societies to 
be both stable and just, it would be a shame if we had to choose between these desiderata.  
Be that as it may, I see no reason why we should think that justice-making properties 
must be stabilizing.  Consider, first, a libertarian capitalist theory of justice of the sort 
advanced by Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).  The human 
tendency to experience envy being what it is, it may be that libertarian capitalist 
principles of justice, which permit radical economic inequality, simply cannot be satisfied 
by a society without resulting in significant social instability.  I suspect that this could be 
                                                
16 Or, at any rate, it is all but guaranteed that those societies will exhibit more stability than societies 
satisfying competing principles of justice. 
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true even if the economy of such a society succeeded in meeting the basic needs of the 
worst off.  If this is so, then this strikes me as a reason not to want to see such principles 
of justice realized.  But this does not strike me as a reason to think that those principles 
must be false.  I think something similar holds for the sorts of egalitarian principles of 
justice that I favor.  Human nature being what it is, it could turn out that egalitarian 
principles of justice would never be accepted by large segments of the most powerful 
groups in any given society.  If this were true, then such principles would make for a less 
stable arrangement than some other, less egalitarian principles of justice.  While such a 
fact might lead me to hesitate as to the matter of whether, all things considered, I would 
like to see egalitarian principles of justice realized, I am less inclined to worry that the 
instability would indicate the incorrectness of those principles.  It may simply be an 
unfortunate fact about human nature that the most just arrangement can never garner as 
wide an allegiance as some less just arrangement.  For this reason, it seems to me that C2 
should not be held as a non-negotiable condition of adequacy for theories of justice.   
  
7.5.3. Justice is not what explains stability. 
Finally, it seems to me that, to the extent that there is a causal or explanatory relationship 
between justice and stability, what explains the stability of a society is not the fact that 
the society satisfies principles of justice that are stance-independently true; rather, what 
explains the stability is the fact that the society satisfies principles of justice that are 
widely accepted by its members.  As long as a large enough segment of society can and 
does internalize and subscribe to its principles of justice—whatever they happen to be—it 
seems plausible to suppose that the society will be to that extent stable.  If this is correct, 
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then, unless a plausible case can be made for the claim that only the true principles of 
justice can be internalized by a vast supermajority of denizens living within the 
boundaries of a state—and I see no reason to think such a case will succeed—we should 
expect that even unjust states can exhibit a good deal of stability.17  But in that case, 
when a theory of justice, conjoined with C2, successfully predicts that a society is stable, 
this success can be satisfactorily explained without supposing that the theory is 
approximately true.  Thus, example C fails to show that the approximate truth of our best 
theory of justice is needed in order to explain the instrumental reliability of that theory. 
 
7.6. Moral Explanations and Interesting Generalizations.   
There is a final point that I need to address, although it is not entirely obvious to me 
where it fits in the current dialectic.  Brink and Sturgeon suggest that there are some 
moral explanations of non-moral facts that cannot be replaced by wholly non-moral 
explanations that cite instead only the non-moral supervenience base facts that realize 
those putative moral facts.  This sort of situation might occur when there are a number of 
distinct non-moral properties that can realize the same relevant moral property in 
different circumstances.  It may be that the instantiation of the moral property would have 
                                                
17 Against this, Brink suggests that sometimes “there will be cases where the causal efficacy and 
explanatory power of moral facts precede their recognition” (1989: 189; cf. Railton 1986: 192).  
Unfortunately, although Brink offers an illustration showing how this might happen, he offers nothing in 
the way of evidence to suggest that it ever actually does happen.  Moreover, the illustration that he offers 
(which involves a person who comes to unreflectively resent his social position despite his accepting an 
inegalitarian ideology according to which his own inegalitarian society counts as just) does not obviously 
preclude a satisfactory non-moral explanation.  Again, for example, it may simply be a fact about human 
nature that we resent it when some have more power and goods than we have.  (And this feature of human 
nature may be so recalcitrant that it operates even when we consciously accept inegalitarian principles of 
justice.)  If this was a fact of human nature, then it may well be true that the inequality of social 
arrangements causally contributes to resentment among those of a lower socio-economic status.  But we 
should expect this resentment to occur regardless of whether the true principles of justice are, in fact, 
egalitarian ones.  In fact, we should expect this resentment regardless of whether any principles of justice 
are true at all. 
241 
the same causal consequence no matter which of its potential non-moral realizer 
properties has realized it.  In that case, it could be argued that a better explanation of the 
effect in question would cite the higher-level, moral property (or the fact of its 
instantiation), rather than the lower-level, non-moral realizer property (Brink 1989: 193-
197; Sturgeon 1998: 201; 2006: 251f).   
 One reason that I am unsure how this fits into the present dialectic is that it is not 
clear how this consideration, if true, could be used to support an ultimate moral 
argument.  I suspect that it could support such an argument if it should turn out that 
theories that recognize the higher-level moral property make better, more accurate 
predictions than any theory that does not recognize it.   If so, then perhaps we will need to 
cite the approximate truth of those theories in order to explain their predictive success.  
However Brink and Sturgeon’s claim relates to the prospects for building an ultimate 
argument, I want to address their suggestion that, because explanations citing only non-
moral realizer properties might fail to capture “interesting generalizations”—
generalizations that a better explanation would illuminate—our best explanations of non-
moral facts might require us to make reference to moral properties. 
 I do not deny that Brink and Sturgeon are right when they suggest that if no non-
moral explanation can capture the right generalizations or support the right 
counterfactuals, then moral facts would be needed in our best explanation of some state 
of affairs or event.  I do not believe, however, that they have shown that it is likely that 
there really are regularities or generalizations or other phenomena for which a moral 
explanation is better than all competing non-moral explanations.  To begin with, consider 
explanations couched in terms of an agent’s moral character.  In §6.2.2 I noted that that 
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Sturgeon maintains that Hitler’s genocidal actions are explained by the fact that he was 
morally depraved.  In that same section, however, I pointed out that any explanation that 
did not go on to cite Hitler’s non-moral, depravity-making properties would be a poor 
explanation.  This is so because it isn’t true that Hitler would have ordered genocide if his 
depravity had been constituted by the non-moral properties of being dishonest or of being 
a pedophile rather than the non-moral properties of being homicidal or being sadistic.  
But once we have an explanation couched in terms of one (or both) of these latter 
properties, that explanation is not improved by adding the further claim that Hitler was 
morally depraved.  And indeed, such an addition would make for an inferior explanation 
insofar as it renders the explanation less parsimonious than it would otherwise be.  
Consequently, it seems that our best explanation of Hitler’s actions does not require that 
we cite his depravity. 
 Now the Hitler example is just one putative moral explanation.  So perhaps some 
better example can be found.  I contend, however, that the failure of the Hitler example 
places the burden of evidence on those who would claim that some moral explanations 
capture interesting generalizations that cannot be captured by wholly non-moral 
explanations.  Let us examine, then, the sorts of examples that the synthetic ethical 
naturalists offer to support the claim that some moral explanations cannot be replaced 
without explanatory loss. 
 Between the writings of Brink, Boyd, and Sturgeon, I am aware of only one 
example offered to illustrate a case in which an explanation of a non-moral fact that cites 
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only non-moral realizer properties is explanatorily inferior to a moral explanation.18  The 
example is Brink’s: 
…[R]acial oppression in South Africa consists in various particular social, 
economic, and legal restrictions present in South African society.  Now, it seems 
better to cite racial oppression as a cause of political instability and social protest 
in South Africa than the particular social, economic, and political restrictions, 
precisely because there would still have been racial oppression and instability and 
protest under somewhat different social, economic, and legal restrictions, and the 
only thing this large set of alternate possible social, economic, and legal bases of 
oppression have in common is that they realize racial oppression (it is very 
unlikely that there is a natural – nonmoral – social category that corresponds to 
this set) (1989: 195). 
 
 This example is unpersuasive.  In the first place, it is, again, doubtful whether the 
oppressiveness or the injustice of South Africa’s policies during the relevant period of 
time can explain the protest and instability independently of facts about what South 
African blacks (and sympathetic whites) thought about the system.  In other words, what 
explains the protest and instability is the fact that the socio-political arrangements 
violated principles of justice that blacks and sympathetic whites accepted or believed.  If 
so, then the protest and instability is to be expected regardless of whether those beliefs 
were true.  But then, the actual oppression or injustice is not what does the explaining.  
As support for the claim that what explains the instability are beliefs about what is unjust, 
rather than injustice itself, notice that most of the world’s population throughout human 
history has lived under political arrangements that are, by our own lights, seriously unjust 
or oppressive.  Liberal democracy, after all, is a fairly recent invention.  Most humans 
living under the jurisdiction of a state have lived under some form of aristocracy, 
monarchy, or oligarchy.  I take it that according to our own best theories of justice, all of 
                                                
18 To avoid misunderstanding: when I say that the relevant explanation cites only non-moral realizer 
properties, I do not mean that it cites no other non-moral properties (e.g., non-moral properties that no one 
thinks realizes any moral property).  I mean only that the explanation cites no moral properties in addition 
to the non-moral realizer properties. 
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these forms of government are unjust.  Moreover, most states that have existed 
throughout human history have been deeply sexist.  The oppression of women was often 
explicitly written into law, and when it wasn’t, it was condoned anyway.  Despite the 
injustice of these arrangements, many of these states managed long eras of internal 
stability.  It seems to me that if injustice or oppression—rather than merely the belief that 
one’s society is unjust or oppressive—is what explains political instability, this historical 
fact would be more surprising than it is.   
 Secondly, I do not concede Brink’s claim that there is no non-moral property 
realized by the various possible social, economic, and legal arrangements that are said to 
be potential realizers of racial oppression.  It is true that at present we may not have a 
convenient non-moral term for such a property; but I see no reason to think that such a 
term cannot be concocted.  As a first approximation, consider the following non-moral 
term: ‘being a socio-political system that allocates basic rights and privileges 
differentially on the basis of race.’  For convenience, let’s abbreviate this term with ‘N2.’  
Like racial oppression, the property picked out by ‘N2’ (viz., N2) can be realized by a 
multitude of different social, economic, and legal arrangements.  Indeed, it seems to me 
that any particular socio-political arrangement that realizes racial oppression also realizes 
N2.  A more difficult question, however, is whether every socio-political arrangement that 
realizes N2 also realizes racial oppression.  I think there is reason to doubt that they do.  
The trouble is that political systems that employ affirmative action programs to redress 
past racial injustices can arguably be said to allocate rights and privileges differentially 
on the basis of race.  If this is right, then those political systems will realize N2.  
Nevertheless, many of us do not view affirmative action programs to be unjust.  Thus, N2 
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will not be perfectly coextensive with racial injustice as this latter property is 
characterized by our best current moral theories. 
 I do not think this feature of N2 constitutes a serious problem with my objection to 
Brink’s argument.  In the first place, if we were really convinced that only a natural 
property that was perfectly coextensive (or co-intensive) with racial injustice can capture 
the right causal generalizations, then we could simply find a more complex non-moral 
term to replace ‘N2’, one that picks out a natural property that better mirrors the extension 
(or intension) of ‘racial injustice’ than N2 does.  I see no reason to be pessimistic that a 
term of this sort can be found.  But secondly, I am not convinced that only a natural 
property that is perfectly coextensive with racial oppression can do the explanatory work 
that we need of it.  In fact, a case can be made that reference to N2 makes for a superior 
explanation of the instability of certain societies.  There is anecdotal evidence that 
suggests that government programs allowing for the differential allocation of rights and 
privileges on the basis of race may cause instability even when they are employed with 
the goal of redressing past racial injustices.  The anecdotal evidence of which I speak is 
the resentment expressed by whites in the United States who complain of “reverse 
racism” in response to affirmative action programs that favor non-white minorities.  
Granted, these resentments are not expressed so loudly or intensely that we should say 
that they constitute or herald full-blown social instability or social protest.  But it seems 
to me that these resentments are no different in kind from the sort of resentments that 
ultimately lead to mass protest movements.  If I am right, then it may well be that 
reference to N2 makes for an even better explanation of social instability and social 
protest than does reference to racial oppression. 
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 I conclude, then, that naturalist moral realists have yet to provide a compelling 
example of a moral explanation of a non-moral fact that cannot be replaced without 
explanatory loss by a non-moral explanation.  We may conclude, further, that to the 
extent that our best theory of justice successfully predicts which societies will be 
unstable, we can satisfactorily explain this predictive success without supposing that that 
theory is true.  Nor is there any reason to think that a realist explanation would be better. 
 
7.7. Conclusion.   
The prospects for constructing a compelling ultimate moral argument in defense of moral 
realism are dim.  An argument of this sort consists of two premises.  First, it is claimed 
that our best current moral theories are highly instrumentally reliable—where this 
reliability is a measure of their success at making accurate empirical predictions (with 
special weight given to those predictions that are novel).  Second, it is claimed that the 
best explanation of this success requires that we suppose those moral theories to be 
approximately stance-independently true. 
 We have considered three examples of predictions derived from moral theories.  
None of these have furnished us with a compelling example of a (i) currently best moral 
theory that (ii) yields successful empirical predictions, where (iii) the best explanation of 
this success requires a realistic interpretation of that moral theory.  In the absence of 
convincing examples of predictions that have these characteristics, there can be no 
compelling ultimate moral argument.  While my discussion has obviously not considered 
all of the possible examples of moral prediction that might be offered, I believe that the 
(mis)fortunes of A, B, and C give us reason to be pessimistic that any others will do 
significantly better. 
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 Let me conclude by tying Chapters 6 and 7 together.  In Chapter 6, I argued that 
the most plausible a posteriori explanations of our accepting the moral theories that we 
accept (e.g., the evolutionary story) do not require us to suppose that those moral theories 
are approximately true, and thus, they do not require us to suppose that there are any 
stance-independent moral facts.  In addition, in the present chapter I have argued that 
moral facts are not needed in order to explain anything else, such as the apparent 
predictive successes of our best moral theories or the occurrence of historical events, such 
protests and revolts.  Because metaphysical naturalists are committed to a methodological 
principle that directs us to accept an ontological commitment only to those entities and 
kinds that are needed in our best a posteriori explanations of observable phenomena, 
metaphysical naturalists must reject moral realism; and because moral realism is a 
commitment of SEN, SEN must be rejected as well.  
248 
APPENDIX 
A DEFENSE OF MORAL TWIN EARTH FROM MISCELLANEOUS 
OBJECTIONS  
 
A. Appendix. 
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I defended the Moral Twin Earth argument against SEN from 
several objections.  In this appendix, I take up several additional responses to the MTE 
argument that have been made (or that might be made) on behalf of SEN.  
 
A.1. Adopting Partial Non-Cognitivism.   
Some have suggested that the appearance of moral disagreement between Earthlings and 
Twin Earthlings can be satisfactorily accounted for if, allowing that CSN or some other 
cognitivist semantics accounts for the content of ‘morally right’ is correct, we adopt a 
non-cognitivist semantics for the non-moral, “all things considered” ‘ought.’   Something 
like this strategy is hinted at by David Copp (2000: 120-124); but it been expressed more 
explicitly, and developed in greater depth, by David Merli (2002). 
 Merli distinguishes an “all-in” use of ‘ought’ from the term’s moral, prudential, 
and aesthetic uses.  He sometimes refers to this kind of ought as “the last ought before 
action.”  His idea is that, even when it is settled by our moral theory that φ is morally 
obligatory (and thus, that we morally ought to φ), there remains a further question about 
whether one ought to φ.  For instance, there may be cases in which φ-ing exacts such a 
large a cost on an agent that it simply “makes more sense” for the agent to abide by what 
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he prudentially ought to do, rather than by what he morally ought to do.  With this 
distinction in hand, Merli writes, 
There is, I think, another way of thinking about the last ought before action.  This 
combines realism about moral discourse with expressivism about all-in 
endorsement.  According to this view, moral rightness is a matter of natural fact, 
but an answer to the question of what to do...is not a factual judgment but an 
endorsement of one course of action or one set of reasons for action.  When I get 
behind doing the [morally] right thing, I’m expressing my acceptance of certain 
norms, or urging others to act accordingly, or something along these lines (2002: 
236). 
 
This combination of views allows the defender of SEN to make sense of the disagreement 
between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings without having to deny that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ 
express different natural properties.  When an Earthling and a Twin Earthling are 
debating whether or not to perform an organ harvest, the locus of their disagreement is 
not about whether the act is morally right; instead, their disagreement is a non-moral 
disagreement about whether to perform it.  Each party is prescribing (or expressing their 
endorsement of) the action or its omission.  Since their disagreement takes place with 
respect to all-in ought judgments, rather than moral ought judgments, we may still 
maintain that ‘morally right’ and t-‘morally right’ express different natural properties, as 
is entailed by CSN.  Importantly, however, because they have a disagreement in attitude 
(at the level of all-in ought judgments), we do not need to view the parties as having a 
merely verbal disagreement.  In this manner, it might be argued that the problem of 
chauvinistic conceptual relativism is avoided.  Because of this, the pressure to view 
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings as expressing the same content with their respective uses 
of ‘morally right’ is greatly diminished. 
 There are two problems with the “partial non-cognitivist” strategy.  First, Merli’s 
proposal seems to require that the disagreement between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings, 
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though substantive, isn’t really a moral disagreement.  However, it is easy enough to 
imagine a case of disagreement where this result is incorrect.  We may easily suppose 
that the Earthlings and Twin Earthlings find themselves in a situation in which they agree 
that prudential, aesthetic, legal, and etiquettical considerations are all of negligible 
relevance to the decision of whether or not to perform, say, an organ harvest; in such a 
situation, the question of whether to perform the act will hinge entirely on the question 
what there is most moral reason to do.  Unfortunately, as before, it is hard to make sense 
of the Earthlings’ and Twin Earthlings’ disagreement about what there is most moral 
reason to do if we accept CSN; for, if CSN were true, each party’s judgment about what 
there is most moral reason to do will be incommensurable with the judgments of the other 
party.1 
 The second problem with Merli’s proposal is that concedes too much to the moral 
non-cognitivist opponents of moral realism.2  Moral realists have long argued against 
moral non-cognitivism on the grounds that the latter view: (a) requires us to view the 
declarative surface grammar of moral utterances as misleading, (b) cannot make good 
sense of moral sentences embedded in conditional statements, (c) cannot make good 
sense of the apparent logical validity of arguments involving moral predicates, and (d) 
cannot make good sense of our practice of predicating truth of some moral sentences 
(Brink 1989: 25; 87; 1999: 197ff; Shafer-Landau 2003: 23f).  Unfortunately, if 
naturalistic moral realists adopt non-cognitivism about the all-in ought, they would find 
                                                
1 One might be tempted to respond to this objection by proposing that, in this circumstance, their 
disagreement is over which party’s moral norms to all-in accept.  Whatever the merits of this kind of 
maneuver, it seems to me to concede a too much to certain non-cognitivist treatments of moral judgments.  
In particular, the view that emerges from this way of viewing the parties’ disagreement is strikingly similar 
to the norm-expressivist account of moral judgment advanced by Alan Gibbard (1990). 
2 By ‘moral non-cognitivist’ I mean someone who advances a non-cognitivist account to moral judgments, 
as opposed merely to some other sort of practical judgment (such as all-in ought judgments, or prudential 
ought judgments, etc.). 
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themselves obliged to answer these very same objections—only now with respect to all-
in ought judgments, rather than moral judgments.  To see that this is so, consider the 
following argument: 
1. We (all-in) ought to perform the organ harvest only if we have sterile 
instruments. 
2. It is not the case that we have sterile instruments. 
3. Therefore, it is not the case that we (all-in) ought to perform the organ harvest. 
 
This argument is perfectly intelligible.  The premises and the conclusion each have a 
declarative form.  In the first premise, an all-in ‘ought’ appears embedded in the 
antecedent of a conditional statement.  Moreover, the argument appears to be logically 
valid in the form of modus tollens.  And finally, it is easy enough to imagine situations in 
which we will want to say that all of the premises and the conclusion are true.  Thus, it 
should be clear that all of the same phenomena that are thought to raise trouble for non-
cognitivism about moral judgments arise with respect to all-in ought judgments as well.  
This fact poses a dilemma for the proponent of SEN who would avail himself of the 
partial non-cognitivist solution to Moral Twin Earth:  On the one hand, if he cannot 
answer the standard objections to non-cognitivism, then his solution fails for all the same 
reasons that moral non-cognitivism fails.  On the other hand, if he succeeds in answering 
the standard objections to non-cognitivism, then he has vastly improved the fortunes of 
his metaethical rivals, the moral non-cognitivists.  Indeed, once it is shown that non-
cognitivism about all-in ought judgments is a viable position, it is hard to see why we 
shouldn’t adopt non-cognitivism about moral judgments as well.  Given the advantages 
that moral non-cognitivism has over moral realism with respect to ontological parsimony 
and an explanation of the intimate (even if contingent) connection between moral 
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judgment and motivation,3 the concessions that Merli’s proposal requires may well prove 
fatal for moral realism.  At a minimum, however, these concessions deprive moral 
realism of a great many advantages over moral non-cognitivism that are often claimed on 
its behalf. 
 
A.2. Brink’s Counterfactual Causal Regulation Account of Reference 
Before offering his own preferred moral semantics (BMS, discussed in Chapter 4), Brink 
proposes a revision to Boyd’s causal regulation theory of reference.  This revision 
promises to render the application of Boyd’s theory of reference to moral vocabulary less 
vulnerable to MTE-type counterexamples.  He suggests that Boyd’s account be revised so 
that we understand causal regulation in the following way:  “[A] natural property N 
causally regulates a speaker’s use of moral term ‘M’ just in case his use of ‘M’ would be 
dependent on his belief that something is N, were his beliefs in dialectical equilibrium” 
(2001: 169).   
 Because Brink does not ultimately endorse the resulting semantics as answer to 
MTE, I will not discuss it in depth.  I do, however, want to make brief note of two 
objections to it.  First, it can easily be shown that a moral semantics that incorporates this 
                                                
3 Naturally, those who accept a strong link between moral judgment and motivation—such as the link 
expressed by MJI (see §1.5.5)—will find a non-cognitivist treatment of moral judgments more congenial 
that cognitivist-realist treatment.  However, realists such as Brink and Sturgeon deny MJI.  Still, there is a 
weaker kind of internalism that is to my mind less vulnerable, less easy to reject than MJI is.  I have in 
mind a form of internalism that asserts not a necessary link between an individual’s moral judgments and 
her motivation, but rather a necessary link between the having of a moral vocabulary by a community, and 
the motivational tendencies of its members.  Roughly, this form of internalism holds that it is not possible 
that there be a community of speakers that have a moral vocabulary (and who make moral judgments) 
where the large majority of these speakers are not regularly motivated to act in accordance with those 
judgments.  We may call this claim global internalism.  (Something like this form of internalism is 
suggested by James Lenman [1999: 445f].  He denies the possibility of a form of “global” amoralism, 
where global amoralism is essentially the contradictory of my global internalism.)  The truth of even this 
weaker form of internalism seems hard to explain given the naturalist moral realist’s understanding of 
moral judgment.  Thus, if true, global internalism arguably favors a non-cognitivist construal of moral 
discourse. 
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understanding of causal regulation leads to a view of moral facts that is incompatible with 
moral realism.  In particular, it leaves no room for the possibility that our ideal moral 
theory is false.  Here is why: when Brink’s counterfactual account of causal regulation is 
conjoined with CSN, facts about what moral theory we would accept under ideal 
epistemic conditions themselves fix the referents of our moral terms.  This feature of the 
present proposal violates realism’s stance-independence requirement.4 
 A second problem for Brink’s proposal is that it is hard to see how the revised 
understanding of causal regulation is supposed to shield CSN from MTE-type 
counterexamples.  H&T’s stipulations are consistent with the assumption that both 
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings would accept different moral theories even when their 
respective beliefs are in dialectical equilibrium.5  Unless this stipulation renders the MTE 
example incoherent, and I see no reason to think that it does, then even the revised 
version of CSN wrongly entails that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express different content. 
 
                                                
4 Brink appears to acknowledge this in (2001:  175f, especially note 34).  In fact, he seems to suggest that 
genuine moral realism is incompatible with—or at any rate, fits uncomfortably with—Boyd’s causal theory 
of reference as Boyd himself formulates it.  (I think this is incorrect; but if I am wrong, then so much the 
worse for moral realists who would avail themselves of Boyd’s semantics.) 
5 While Brink contends that there is no a priori reason to think that a common moral theory would not 
emerge for all rational creatures whose beliefs are in dialectical equilibrium (2001: 170), the proposed 
response to MTE that we are presently examining requires more than just the possibility that there would be 
convergence in moral belief; it requires that such convergence is necessary.  The reason why is that, if it is 
so much as possible that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings fail to converge in the moral theories they accept 
in dialectical equilibrium, then an MTE-type counterexample can be concocted to refute the revised 
Boydian semantics.  Thus, to sustain the case that the revision of Boyd’s semantics avoids MTE, Brink 
needs to make the much stronger claim that we have good reason to believe that there could not be a 
divergence in moral theory under conditions of dialectical equilibrium.  With respect to this strong claim, it 
seems to me that skepticism is perfectly warranted as a default position. 
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A.3. Boyd’s Achievement Explanation Condition.   
A.3.1. The achievement explanation condition and practical success.   
On Boyd’s most recent formulation of his theory of reference, the mere fact that a term, t, 
is causally regulated by the properties of a given phenomenon, p, is not sufficient to 
establish that that t refers to p.  What is required, in addition, is that “the epistemic access 
which uses of t affords [sic] speakers to the real properties of p must (help to) explain the 
theoretical and/or practical successes achieved in the domains of inquiry or of practice to 
which t-talk is central” (Boyd 2003a: 515; cf. 538).  Boyd calls this the achievement 
explanation condition for reference.6  Given the addition of this condition to his 
semantics, it follows that Moral Twin Earth is a problem for SEN only if we can 
coherently add a further stipulation to the Twin Earth story: where it is stipulated that 
Twin Earthling uses of t-‘right’ are causally regulated by Td properties, we must be able 
to add the further stipulation that the fact of this causal regulation helps to explain the 
successes Twin Earthlings achieve in employing moral terms like ‘right.’7  (Similarly, we 
must be able to stipulate coherently that the causal regulation of ‘right’ by Tc properties 
on Earth helps to explain Earthling successes achieved through the use of moral 
discourse.)8 
 To evaluate whether Boyd’s achievement explanation condition poses a threat to 
Moral Twin Earth, we would need to know what would count as a theoretical or practical 
                                                
6 In other contexts, Boyd calls it the accommodation condition. 
7 For Boyd, a term’s affording us epistemic access to a phenomenon, p, consists in the fact that p causally 
regulates the use of t.  (In the later formulation of his theory of reference, the causal regulation condition is 
dubbed the epistemic access condition, see Boyd 2003a: 538.) 
8 In adding the achievement explanation condition to his semantics, Boyd cannot be accused of making an 
ad hoc modification for dealing with Moral Twin Earth.  He adds the achievement explanation condition 
with the goal of addressing problems of referential indeterminacy that have long posed a challenge to 
causal theories of reference.  His actual motivation for this modification, as far as I am aware, has nothing 
to do with worries about MTE-type cases. 
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success of moral discourse.  In the natural sciences, it does not seem all that difficult to 
identify such success.  Using scientific theories, we are able to make impressive 
predictions about observable phenomena.  Especially important for the successfulness of 
a theory are those predictions that are “novel,” i.e., those predictions that were not 
utilized in the construction of that theory.9  To give an example relevant to the concern at 
hand, we may plausibly suppose that our scientists’ practical achievement of detonating a 
nuclear bomb (and their ability to predict the conditions under which this achievement is 
possible) is to be at least partially explained by the fact that the discourse of our best 
physical theories, which include terms like ‘proton,’ ‘neutron,’ and ‘electron,’ is causally 
regulated by protons, neutrons, electrons, and their properties.  When we turn our 
attention to the supposed theoretical and practical achievements of moral discourse, 
however, it is not obvious what those achievements might be.  I have already argued in 
Chapter 7 that moral properties and facts do not seem to play any ineliminable role in the 
best explanations of whatever practical successes we have achieved utilizing that 
discourse.  On the face of it, this finding would seem to imply that, to the extent that our 
moral terms are causally regulated by certain natural properties, the fact that these terms 
are causally regulated in this way does not help to explain any theoretical or practical 
successes achieved using them.  If so, then it follows from Boyd’s updated semantics that 
the central terms of our moral discourse fail to refer.  In that case, moral nihilism is true 
and moral realism is false. 
  
                                                
9 Several examples of this kind of predictive success were discussed in §6.5.2. 
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A.3.2. Practical success as facilitating well-being.   
Perhaps the argument of the previous section is too hasty.  Although Boyd acknowledges 
that “it is a controversial issue just what sorts of successes would count as moral 
successes,” he suggests, nevertheless that what we achieve (or what we can achieve) 
through our use of moral discourse is “the well-being of people generally” (Boyd 2003a: 
516f, 2003b: 36, emphasis in the original).  Now, I count myself among those who are 
skeptical that such an achievement, if it is real, is best viewed as a success of moral 
theory, rather than, say, psychological theory.10  But let us waive this skepticism and 
suppose that moral discourse really does play an indispensable role in our achieving the 
well-being of people.  With this supposition granted, those who would press the MTE 
argument against Boyd’s semantics must make plausible the further stipulations that (a) 
Twin Earthlings are able to successfully achieve some measure of well-being through 
employing terms like t-‘right’ etc., and (b) this success is partly explained by the fact that 
Td properties causally regulate the use of their terms like t-‘right’ etc.   
 What are the prospects for the anti-naturalist defender of MTE with respect to 
meeting this challenge?  Can an MTE scenario be described that coherently incorporates 
these two additional stipulations? 
 One thing that makes answering these questions difficult is that the question of 
what constitutes well-being itself depends upon the results of first-order theories in 
axiology.  Presumably, then, the term ‘well-being’ as used on Twin Earth is causally 
regulated by a different natural property than the natural property that regulates its use on 
                                                
10 Provided that I have a fairly clear idea of the sort of mental or physical condition that I want to be in (i.e., 
of what sort of property I view as flourishing-making), I do not seek out the writings of philosophers for 
advice on how to achieve this condition; for that, I address my inquiries to psychologists, nutritionists, and 
physical trainers.  I expect things would be no different if I were concerned to discover how best to bring 
about this condition for a multitude of people in my community, rather than just myself. 
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Earth.  This raises the question of whose standard of well-being we should use to 
determine whether Twin Earthlings have succeeded in achieving some level of 
flourishing.  There appears to be three options:  First, Twin Earthlings’ success in 
achieving well-being should be judged by their own Twin Earthling standards (i.e., by the 
standards prescribed by the theory Td, which specifies the essences of the properties to 
which Twin moral terms putatively refer).  Second, we should judge Twin Earthlings’ 
successes using our own Earthling axiological standards; that is, we credit Twin Earthling 
individuals with achieving a measure of flourishing when they exemplify the natural 
property that causally regulates our own Earthling uses of ‘well-being’ and ‘flourishing,’ 
i.e., a property specified by Tc.  And the final option is that we should judge their and our 
own successes by some very broad axiological theory that is somehow compatible with 
both Td and Tc. 
 Now, it is not entirely clear to me how the third option can be worked out.  
Presumably, the axiologies associated with Td and Tc respectively will give divergent 
verdicts about the welfare-value of at least some lives.  If they do, it is hard to see how to 
formulate a broad, substantive axiology that is compatible with both evaluative theories.  
For this reason, I recommend that we set option three aside.  Let’s consider, instead, the 
first option.  According to this, we are to judge Twin Earthlings’ practical successes using 
the axiological standards enshrined in their own moral theory, Td.  Under this constraint, I 
see no reason why it is impossible that there be a scenario where Twin Earthling 
discourse satisfies Boyd’s achievement explanation condition.  Presumably, well-being 
for a Twin Earthling consists in living a life in accordance with some standard prescribed 
by Td.  This standard specifies what natural properties must be instantiated by a life in 
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order for it to count as flourishing for Twin Earthlings.  If, in fact, these natural properties 
are what causally regulate Twin uses of t-‘good,’ then it would seem that Twin Earthlings 
can come to better know the relevant axiological standard by investigating which natural 
properties regulate their uses of this predicate.  In turn, this knowledge would seem to 
facilitate their success at satisfying this axiological standard, i.e., their success at living 
good, flourishing lives.  To put all of this together:  The causal regulation of t-‘good’ by 
these natural properties explains Twin Earthlings’ knowledge of their own axiological 
standard; this knowledge explains their ability to satisfy this standard, and thus, to 
successfully achieve flourishing.  Assuming the transitivity of explanation, then, we may 
conclude that the causal regulation of twin moral discourse by the relevant natural 
properties explains the practical successes achieved by Twin Earthlings through utilizing 
that moral discourse.  If all of this may be coherently conceived, then there is no problem 
describing a Twin Earth scenario in which Twin Earthlings satisfy both Boyd’s causal 
regulation condition and the achievement explanation condition for reference.  The 
addition of the achievement explanation condition to Boyd’s semantics does not threaten 
the cogency of the MTE argument. 
 It might be argued, however, that when judging the practical successes of twin 
moral discourse, we should do so utilizing our own Earthling standard of human 
flourishing, as captured by Tc.  This is the second option mentioned above.  Hitherto, I 
have not specified what sort of axiology is incorporated into Tc.  Let’s suppose that Tc 
includes a simple hedonist theory of well-being.  (According to this theory, the well-
being of a life is a measure of the amount of pleasure the life contains, minus the amount 
of pain it contains.)  By contrast, we should suppose that the axiology of Td is a non-
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hedonistic theory (perhaps it is a form of perfectionism).  Even with these stipulations, I 
see no reason to think that a coherent MTE scenario cannot be told according to which 
the causal regulation of twin moral discourse by Td properties nevertheless explains the 
Twins’ practical success at achieving a high level of flourishing, where this flourishing is 
measured by the hedonistic axiology (which, we are supposing, the Twin Earthlings do 
not themselves accept).  This could be explained by Twin Earthlings’ different 
psychological temperament.  Due to their temperament, the Twin Earthlings best achieve 
well-being by hedonist standards when they collectively subscribe to, and act in 
accordance with, their deontological theory of rightness and perfectionist theory of value.  
In this way, twin moral discourse could satisfy the achievement explanation condition 
even when we measure their success by our own Earthling standard of well-being.11   
  
A.3.3. Predictive success.   
It may be worth considering one more example of putative practical success that is 
arguably facilitated by moral discourse.  In Chapter 7, I discussed several examples of 
empirical predictions generated by moral theories.  As I suggested in §A.3.1 above, I 
believe that the arguments I advance in that chapter warrant the conclusion that, if natural 
properties do causally regulate the use of our moral terms, this fact is not part of the best 
explanation of the successful predictions we make using those terms and our best moral 
                                                
11 Against this, the defender of SEN may insist that, in the case I have described, Tc properties rather than 
Td properties are what are regulating the Twins’ use of moral terms, even if the Twins are unaware of this.  
I do not know exactly how this objection would proceed, but I see a temptation to make it.  In any event, I 
think it can be sidestepped.  I see no reason to insist that Twin Earthlings’ use of moral terms succeed in 
referring to Td properties only if the regulation between their terms and the Td properties help to explain the 
Twins’ ability to achieve well-being by our Tc standards.  For if we did insist on such a condition, we 
would be forced to conclude that, where the regulation of moral terms by Td properties fails to result in and 
explain the Twins’ success at achieving well-being by our Earthling standards, twin moral terms simply fail 
to refer, even if they achieve success by their own standards.  It seems to me that this sort of construal of 
the MTE scenario is unmotivated, at least given realist assumptions about moral discourse. 
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theories.  But suppose I am wrong about this.  Let us revisit the example involving 
empirical predictions based on judgments about an agent’s moral character and consider 
its implications for MTE, given Boyd’s achievement explanation condition.   The 
question before us is this: can we coherently imagine that Twin Earthlings are able to 
make successful predictions of this sort utilizing their own moral vocabulary and moral 
theories (while, at the same time, Earthlings are also able to achieve a similar success 
using their moral vocabulary and moral theories)?  I see no reason to think not.  Horgan 
and Timmons’ have already stipulated that Twin Earthlings tend to perform those actions 
that they judge to be “right.”  Since we know that the sorts of actions that they judge to be 
right are just those actions that treat no one as a mere means, and since, presumably, 
Twin Earthlings apply t-‘good’ roughly to all and only those agents who have an 
especially strong tendency to perform only actions that treat no one as a mere means, 
Twin Earthlings should be able to make successful predictions about the behavior of 
those to whom t-‘good’ is properly applied.  For example, suppose that some Twin 
Earthlings properly judge that t-‘good’ applies to Dr. Smith.  And suppose, further, that 
they properly judge that t-‘wrong’ applies to any act of organ harvesting, because such 
acts involve treating someone as a mere means.  Given these facts, we should expect 
Twin Earthlings will be able to successfully predict that Dr. Smith will not perform the 
act of organ harvesting.12  If so, then, again, there seems to be no reason to deny that a 
coherent MTE scenario can be described in which Boyd’s achievement explanation 
condition for reference is satisfied along with his causal regulation condition. 
                                                
12 Given the sorts of complaints I raise above in §7.4.2, this may be false.  But again, I am waiving those 
complaints here in order to make favorable assumptions on behalf of naturalistic moral realism. 
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 Perhaps there are further examples of achievements that are won through the use 
of moral discourse that yield more favorable results for naturalistic moral realists with 
respect to the present concern.  If so, I do not know what those examples are.  Until such 
examples are produced, I believe that the above considerations license us in concluding 
for now that that Boyd’s amended semantics poses no special problem for the Moral 
Twin Earth argument.  
 
A.4. Partial denotation.  
H&T formulate Boyd’s CSN in such a way that it requires a natural property to uniquely 
causally regulate the use of a moral term t in order for that property to be designated by t.  
However, in his (1988: 226) Boyd leaves open the possibility that more than one natural 
property causally regulates our use of ‘right.’  In a scenario of this kind, according to 
Boyd, the term ‘rightness’ would partially denote each of those properties.13  A plausible 
illustration of partial denotation is provided by the kind term ‘jade.’  It is often claimed 
that ‘Jade’ partially denotes the mineral jadeite and partially denotes the mineral 
nephrite.14  Given Boyd’s semantics, the explanation for this is presumably that our use 
of ‘jade’ is causally regulated by both kinds of mineral.  (In addition, we may have to add 
that neither mineral better explains the achievements of ‘jade’-talk than the other). 
 With respect to the MTE scenario, an appeal to partial denotation might be 
thought to furnish a way to provide a common referent for ‘rightness’ and t-‘rightness’: 
                                                
13 Here I follow Boyd in using the term ‘denotes’ to express the semantic relationship between a term and a 
kind or property.  While some philosophers draw a distinction between the semantic relations expressed by 
‘denotes,’ ‘refers,’ and ‘designates,’ others seem to use these terms interchangeably.  For the purposes of 
this appendix, I follow the latter practice.   
14 As far as I know, this claim entered the philosophical literature through Putnam (1975b: 241).  I have 
seen it repeated in a number of commentaries on Putnam, usually without objection. 
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just as ‘jade’ partially denotes jadeite and partially denotes nephrite, it might be argued 
that ‘rightness’ and t-‘rightness’ both partially denote both maximizing utility and treating 
no one as a mere means.  If so, these two terms have a common denotation; moreover, 
their corresponding predicates (‘right’ and t-‘right’) express a common content.  Because 
of this, it might be argued, CSN does not entail a form of conceptual relativism with 
respect to the MTE scenario. 
 The partial denotation reply will note work.  The trouble becomes apparent when 
we consider what we should say about the truth-conditions of sentences in which partially 
denoting terms occur.  To see the trouble, let’s return to the example involving ‘jade.’  
Consider, first, a relatively unproblematic sentence: ‘Jade is a mineral.’  This sentence 
attributes to jade a property that, as it happens, is instantiated by both jadeite and 
nephrite.  Because of this, there seems to be no difficulty in holding that ‘Jade is a 
mineral’ expresses a truth.  The more difficult case involves a sentence such as ‘Jade is 
partly composed of aluminum.’  If ‘jade’ uniquely denoted jadeite, this sentence would 
express a truth, since jadeite is partly composed of aluminum.  If ‘jade’ uniquely denoted 
nephrite, this sentence would express a falsehood, since nephrite is not partly composed 
of aluminum.  However, as things actually are, ‘jade’ does not uniquely denote either of 
these minerals; rather, it partially denotes both.  What, then, is the truth-value of ‘Jade is 
partly composed of aluminum’?  There seems to be two salient options.  First, we can say 
that the truth-value of this sentence is indeterminate.  Second, we could say that, relative 
to one disambiguation, the sentence is true, and relative to another disambiguation, it is 
false (cf. Field 1973). 
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 Assuming that ‘rightness’ and t-‘rightness’ partially denote maximizing utility and 
treating no one as a mere means, the same interpretive decision is forced on us with 
respect to certain moral sentences.  Consider, for example, the question of what truth-
value we should assign to the sentence ‘the organ harvest instantiates rightness.’  Given 
that the organ harvest has the property of maximizing utility, but lacks the property of 
treating no one as a mere means, and given supposition that ‘rightness’ partially denotes 
both of these properties, it seems that we are forced to say either that the sentence in 
question has an indeterminate truth-value, or else that it is true according to one 
disambiguation of ‘rightness,’ but false with respect to another. 
 Whichever of these options we choose, the prospects for building a satisfying 
defense of SEN against MTE are dim.  In the first place, the reason for supposing that 
‘jade’ partially denotes jadeite and nephrite (at least, assuming the truth of Boyd’s causal 
regulation semantics), is that both of these minerals causally regulate our uses of ‘jade.’  
If only one of these minerals had causally regulated the use of ‘jade,’ it would be wrong 
to say that ‘jade’ partially denotes both.  Notice, however, that in the MTE story, it is 
stipulated that only one property (maximizing utility) causally regulates the use of 
‘rightness’ while a different, but unique, property (treating no one as a mere means) 
causally regulates the use of t-‘rightness.’  Given this stipulation, there is simply no 
justification for supposing that ‘rightness’ and t-‘rightness’ both partially denote the same 
properties.  To suggest this is to ignore the way the scenario is described.  Consequently, 
the observation that ‘moral rightness’ might partially denote different properties on our 
planet in the actual world does nothing to supply the naturalist moral realist with a reply 
to MTE. 
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 At best, the appeal to partial denotation might be employed to answer concerns 
about a moral term being regulated by multiple distinct natural properties within a single 
linguistic community.  But even here it does no good.  If our use of ‘rightness’ is causally 
regulated by multiple distinct natural properties, then in any circumstance in which these 
properties fail to be coextensive, an attribution of moral rightness will be indeterminate.  
If, for example, ‘right’ were causally regulated by both Tc and Td properties, it would 
follow that, prior to any disambiguation, there is simply no fact of the matter as to 
whether (e.g.) it is right to keep our promises when the utility of breaking them is greater.  
This seems to me to be a problem: while it is certainly unfair to require of moral realism 
that every act-token have a determinate moral status, this sort of indeterminacy is just too 
easy to stumble upon.  The result would be that in all cases where consequentialists and 
deontologists reasonably disagree about the moral status of an act (where this 
disagreement is not due to ignorance of the non-moral facts), there would be no 
determinate answer as to who, if anyone, is correct.  Surely this is too much 
indeterminacy. 
 I have suggested that, under the present assumptions, the partial denotation of 
moral terms would render too many moral utterances indeterminate with respect to their 
truth-values.  To avoid this result, we might insist that partially denoting moral terms that 
appear in utterances must be disambiguated before we attempt to assign truth-values to 
those utterances.  This maneuver permits us to say of the sentence, ‘Breaking promises to 
maximize utility instantiates rightness,’ that it is true according to one disambiguation of 
‘rightness,’ but false according to another disambiguation.  Thus, there is no need to posit 
rampant indeterminacy. 
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 The trouble with the disambiguation approach is that it leaves it unclear which 
disambiguation of ‘rightness’ to use in which context.  If there are no general rules to 
guide us, then partisans of deontology may simply insist that we always understand their 
uses of ‘rightness’ to denote treating no one as a mere means; meanwhile partisans of 
consequentialism might insist that we always understand their uses of ‘rightness’ to 
denote maximizing utility.  But this is surely unacceptable; for it implies the most vulgar 
kind of moral subjectivism.  But suppose that we are optimistic that rules for 
disambiguation can be found.  What might those rules be?  With respect to utterances of 
‘jade’ it is natural to suppose that the principle of charity dictates which disambiguation 
to select.  That is to say, we should select the interpretation of ‘jade’ that makes more of 
the speaker’s beliefs come out true.  But notice that, if we try to apply this principle to 
uses of ‘rightness,’ we will very likely be plunged back into moral subjectivism.  For if 
someone subscribes to Td, then surely the way to make most of her utterances involving 
‘rightness’ to come out true is to suppose that the term denotes treating no one as a mere 
means.  Likewise, if someone subscribes to Tc, then the way to make most of his 
utterances of ‘rightness’ come out true is by taking the term to denote maximizing utility.  
This kind of moral subjectivism, whereby the truth-conditions of a person’s moral 
utterances depend upon whichever moral standard she happens to subscribe to, almost 
certainly violates moral realism’s stance independence requirement; and so, it would 
seem to entail the falsity of moral realism.  But whatever the case may be, this form of 
subjectivism is surely an unappealing metaethical commitment in its own right.  I 
conclude then, that the adoption of a partial denotation maneuver cannot be used to 
rescue naturalistic moral realism from the MTE argument. 
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